needs to address local problems to avoid the break-up of Sudan, reports Asmaa El-Husseini Some consider Sudan to have come out on top after the recent African summit. It gained the strong support of the 54 African Union states in the form of a summit resolution not to cooperate with the International Criminal Court (ICC) to arrest President Omar , that it would be an obstacle to the Sudanese peace process. They demanded that Article 16 of the Rome Statute be used to delay 's trial for a year, a delay that may later be extended. William Pace, head of the ICC international coalition of 2,500 organisations, commented, "The intensified attacks by African and Arab governments on the ICC over the last few months form the greatest threat the ICC has faced since the United States declared its opposition to it in 2002." The coalition that Pace heads enjoys strong support from Western states. Yet others hold that African leaders with weak human rights records are trying to undermine the credibility of the ICC and its prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo. In doing so they are relying on the fact that three of the permanent member states of the UN Security Council that transferred the Darfur case to the ICC haven't signed the Rome Statute establishing the ICC in the first place, namely, the United States, Russia, and China. Holders of this view also assert that the ICC and its prosecutor have made mistakes in their treatment of the case. Yet even though these regional positions offer moral support to the Sudanese government, or rather to the National Congress Party led by President Omar , and although they form a means of pressure, they are simply not enough for a number of reasons. Firstly, this is not the kind of support needed to loosen the ICC's grip. Support is needed from influential states, for the matter is now in the hands of the UN Security Council, only two of whose permanent members -- China and Russia -- are standing beside Sudan. The three other member states -- Britain, France, and the United States -- oppose using Article 16 to delay 's trial. Although the Security Council did not reach a final decision on this matter during its last meeting this June, it will reconsider the issue in December. The decision to delay the trial requires the support of the majority of the Security Council members, with no vetoes allowed. Secondly, the African Summit's support for Sudan has come at a time when the ICC prosecutor has been working to further the third accusation against President that the ICC had previously ruled out. The ICC has only approved two accusations against -- those of war crimes and of crimes against humanity. The court has allowed Moreno-Ocampo the opportunity to appeal the accusation of genocide and he recently did so, declaring that this time there was a good chance of securing it. To do so he might rest his case concerning 's measure to expel 15 international relief organisations from Darfur following the ICC's decision to arrest him, depriving local residents of their means of living. The UN committee that visited Darfur in 2004 issued a report saying that the physical elements of genocide existed but that the element of genocidal intent was missing. Yet if the situation is not redressed in Sudan and the anticipated measures are not precluded by counter measures, it would be the right of any party in the United Nations to militarily intervene in Sudan should the accusation of genocide be advanced. Countries could do so unilaterally without a resolution from the Security Council, and while military intervention remains a difficult option for international powers, economic sanctions could prove an appropriate alternative should the motives for intervention remain in place. Thirdly, even under the best, calmest scenario, which would be for the situation to remain as is without intervention by the Security Council or another escalation from the ICC, the fragility of this situation is causing harm to Sudan on two levels. The first is economic -- in recent years Sudan has made great progress in attracting foreign investment and has come to hold third place among Arab and African countries in the field of investment. The ICC resolution, however, casts a dark cloud over conditions in Sudan just when it had begun to heal from the effects of civil war. The second of these levels is that of Sudan's future and whether it will remain a unified state following the sovereignty referendum to be held among citizens of the South in less than 20 months. A continuation of the current situation would not encourage southerners to vote for unity. Finally, in its focus on seeking a way out of the ICC crisis and given occasional positive signs from various parties, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) -- as all other entities in Sudan -- has overlooked perhaps the most important element to a solution. This is the fact that domestic efforts are currently split between two sides -- those with the NCP and those against it -- and that this has caused tension. Today, more than ever, efforts are needed to secure true national accord. The agreement signed between the Umma Party led by Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of Darfur, which waged attacks on the Sudanese capital in May of 2008, has merely been a sign of the tension and polarisation in Sudanese political life. This agreement, which has been described as unexpected and worrying for the NCP, is the most recent agreement of its kind. Current domestic conditions thus really need to be addressed. Their continuation would be harmful for the NCP, its allied parties, and parties in opposition to it, since they threaten Sudan in its entirety. What is needed is accord among all powers on a number of high priority issues, including dealing with the ICC, solving the Darfur crisis, and concluding a peace agreement with the South. True domestic accord would be the shortest, most successful, and least costly path to resolving Sudan's crises.
