Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran have both a meeting of interests in Syria, and the chance to mediate that conflict for the better, writes Abdel-Moneim Said To be clear from the outset, the "quartet" I am about to speak of here is not the old one, which consisted of the UN, the EU, the US and Russia. The mission of that quartet was to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and it has failed miserably in that task so far, not just because success is not always the fate of multilateral diplomacy but also, and more essentially, because the participants were not resolved to make peace. The Israelis remained, as always, bent on their colonial project. The Palestinians agreed among themselves to disagree about everything until their internal rift broadened to the point that Gaza was severed from the West Bank. Syria was more preoccupied with Lebanon and Palestine than with the liberation of the Golan. The international community, whether members of the Quartet or not, was frustrated and wearied by parties that wanted an everlasting peace process but that remained readier yet for a protracted conflict with periodic flare-ups of military hostilities every few years. As for the new quartet, it consists of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Iran. In the recent Islamic summit in Mecca, these four major regional powers in terms of population, land area and influence determined to intervene collectively in the Syrian crisis in the hope of producing a solution. If this quartet is to avert the dismal failure of the other one, it will have to carve out a space for itself in a field that is already well-populated by such major-league players as the UN, the US, the EU, Russia and China, all of which have established a heavy presence on the ground, whether through the provision of money and arms, or by virtue of their international influence and their right to wield a veto in the Security Council. But as though the challenge of acquiring a political role amidst all those heavyweights were not enough, this new quartet hopes to carry out its mission at a time when hostilities in Syria are seething and all the gloves are off, and when all taboos are being trampled underfoot whether by the regime in its actions towards the Syrian people or by the revolutionaries in their warfare against the regime and its army. In short, the quartet has to work under conditions of ceaseless and merciless bloodshed. If this quartet is to have a chance to succeed at all, it must, first, designate its mission precisely; second, determine how to best deploy the abilities of its members; and third, fully appreciate the fact that conflict settlement is not a zero-sum game, whereby one side emerges victorious and imposes its terms unconditionally on the other, but rather a process of enabling disputants to obtain at least a minimum of their demands. The quartet could define its task quite simply as to change the government in Damascus and to establish a democratic order founded on the principle of full and equal citizenship and the recognition of and explicit guarantees for the rights of all minorities. But carrying out this task is no easy matter. President Bashar Al-Assad would have to be persuaded that he no longer has a place in Syria and that his time and the era of the Baath Party have come to an end and must now be consigned to the annals of history. But difficulties come from another direction as well. Changing Syria would not only affect the people at the top. If it is to be carried out successfully, it must forestall vengeance against the adherents of the Alawi sect and it must ensure protection for and recognition of the rights of the Christian, Kurdish and Turkmen minorities. The lid has come off in Syria, as it had in Iraq, but perhaps the quartet can avert the Iraqi tragedy that continues to unfold today. What could the members of the new quartet do, individually or collectively, in order to realise their aim? Iran is the only party that could convince Bashar Al-Assad to step aside. But it would have no reason to help in this way if it knew that the result would be a net loss to its strategic interests, whether with regard to its nuclear ambitions or its relationship with Hizbullah in Lebanon, or if it knew that the Shia and Alawi communities in Syria would be gravely imperilled. Turkey is directly involved in the crisis and it also has to bear in mind its relations with certain other parties. While Ankara is firm in its belief that Bashar has to go, it is simultaneously haunted by the spectre of the disintegration of the Syrian state and the rise of petty states that could fuel dissension and rebellion among the Shia, Alawi (Alevi), and Kurdish peoples in Turkey. Regardless of the differences in their approach to the crisis, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are bound by a relationship that existed long before the Arab Spring and remained intact after the season passed. One of the cornerstones of this relationship is the principle that regional stability is beneficial to all parties. As long as Bashar was useful in this regard, he posed no problem. But this is no longer the case, now that his tenacity threatens to wreak regional chaos. On the other hand, Cairo and Riyadh simultaneously fear that his departure might invite the inferno of civil war, which could spill over into Iraq, Lebanon and possibly Turkey due to the demographic extensions of Syria's minority sects and ethnic groups. If Saudi Arabia definitely has the material resources, Egypt brings with it something less tangible but equally crucial: a new and unique blend of the continuity of the state and revolutionary ardour. The latter offers a direct link to the Syrian revolutionaries and, prime among them, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In taking part in this mission, Cairo is signalling its return to the regional arena, right in the centre of its gravest crisis, which is in Syria, with which Egypt had once formed the United Arab Republic. Clearly, each of the four members of this quartet offers an advantage and, simultaneously, has interests at stake. Without a doubt there are contradictions and differences between them, but these could be overcome if they reach an understanding over the future of Syria after Bashar. If this vision satisfies the concerns and interests of Iran and Turkey and is acceptable to Egypt and Saudi Arabic, then all members of the quartet would be ready and willing to do their part in what we might call a grand compact. For example, if Tehran obtained a commitment from the other members of the quartet that they would not agree to or support in any way a military strike against Iran, then Tehran would probably be willing to lend a hand by offering Bashar Al-Assad and his family refuge in Iran. Tehran might be further inspired if it obtained a regional or even international guarantee for the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in Syria, inclusive of the right to administer their own affairs. Such conditions would be the least Iran would expect. Iran would probably prefer the Iraqi solution, but this would be unacceptable to Turkey, which is wary of the application of the federal idea in Syria. It would also be rejected by Riyadh and Cairo, both of which are, by nature, inclined towards the centralised state. Meanwhile, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could be instrumental in shaping a process that would be the reverse of what happened in the countries of the "Arab Spring". In those countries, revolution was followed by a gruelling and uncertain transitional period. This time, perhaps Cairo and Riyadh could work out a transitional phase that would take place under the auspices of the Arab League or within another framework and that would provide specific arrangements for an interim authority, elections, autonomous regions, drafting a constitution and bill of human rights, and the protection of minorities. The major problem, then, will be to ensure that the transitional phase between the departure of Bashar and the establishment of a new government proceeds according to plan and in accordance with the agreed upon arrangements. There are no easy solutions. Nothing has been easy with Syria up to now. But the quartet must give careful thought to the nature of the transitional government that will be required and it must work out a detailed roadmap that will keep Syria united and ensure that it emerges democratic.
