At the end of an intense four-year term as Egyptian ambassador in Washington, Sameh Shukri spoke to Ezzat Ibrahim about Egypt's relationship with the US, former president Mubarak and the 25 January Revolution In a wide-ranging interview conducted as ambassador Sameh Shukri, Egypt's ambassador in Washington over the past four years from September 2008 to August 2012, prepared to leave the US capital, he explained his views regarding the relations between the two countries, notably in the wake of last year's 25 January Revolution. According to Shukri, there are signs of a possible clash between the new Egyptian leadership in Cairo and Washington, and Egyptian public opinion now plays a far more important role in Egyptian-US relations than was the case under the regime of ousted former president Hosni Mubarak. During the Mubarak regime, there was a widespread feeling that Egypt's foreign policy was subordinate to US interests, and this is now no longer the case. Members of the former regime believed that the sustainability of the regime was linked to strong relations with the US and US support for Mubarak in particular. Shukri's tenure as Egyptian ambassador in Washington bore witness to the tensions before January 2011 when the former Egyptian president and his entourage attempted to arrange the succession of Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak's son, to the presidency. According to Shukri, while ambassador in Washington he had helped organise only one trip by Gamal Mubarak to the United States in the latter's capacity as a member of the then ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Later, the US and the world as a whole were stunned by the Egyptian revolution, which overthrew one of the US's most important regional allies. As a result, US decision-makers have been obliged to follow a new path, seeking new allies on the Egyptian stage as Egyptian diplomats closely monitored the repercussions of the revolution on the country's relations with the outside world. Shukri began his tenure in Washington in late 2008 at the height of tensions between former US president George W Bush and a number of Arab leaders concerning democratic change in the Middle East and the way that this could be achieved. He left after the replacement of Mubarak by a new president drawn from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has gained the most in influencing Egypt's foreign policy in the Arab, Islamic and international arenas. Shukri's time as Egyptian ambassador in Washington covered a sensitive time in US-Egyptian relations. In the interview below, he reveals what went on behind the scenes and particularly the players and events in a revolution that rewrote Egyptian-US relations. While you were in the US, you were closely involved in managing relations between Cairo and Washington, especially in the final years of the former regime. What is your opinion of Mubarak's relationship with the US? What were the faults in these relations that made ordinary Egyptians feel that the former regime was subordinate to the US? In order to evaluate Egyptian-US relations, we need to review the history of these relations. Over the past three decades, such ties grew, beginning with the US-mediated peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. This was followed by US military and economic assistance to Egypt, as well as US assistance in enhancing Egypt's national security through modernising Egypt's military capabilities. Regarding bilateral relations during the tenure of the former president, I would rather talk about the policies that were implemented than the person who carried them out. From my experience as Egypt's ambassador to various international agencies in Vienna and ambassador to UN headquarters in Geneva and during my first and second years as Egypt's ambassador to Washington, I would say that Egyptian foreign policy had strong ties to the US during that period, but I would not describe it as being subordinate to the US. The policy aimed to serve Egypt's interests, as these were seen from the standpoint of the official circles that drew them up and from those coordinating them with other state agencies. This does not preclude there having been a sense among large segments of the Egyptian public that there was some form of dependency on the part of Egypt towards the US, and this should be taken seriously in addressing the factors that this impression was based on. What were these factors in your opinion? In my opinion, this impression was based on two factors. First, there was a lack of transparency and honesty in addressing public opinion, and second, there was the approach and methods used by Egyptian state agencies on all levels in dealing with the US that acted to confirm this impression. The state agencies were over-zealous in establishing contact with various US agencies in order to benefit from their assistance in realising activities and goals through the US aid programme. Some officials mistakenly believed that such direct relations would reflect well on their performance in their jobs, including officials at the presidency and even the former president himself. There was a desire to win over the US in order to ward off any animosity that could negatively have affected the stability of the regime. As a result, reasonable efforts to establish good relations with the US came under the spotlight. I believe that the former president's long period in office and the above-mentioned outlook of many Egyptian state institutions cemented the impression of Egypt's being subordinate to the US as a negative feature of the former regime, especially in its final years when many positions were not made public when there was discord with the US and disputes were painted in a positive light. Some officials also felt that sustaining the regime depended on the strength of Egypt's ties with the US and the support of the superpower for them as individuals. For this reason, there were personal factors, as well as objective reasons, that caused the public to gain such an impression of Egyptian-US relations, as they linked the power and strength of Egypt's ties with the US with the regime's longevity. The issue of the succession was one of the reasons why the regime was overthrown. How did Egyptian diplomacy in Washington deal with Gamal Mubarak? Did the former president's son have US support as a result of pressure from the presidency to approve the succession plan? The issue cast a shadow on Egyptian politics, and many felt that the chosen heir was illegitimate and his appointment would not be based on any aptitude qualifying him for the job of president. Despite the denials, non-disclosures and opaqueness, all the signs indicated that the succession was a serious plan. The more it was denied, the more credible it seemed, proving that the former regime lacked the most basic respect for democracy, which requires transparency and full disclosure. Matters were complicated further, and became more disturbing for Egyptians, when the role of the former president's son grew and he began to take decisions without holding any specific post, thus making him immune in terms of political responsibility. This contributed to a negative impression of the regime as a whole and of the former president, and it led to the growing sense of discontent that was a main reason behind the revolution. Before I was appointed Egypt's ambassador to Washington, the former president's son made several trips to the US, where he met with senior officials and various non-government figures. During my tenure as ambassador, he came to the US once after president Barack Obama was elected, and he was treated as a prominent figure in the former ruling party as he was at the time serving as head of the party's policies committee. In this capacity, he met with administration officials and was well received in administration circles that were keen to meet him as a leading figure in the former ruling party and the former president's son. The Americans are always keen to make contact with members of the Egyptian government, and there is no doubt that at that time the role of the National Democratic Party and the president's son in running the country caused the Americans to be keen to meet him and to find out about his views and ideas. However, organising such visits is not the job of the embassy, and it seems that the presidency did not hesitate to use diplomatic resources for this end. What would be your response to such criticisms? The role the embassy played during the visit of Gamal Mubarak to Washington during my tenure as ambassador was within the range of its normal duties, which depend on the rank of the visitor in question. It played the same role in Gamal Mubarak's case as it would have played for any party or political figure, or any representative of an NGO, depending on the individual's stature and grassroots base. The same thing applied to representatives of Egyptian opposition parties if they made contact with the embassy and asked for its assistance. Concerning the former president's son using the presidency in order to gain the approval of the US for his succession as president, I believe that circumstances in Egypt pointed to the possibility that such a transition of power could have taken place. However, the presidency did not possess the power to pressure the US into supporting this idea. Could you describe the atmosphere in the US at the beginning of the Egyptian revolution? How did you handle the situation at the beginning and through the 18 days of the revolution? Washington was in a state of high alert, and there was widespread concern after the 25 January Revolution started as the US knew that such an event in Egypt would have long-term ramifications in the region and directly impact the strategic equation. I sensed this concern during my contacts with US officials. Naturally, I dealt with the situation from a dual perspective. First, I viewed the situation as an Egyptian citizen witnessing a historic event in his country's march towards freedom and democracy, an event that was closely covered by the US media through broadcasts from Tahrir Square in Cairo. However, at the same time, I also had to handle the situation as the ambassador representing Egypt in the US, and it was my duty to keep the channels open between Cairo and Washington in order for both sides to be able accurately to assess their policies regarding the ongoing developments. Two days after the revolution began, I was inundated by requests from the US media for interviews, and I felt obliged by my position to fill the media vacuum since no Egyptian officials were making statements. I had to appear in the US media in order to explain what was taking place on the ground in Egypt and on the political scene there. My decision to speak to the media was my own: I did not receive instructions to talk to the media and I did not receive instructions on what I should say. I took it upon myself to inform US public opinion about the principles and demands the protestors were calling for and to assert the right of Egyptian citizens to express their opinions and their right and aspiration for a better future. When did the US administration put pressure on Mubarak to step down? Did it want him to stay on, while making concessions to the revolutionaries? When did Washington abandon the former president? I believe the US gradually changed its position over the course of the revolution. Decision-makers in the US were unsure about what policy to adopt towards the developments because they could not tell which way things would go. As a result, they were very cautious. As the administration began to sense the strength of the revolution and the revolutionaries, as well as the courage of the Egyptian people in confronting the repressive machine and raising the ceiling of their demands, Washington began leaning towards advising the former president and regime to take serious political steps to meet the people's demands. In the end, former US ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner was sent as Cairo to urge the former president to take the decisive step of conceding to the demands of the revolutionaries, finally insisting that he should step down in order to meet the people's demands for his departure and defuse the situation. Speaking of US pressure, could we go back to the period when George W Bush was president during the US war on terror against Ossama bin Laden? Could you tell us what took place behind the scenes between Mubarak and the US during that period? Is it true that Bush was exerting pressure on Egypt after the Iraq war? I was not in Washington for most of Bush's tenure as president, and I arrived only three months before the end of his presidency. However, what I witnessed in my other posts at home and abroad during that period leads me to believe that Egyptian-US relations were very tense during that period. This tension was linked to two issues: the manner in which Bush handled the peace process in the Middle East and the clear and glaring bias of the US administration towards Israel. One example is when a US guarantee on Israeli settlements in the West Bank was made only hours after the former Egyptian president visited the US. This demonstrated a lack of appreciation and a disregard of Egypt's role in trying to reach an acceptable solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such tensions were exacerbated after Egypt objected to the US intervention in Iraq, and they were compounded when the neo-cons in Washington sought to implement their well-known goals of changing the map of the Middle East through direct intervention to change regimes, with the US becoming more assertive in advocating democracy and human rights. These were all sensitive issues for the former Egyptian regime. Was the US administration counting on the Muslim Brotherhood to take power in Egypt from the beginning of the revolution? What is your evaluation of the relationship between Washington and the Islamists in Egypt and the Arab world today? The Egyptian revolution took the US administration by surprise, because it did not expect the events to play out in the way they did and it was unprepared in terms of timing. It is futile to look back in hindsight and try to guess what the US was planning as a result, but this does not rule out the fact that the administration was encouraging the former Egyptian regime to carry out reforms. There was a continuous monitoring by the US of developments in Egypt, including the growing popular discontent and the troubles in the streets, and there was a concern in the US that Egypt should remain stable in order to help maintain the stability of the region as a whole. At the same time, the US was keen on interacting with all the political players in Egypt. From 2005 onwards, stories began to emerge in the media about meetings between the US embassy in Egypt and Islamist members of parliament. The US sustained these contacts with individuals from across Egypt's political spectrum even after the ouster of the former president. It was in contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, liberals and NGOs in attempts to monitor the political scene from close to and be able to deal with whoever took power during the transitional phase. The administration also stayed in close contact with the former ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in order to stay informed about progress during the transition phase and express its opinions about what it believed would benefit democratic transition and serve US interests in Egypt, which do not necessarily contradict Egyptian interests. I believe the US today appreciates the need for establishing a democratic regime in Egypt and for handing over power to an elected government, as this would base bilateral relations on popular approval in Egypt and would benefit both sides. In the light of recent contacts, how do you view progress in bilateral relations today and how can any clash between the elected government in Egypt and US interests in the region be avoided in the light of the remarkable transformation of the Egyptian regime? The January Revolution is a significant opportunity to redraw the course of Egyptian-US relations and confirm the basis on which this important relationship is built, most importantly mutual respect and benefit. Accordingly, the US partner should realise that Egypt has changed and the mechanisms governing bilateral relations should stay abreast of this change by taking the opinions and resolve of the Egyptian people into account, these having become key components of Egyptian foreign policy. After the former president stepped down, the US warmly welcomed developments in Egypt in terms of a process of comprehensive political reform that would guarantee a political life in Egypt that was transparent and responsive to the demands of the people about the future. At the same time, the US, both the administration and the Congress, has said that it will support Egypt politically and economically during the transitional phase. However, these developments, and the conflicts among the political players during the transitional period, have caused the US to adopt a "wait and see" policy until such internal changes subside and before sending over the assistance it has promised. As for any possible clashes between the new government in Egypt and the US, I believe there are no indicators of these on the ground. The new Egyptian leadership will formulate its policies, and the Egyptian and US sides will evaluate their policies, in order to reach consensus on a future course. The Egyptian side appreciates the importance of Egypt's relations with the US as a superpower and given its political, military and economic capabilities. The orientation of the new Egyptian leadership will definitely be monitored by US official and unofficial circles. Contacts since the revolution, most recently the visit by the US secretary of state to Egypt last month and previous visits by other senior US officials, have indicated that there is growing interest on both sides in nurturing relations and outlining future frameworks. Another point I'd like to make is that the changes Egypt is witnessing and the existence of an elected government that gains its legitimacy from the will of the people who voted it into office will be additional factors to bear in mind in the bilateral relations between Egypt and the US, making them stronger. At the same time, Egyptian public opinion has for the first time become a component in these bilateral relations, and it has an influence that must be taken into account by both the Egyptian and US sides. What is the US's definition of its national interests in the Middle East, and what circles play the most important roles in formulating US policy towards countries like Egypt? US interests have expanded since the emergence of the US as a major international player after World War II. After the end of the Cold War, US interests became more defined, since it was no longer focused on containing communism as part of the polarised world that had existed up until that time. The US's sense of its own status grew when it became the single superpower having hegemony over the world order as a whole following the end of the Cold War, and it took a special interest in the Middle East by seeking to achieve its interests there directly, including through the use of military intervention. Its priorities were, and continued to be after the events of 9/11, to eliminate any threats to US national security by terrorist groups that could emerge in the Middle East. Its interests also lie in securing the energy sources that underpin the world economy and in guaranteeing Israel's security in the light of the special relationship that exists between the two countries. US policies in the region revolve around these goals, whether they are expressed through the US intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan, dealing with Iran's nuclear programme, or managing the peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, which has failed up to now. These things have influenced Egyptian-US relations and the perception of Egyptian citizens of the US. Overall, US foreign policy is determined by the triangle of the White House, the security and intelligence agencies, and the state and defence departments. What do you think the future of the Camp David agreement will be? Throughout the transitional phase in Egypt and also after President Mohamed Mursi came to power, Egypt has reiterated its commitment to its international obligations and has said that it has no intention of breaching them. It is a responsible country with steadfast institutions that respect the country's obligations as long as they are respected by other parties and serve Egypt's national interests. This is how international relations are managed in general. All these issues are multi-faceted and they are evaluated as part of Egypt's general policies, assessing their positive returns for the Egyptian people. The peace treaty with Israel has its benefits and it has contributed to stability and preventing war on the Egyptian-Israeli front. Revising any treaty is possible and is accepted in international law if there is a need for this to be done. Such revision takes place through consensus by both sides, taking into account any changes that have happened over time. What was the content of your discussions with the US administration regarding the coming phase, and what has been discussed with the US administration more recently? During the interim phase after the parliamentary elections in Egypt, I emphasised a key point during discussions with the administration and Congress, namely that deep-rooted changes have taken place in Egypt and the US must keep this in mind in its policies towards Egypt. The approach used in managing relations between the two countries during the rule of the former president must be reassessed. The US must adopt a new approach in dealing with an Egyptian government that has been elected by the Egyptian people. Egyptian public opinion has higher expectations of the relationship with the US, and the people's opinions must be taken into account when framing US-Egyptian relations. The US should also deal with Egypt from a new perspective based on mutual respect, joint interests and the understanding that consensus may not be possible all the time. Washington should realise that Egypt is made up of many political forces, and they all have a right to contribute to deciding what is in Egypt's best interest. Is there a better mechanism to formulate Egypt's foreign policy, which in the past was essentially in the hands of the president? The starting point is that no single body should have a monopoly over foreign policy without the input of other parties. Indeed, there should be no monopoly over any issue in general. The presidency, or the ministry of defence, or the ministry of foreign affairs, or the security agencies cannot have exclusive rights over decision-making. A comprehensive foreign policy and the many components that go into managing foreign relations cannot be formulated by any one institution in isolation from others. We must establish transparency and full disclosure between the agencies working on foreign policy, which were isolated from each other in the past whether because of bad management or deliberately for personal reasons. No single body should be able to monopolise the formulation of a given outlook, even if one on a purely technical issue, because this makes it impossible to establish an integrated foreign policy. At the end of your diplomatic career, what advice would you give to today's foreign-policy makers, whether those in charge of Egypt's Foreign Ministry or your own colleagues in the diplomatic service? I am now ending my tenure as Egypt's ambassador in Washington, and I will soon be retiring after 37 years in the service of my country, which I have been honoured to serve in various capacities. I feel happy about my work and my accomplishments. At every stage of my diplomatic career, I have sought to serve the interests of my country and the Egyptian state. Throughout my career, I have focused on presenting and evaluating issues with honesty and clarity and a commitment to professional standards. Decision-makers cannot adopt sound policies unless they are given accurate information. They cannot just be told what they want to hear. The main challenge for foreign-policy decision-makers today is to be able to strike a balance between the constants and the variables in Egypt's foreign policy. Post-revolutionary Egypt must reformulate its foreign policy to conform to certain new orientations and to correspond to the aspirations of public opinion, while not compromising on its principles. Egypt must also carefully define the components of the country's national security interests and decide on the mechanisms that will be able to determine and achieve Egypt's interests in a way that benefits its people. All of Egypt must participate in overhauling the institutions working in the fields of national security and foreign policy.
