Fouad Ibrahim is a prominent intellectual, human rights advocate and author of numerous publications on Saudi Arabia. For nearly four decades, Ibrahim has led a life of activism dedicated to raising public awareness regarding issues of reform, human rights abuses and social justice in the "kingdom of silence". He was a member of Al-Haraka Al-Islahiya (The Reformist Movement) for nearly two decades (1984-2004). In 1991, he moved to London where he joined a team of researchers and issued several publications on Saudi affairs. At a time when Saudi-financed media and the Western press imposed a blackout on news regarding the opposition movement in Saudi Arabia and manifestations of popular discontent in the kingdom, Ibrahim and his colleagues took the risk of exposing the Saudi regime's human rights abuses and systematic discrimination against minorities. Al-Jazira Al-Arabiya magazine and Shun Saudiah (Saudi Affairs), both edited by Ibrahim, offered a resource for unbiased news from the kingdom. Ibrahim holds a PhD from University of London and is the author of numerous books considered seminal reference points for any student of Saudi Arabia's history, political system and religious jurisprudence. His books include The Shia of Saudi Arabia (2006), The Jurist and the State: Shia Political Thought (1998), Jihadi Salafism in Saudi Arabia (2010) and Doctrine and Politics in Saudi Arabia (2010). Ibrahim is currently deputy head of the Geneva-based International Council on Human Rights. In a recent assessment of the Arab Spring, Syrian writer Samir Al-Aita suggested that the paradigm shift it represented was founded on two historic realities: the existence of an authority above the state, and a massive young population (known as the "youth bulge") whose needs the authoritarian state failed to satisfy. Both appear to exist in most Gulf states. Why, then, did these factors fail to lead to a popular awakening in the Gulf region akin to what happened in Egypt, Tunisia or even Yemen? The question addresses a range of topics closely associated with the concept of the state in general and the concept of the Gulf state in particular. There is an inverse relationship between the rentier state (all Gulf countries are) and political development. It became clear that the conditions for political transformation in the region have been weakened by the advent of oil boom in the mid-70s of last century. Such boom led consequently to consolidating the authoritarian state, as late Kuwaiti thinker Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb once described it. This model relies on a capital growth which is connected organically with the global capitalist market. It, therefore, failed to provide the conditions for sustainable development. It is also the same state which broke away completely from the aspirations of Arab nationalism, chained itself with a series of economic, political, security as well as strategic agreements and commitments to the super powers. In other words, it is a state which represents the interests of the latter rather than the interests of its own people. The relationship between the ruler and the ruled within such a context became completely irrelevant since power was not founded on this principle in the first place. The whole notion of the rentier state in the Gulf is based on the premise that its inhabitants are "subjects" not "citizens". The difference between those two categories is clear. The late crown Prince Nayef bin Abdel-Aziz described this relationship briefly when he stated that the "guardian" knows the nation's interests better than the people. He was referring to the selection of Shura council members, ruling out any right of the people to select their representatives. With regards to the "youth bulge", it should be noted that a complete breakup has taken place between the rentier state, on the one hand, and the majority of the population -- I mean the young people in almost all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Simply because there is an inverse relationship between stagnation and change, between past and future. The ruling elite in the Gulf region failed to consider the young population as cultural and social capital. Instead, they can only perceive them as masses that can be bought through "social benefits" allocated to contain youth discontent and resentment about poor economic, social, political and cultural conditions. This condescending approach made young people more determined to break the cultural, social, political and even religious taboos. They resorted to different means -- some unheard of -- to drive the message home that times have changed. What are the obstacles standing in the face of an "Arab Spring" in the Gulf region? They are the same barriers that stand in the way of establishing a national state in the Gulf region. In other words, all popular revolutions in the world have to function in a context conducive for change. Such a context cannot be located outside of civil institutions that operate in the space extending from the homes of citizens to the palace of the ruler. In the authoritarian Gulf state, any acts that involved collective forms of organisation were banned. The state in the Gulf deals with its subjects as mere individuals and not as social or political groups. The existing institutions on the other hand -- be they religious, cultural or even sportive -- are subservient to the authoritarian state directly or indirectly. True, there have been signs of rebellion in some Gulf states with attempts to set up de facto institutions in defiance of the national ban on establishing civil institutions, but those who dared do this faced detention and threats. These institutions will not be able to function freely under repressive rule. Do you think the popular and political dynamics of change in the Gulf region have come under the influence of the Arab Spring? Are there indications to substantiate this? The echoes of the Arab Spring reverberated in many parts of the Gulf region and political mobilisation in some countries was influenced by this popular awakening. One such indicator is the popular uprisings -- which vary in size -- that took place in Oman and Bahrain. In Saudi Arabia, one important consequence is how such uprisings galvanised the protest movement and gave it an added momentum. The Saudi regime exerts relentless efforts to confer a sectarian edge to the protest movement, but there have been protests all over the kingdom and all demands centred around human rights issues. The issue of political activists who were arrested in United Arab Emirates last month on charges of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and plotting regime change in the Gulf is making headlines in most Gulf media outlets. Also Kuwait had been the scene of countless protests organised by different social and political forces. The protests calling for the resignation of the former prime minister and the storming into parliament building are all but expressions of popular resentment that can no longer be contained or muted. Even Qatar which is spearheading "regime change" schemes in the region has not been spared from manifestations of popular anger but thanks, of course, to a media blackout that we do not get to hear about it. In my view, the wave of the Arab Spring has had an immediate and direct impact on the Gulf region. Today there are high expectations that the whole Middle East scene will be shaped by the conflict between governments that remain outside history and generations of young men and women that represent the historic mass and that will have the final say in any process of change to come. To what degree do external factors contribute to curbing or accelerating the process of social and political opening in the region -- in particular relations with Iran and the US? I have a firm conviction that any external factors have only a corrupting impact on the process of political change and social transformation. This stands in sharp contrast to the concept of the "public will". So if we want to define the revolution as a moment when both subjective and objective conditions for social change become available, the external factor would be considered an unnecessary intervention on the normal course of the revolution. Even in cases when this external factor played a supporting role, it would still have a damaging impact on the revolution's national identity and legitimacy. What are the components of the reformist movement in Saudi Arabia and its different phases of political and social struggle, and what tools and mechanisms of change has it adopted? It is difficult to talk about a coherent reform movement with ideological and political unity. One can, nonetheless, speak about accumulated political activism that finds its roots back in the 1950s. Different forms of political organisation, with leftist and nationalist leanings, targeted the oil company (Aramco) as a subject of struggle against US imperialism and Western capitalism. It was inspired by Nasserite ideas. Such movements clashed with the Saudi regime when activists sought to transfer the model of revolutionary coups to Saudi Arabia through senior military officers in the army. Their attempt failed, however, and many faced the death sentence. With the advent of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the political struggle in Saudi Arabia came under the influence of Iranian revolution. Manifestations of this influence could be found in Juhayman Otaibi's movement that challenged the Saudi regime. Also the Eastern Province was the scene of a popular uprising in December 1979. This ushered in the "Islamisation" of political struggle. The 1990s witnessed the defection of some members who formed new movements that upheld such principles as democracy, human rights and a restrictive form of liberalism. Today we are witnessing a reformist discourse permeating social and political public space. It serves as an umbrella for a wide range of popular forces with different ideological and social backgrounds. Their demands centre around political change, a civil state and a constitutional monarchy. This work is done through civil society institutions and organisations such as Hasm (Decisiveness), or through cultural and media activities or even on social media outlets. All represent groups with a particular political or ideological orientation. Is there a unified list of demands adopted by the reformist movement or can one speak of several lists? And do such demands focus on socioeconomic issues of marginalisation or embody other political issues? Finally, to what extent does the protest movement in Qatif and the Eastern Province converge with the demands of the wider Saudi reformist movement? There are two sets of demands; a general list of demands which includes the constitution, separation of powers, a fair distribution of wealth, political partnership, accountability, and to honour the notion of citizenship and social justice and draw on policies. The second set of demands puts special emphasis on the needs of some components of the population that have been discriminated against due to its sectarian or ethnic identity. It must be said that the Saudi regime is keen on dealing with lists of demands separately because first, it wants to keep the demands within a socioeconomic context and ignore any reference or mention of politically-inspired demands; second, in addressing reformist demands only through a socioeconomic angle, it applies the divide and rule policy by reaffirming ethnic, sectarian and demographic divisions among the population. The Saudi regime chooses to deal with citizens not as citizens but rather as tribes, families, sects that have no common grounds. Thus it invokes the most primordial ties. One can imagine the fate of the regime if all citizens had a common list of political and social demands. What is your assessment of the popular uprising in Bahrain and why was it the only Gulf state -- Yemen does not count here -- most affected by the political developments in the region? The popular uprising in Bahrain is a stark evidence of the failure of the model of non-nation state. It is a simple reaction to the grave imbalance in the relationship between the rulers and ruled. Bahrain is the only Gulf state where popular protests and uprisings occur every other decade. One reason for this has to do with a ruling elite that does not want to embrace the rule of majority, neither does it want to adopt partnership as a mode of governance. Not even a system based on sharing power among three components; a third for the Khalifas, a third for Shia and a last third for Sunnis. Instead, the regime is implementing a systematic process of sectarian discrimination and collective punishment against all participants in peaceful rallies including teachers, doctors, students, civil servants, even the peasants were not spared such repressive policies. This makes of Bahrain a police state par excellence. Despite the grim picture, change is taking place in the Gulf. It is a slow pace but a very profound one. It takes various forms but we can say with some confidence that the historic moment of change in the Gulf has already begun. In my view, despite the media blackout which hardly covers people's aspirations for change in this region, there is no long and winding road separating us from democratic transition.
