Could the transition of power be delayed, asks Salah Eissa* Two and a half months before the end of the first interim phase and the mistakes of all the players in the political arena have precipitated a series of political, legal and constitutional bombshells that could threaten the 1 July handover of power to an elected president. The first explosion came from within the revolutionary camp. It was detonated by the discord between its Islamist and secularist wings over the criteria and methods for selecting the 100 members of the constituent assembly charged with drafting the new constitution. When the Islamist parliamentary majority commandeered 72 of the seats liberals withdrew, charging that the Islamists were being deliberately exclusionist. They then pitted their support behind the lawsuit that subsequently froze all activities of the constitutional commission. Freezing the constituent assembly's activities means there is unlikely to be a constitution in place by the time presidential elections are over. The new president will exercise power on the basis on the Constitutional Declaration issued on 19 March 2011 which, because it fails to regulate the relationship between government authorities, has itself been the cause of a series of crises between the People's Assembly, the government and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The second explosion was triggered by the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to field a presidential candidate, breaking the pledge they had repeated for more than a year. The decision caused dismay in political circles, especially among the secularist wing of the January revolutionaries. It was regarded as further proof that the Muslim Brotherhood was determined to monopolise power and replicate the Mubarak regime's one-party authoritarian state with a multi-party façade. The choice of Khairat El-Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood's key organisational and security leader, as the Freedom and Justice Party's (FJP) presidential candidate served to confirm these suspicions. Many assumed the results of the presidential race were now a foregone conclusion, not only because the Muslim Brotherhood is the only organised political force in the arena but also because El-Shater built and controls the organisational power of the Brotherhood. Nor was there any doubt that with a presidential victory in hand the Muslim Brotherhood would automatically change its position on the nature of the system of government under the new constitution. Instead of the parliamentary system espoused by the platform of the FJP, the Muslim Brotherhood's civil façade, or the mixed republican system, which appears to be the option that would have obtained a consensus among political forces, the Muslim Brothers would use their majority on the constituent assembly to push through a presidential system of government, designating powers to the president exceeding those enjoyed by Mubarak under the 1971 constitution, placing the Muslim Brotherhood in a position to realise its long term goal -- the establishment of an Islamic state. In light of this prospect, former vice president General Omar Suleiman put aside his doubts and entered the presidential race. His decision lit the fuse of the third explosion which took the form of a wave of panic that swept all presidential hopefuls, including the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate. Exposing a lack of confidence in its own popularity, the Brotherhood exaggerated Suleiman's ability to rally the public behind him by exploiting disappointment in the face of the rift between the religious and secular wings of the 25 January forces and widespread unhappiness at the chaos, security breakdown and economic deterioration that followed Mubarak's ouster. Suleiman's presidential challenge forced the two wings of the January Revolution to joint action. They began pushing for a law, undemocratic and unconstitutional in nature, to disqualify him from the race. This action was to be a first step towards reviving the alliance between them. But just as the call to rebuild the revolutionary alliance was growing louder the Presidential Elections Commission disqualified 10 presidential candidates. Foremost among those disqualified were Omar Suleiman, Khairat El-Shater and Hazem Abu Ismail. The sudden disappearance of this troika of frontrunners raised question marks over the possibility of rebuilding the revolutionary alliance given that the impetus to do so was a response to Suleiman's presidential bid. Every indication is that the gap between the two sides of the revolutionary camp is vast. They called for separate marches to protest against Suleiman's nomination, with secular liberals chanting "No to Suleiman and no to the Brotherhood's man" during their protest. Trust between the two camps is at an all time low. Secularists accuse the Muslim Brothers of betraying the revolutionary camp as soon as they won the elections, siding with SCAF against revolutionary forces by supporting the Kamal El-Ganzouri government, painting the revolutionaries as thugs, and proclaiming that the basis of legitimacy had shifted from Tahrir Square to parliament. The secularist wing is unlikely to cooperate with the Brotherhood again unless the latter agrees to reformulate the Constitutional Commission in a manner that ensures that all parties are represented on equal footing and abide by its earlier promises not to field a presidential candidate. It is difficult to imagine that the Muslim Brotherhood will accept these conditions. Not only do they ignore the balance of powers between the two sides, but also the radically different nature of their respective political projects. There is no compelling reason for the Muslim Brotherhood to ally with anyone now that the threat of Suleiman's candidacy has passed. The only consideration that could make the Muslim Brotherhood reconsider is if the secularist camp of revolutionaries unified and organised their ranks. This is the task that lays before them as the country approaches the second transitional phase which begins on 30 June. * The writer is editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper Al-Qahera.
