Mixed messages are coming from Washington, says Asmaa El-Husseini Over the last five years, attention has been directed away from conditions in southern Sudan to the issue of Darfur, thus overlooking the serious threats of a north-south war re-erupting. Outstanding problems remain between the two ruling parties in Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), both of which signed a peace agreement in 2005 establishing an interim period until 2011. At that point, southerners will take part in a referendum to decide between splitting from Sudan or remaining part of a unified country. The increase of tribal violence in southern Sudan over the last few months has rung an alarm bell for everyone, as it has caused more victims than those in Darfur over the same period of time. In response, the United States recently invited both ruling parties to Washington to discuss their outstanding issues, an attempt to play a positive role in containing the crisis between the two partners over the oil-rich Abyei region on which the international arbitration council will soon issue a ruling that is expected to cause problems in the region. It was also an attempt to contain other problems related to the referendum, borders, and the census, among others. The Washington conference attended by 30 Sudanese politicians and 170 observers from 32 states and international organisations did not reap any decisive results regarding the issues of the dispute between the Sudanese partners in rule. Some described it as beginning a process rather than as putting a decisive end to the disputes between the partners, for the issues raised, such as the census, the drawing of borders between the north and south, and the referendum law, were all postponed to subsequent rounds. American special envoy for Sudan Scott Gration said that the conference succeeded in determining the points of dispute to be placed on the dialogue table over two subsequent meetings, the first to be held in Khartoum in mid-July and the second in Juba in mid-August. He also said that both sides considered the Washington meetings positive in that they represent a strong return for the United States to mediating in Sudan's peace process. The US had sponsored the peace process prior to 2005 which led to the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement ending the longest civil war on the African continent. Yet the American role in Sudan will remain governed by the following two factors: The first is the differences within the American administration regarding its policies on Sudan. These differences surfaced when Gration's statements noting an improvement in Darfur were immediately followed by contradictory statements from Washington. Former US envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios wrote in a Washington Post article titled 'Obama, Adrift on Sudan' that these differences within the new American administration were about to undermine US efforts to prevent Sudan from sliding towards civil war. He points to the dispute within Obama's administration as to whether the situation in Darfur is genocide or not, saying that the continued use of the term genocide for Darfur forms an obstacle to American diplomacy and threatens to undermine its efforts in Sudan. "The administration is focused more on a dated view of Darfur than on the risks of future atrocities that are likely to come from a new war between the North and South," he wrote. "Two events required under the 2005 peace agreement -- national multi-party elections to be held in February 2010 and a referendum the following year on the secession of southern Sudan -- will determine whether Sudan constructively addresses its internal political problems or descends into Somalia-like anarchy or Rwanda-scale atrocities." The second factor governing the current American orientation towards Sudan is the positions of the Sudanese parties themselves. The government delegation led by Ghazi Salaheddin, the Sudanese president's advisor responsible for the Darfur portfolio, recently said that his primary concern is this golden opportunity to meet directly with American officials for the first time and on various levels in order to improve bilateral relations, normalise relations between Khartoum and Washington, remove Sudan from the list of states sponsoring terrorism, and end the sanctions imposed on Sudan. The SPLM apparently refuses to be a tool for achieving these goals. The SPLM delegation travelled to Washington following statements warning against the possibility of a civil war re-erupting. The SPLM has also warned the NCP against fanning tribal wars in the south and supporting the split of a party from the SPLM led by former foreign minister Lam Akol, called the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement for Democratic Change. It seems that Washington's talks have created an entrance point for a new relationship and communications between Washington and the NCP. The NCP delegation's statements have reflected a partiality for what it considers the moderate team in the Obama administration, while naming the United States Ambassador to the UN Suzanne Rice a hawk on Sudan. Absent from the talks was the issue of the International Criminal Court and its warrant for the arrest of the Sudanese President Omar Bashir and other officials on the charge of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. This absence brought relief to the NCP delegation, considering it a sign that there will be positive American positions on Bashir in the future. Yet Sudanese analyst Al-Haj Warraq considers this omission a source of concern. He holds that the soft position of some American parties on Sudan is dangerous for the country's unified future and is in fact preparation for a smooth separation of the south. Warraq believes that the outstanding differences within the American administration on Sudan reflect American fears that Sudan's collapse could make it like Somalia, fertile ground for terrorism. Head of the Sudanese Umma Party Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi holds that the Washington meeting was not the right approach for solving Sudan's problems because it follows the old path of treating issues in a bilateral context rather than a national one. He points out that the Sudanese peace agreement previously sponsored by Washington, which is now trying to revive it, treats Sudan's problems as north-south ones, which resulted in a flawed agreement that the Sudanese are paying the price for now in Darfur and elsewhere. The agreement requires a review other than that conducted in Washington, he argues. And lobbies within the United States will oppose any moves by the Obama administration to normalise relations with the current Sudanese regime, he adds. In any conflict between the two partners, the current American administration will lean towards its ally the SPLM, which necessitates the presence of a Sudanese national platform to respond to disputes between the ruling partners far from any foreign exploitation, Al-Mahdi says. He also points out that the Darfur factions will strive to draw the new American administration towards a position in favour of them, just as they will pressure the International Criminal Court to execute its demands. The American administration probably realises that these demands are not feasible in practice but that treating the court as though it didn't exist is not possible either, he explains. This requires striking a balance between justice and stability in Sudan, Al-Mahdi argues. The only way to guarantee positive results from Sudan's relations with the United States is for the Sudanese to succeed in achieving a national accord that secures a comprehensive and just peace and democratic transformation.
