The crisis in the Nour Party highlights problems within the Islamist political structure as a whole, writes Amani Maged Controversy over Emad Abdel-Ghafour's leadership has thrown the Nour Party into disarray and caused many to wonder whether this marks the beginning of the end, not only of the party but of a broad segment of the Islamist movement. Salafist ranks have been fissuring since Abdel-Ghafour's decision last month to cancel internal party elections. This week the party's governing committee withdrew confidence from Abdel-Ghafour and expelled him from the party. A second blow was delivered when former presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik revealed he had met with Yasser Burhami, vice president of the Salafist Calling, during the presidential campaign. It is not clear whether the meeting took place in Shafik's home or elsewhere, or whether the communication was conducted by phone, but apparently Shafik had reached certain agreements with Burhami that would come to fruition if Shafik won. People speaking on behalf of Burhami explained that the telephone conversation or meeting occurred within the context of electoral rivalry with the Muslim Brotherhood and that, in that context, understandings between political parties and forces were perfectly legitimate. The argument did not wash with other political forces. Angered by the news of the secret meeting they accused the Salafis of opportunism, a criticism that some extended to the rest of the Islamist trend. Some Salafi leaders have denied the ostensible substance of the communications with Shafik. They claim Shafik approached their party to canvas for its support during the elections and was declined because the party had already pledged its support to Mursi. This is consistent with the Nour Party's public line: it had stated that any party member who cooperated with Shafik would face disciplinary action. Shafik also let it be known, in an interview on a satellite television programme, that Abdel-Ghafour had asked to meet him twice. They eventually met in the home of a mutual acquaintance. Whatever the truth behind the Shafik story or the real motives behind Abdel-Ghafour's dismissal, the crisis has riveted the attention of political observers. Some commentators now question whether the Nour Party was ever a viable option, arguing that the Salafist political experience was always doomed to failure and should lay itself to rest. Defenders of the Nour Party cite its successes since being founded. A major rival to the Muslim Brothers' FJP, the party emerged as the second largest bloc in the People's Assembly and secured a parliamentary majority for the Islamists. The kind of internal arguments in which it is now embroiled, they say, are no different to the rifts that have rent other parties. Others argue that political Islam as a whole has been shaken by the infighting in the Nour Party as the Egyptian public has been treated to the spectacle of the self-righteous at each others' throats, squabbling over positions in their first political party experience. Earlier this year Abdel-Ghafour urged holding the Nour Party's internal elections immediately after the parliamentary elections. He said this would help sustain the party's stability and efficacy and establish a platform for developing the party's organisational and administrative structures. Many members of the supreme committee disagreed, arguing that internal elections were the greatest challenge any party had to contend with and that for them to be held properly required developed administrative structures and qualified personnel. Many months down the line Abdel-Ghafour decided to go ahead with the elections in accordance with the provisions of the party's regulations. In order to be able to vote in the party's elections members had to pass an indoctrination test and graduate from associate member to working member status. This is where things started to go awry. Official Nour Party spokesman Mohamed Nour relates that grievances and complaints against the local Nour Party membership affairs committees, which were conducting the indoctrination tests, began to pile up at party headquarters. The flood of grievances prompted the party president, in his capacity as representative of the party's founders and in accordance with the regulations of the interim period, to issue a decree postponing the elections and dissolving the membership affairs board. The supreme committee took exception to the president's decision, questioned his authority and finally countermanded it, decreeing elections should go ahead in governorates that had not been subject to complaints. One Salafi leader believes that both sides sought what was best for the party, and simply differed in their readings of the situation and the best way to handle it. He also admits that part of the problem had to do with overlapping authorities. Apart from questions related to the decision as to whether or not to proceed with internal elections, there appears to be something fundamentally wrong with the party's electoral practice. Only five per cent of party members have the right to vote in internal elections, leaving 95 per cent in the cold when it comes to choosing their party's leadership. The Nour Party made a powerful entry into the political arena on the strength of hundreds of thousands of members. It needs administrative structures capable of accommodating such numbers and providing effective communications vertically and horizontally, enabling all members to feel as though they are active parts of the whole, with a say in decision-making processes. Perhaps the party has not had sufficient time to put effective structures into place, but what is certain is that what did exist failed its first major test. On the other hand, and more importantly perhaps, the Nour Party had extensive grassroots appeal. This segment of public opinion still exists and cannot be ruled out of the political equation. The Nour Party's challenge, now, is to hold on to this base: to do so it will have to develop the means and mechanisms that will enable these people to feel the party listens to them and truly has their interests at heart. This means giving them a voice inside the party. The party has appointed Mustafa Khalifa as Abdel-Ghafour's temporary replacement and will hold new general assembly elections at the end of October. These will produce a new supreme committee which will then select the party's new president. Meanwhile, the current supreme committee, which withdrew its support from Abdel-Ghafour, announced that it will respect a court ruling reversing its decision to expel the former president from the party. While the current crisis of the Nour Party should serve as a reminder to all political forces of the deficiencies in their own practice of democracy, the problem appears to plague Islamist factions more than others, and the Salafis, above all. Burhami
