Al-Qaeda is alive and well thanks to US policy in the region, and its rising attacks raise a truly terrifying spectre, writes Salah Nasrawi A series of deadly attacks carried out in many cities of Iraq on 22 February has sparked fears of a new surge in sectarian violence as the country remains mired in its worst political crisis since the 2003 invasion by the United States. The latest wave of bombings and other attacks in Baghdad and across the country that killed 55 people and wounded hundreds others also spurred doubts about whether Iraqi security forces can be relied upon to police the war-ravaged country two months after the US military pulled out. The coordinated attacks, including car bombings, explosions and assaults by gunmen, targeting police check points and crowds in markets and schools took place in various Shia neighbourhoods. The widespread violence erupted at a time when Baghdad prepares to host an Arab leadership summit next month, designed to be a showcase for the Shia-led government's new control over the country following the withdrawal of US troops. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the lethal assaults. In a statement, it said the attacks targeted security forces and government officials to avenge what it described as executions and detention of Sunnis in government prisons. Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki's Shia-led government has executed at least 68 prisoners this year, mostly on charges of terrorism. In recent months, the government also ordered roundups of hundreds of Saddam Hussein loyalists, most of whom were Sunni. In a separate statement, a spokesman for Al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq said that a Sunni Muslim war against Shias in Iraq is inevitable and threatened relentless waves of attacks like the one last Thursday. The remarks by Abu Mohamed Al-Adnani seem to play on fears of a new surge in sectarian violence as turbulence in Iraq's political system continues to fuel Shia-Sunni tensions. The new crisis came after accusations by Al-Maliki's government to Vice President Tariq Al-Hashemi of involvement in terrorism cases. It has issued an arrest warrant against Al-Hashemi, Iraq's highest-ranking Sunni politician, who sough refuge in the Kurdish autonomous region. Al-Maliki also fired his Sunni deputy Saleh Al-Mutlaq after he accused Al-Maliki of being a dictator. Al-Hashemi's case and Al-Mutlaq's dismissal sparked the country's worst political dispute since the United States withdrew its troops from Iraq in December, pitting Al-Maliki against senior members of the Sunni-backed Iraqiya alliance. Although the crisis eased a bit after Iraqiya members ended a brief boycott of the parliament and the cabinet, efforts to hold a national conference, dubbed as Iraq's last chance to save the political process from collapse, have stalled. Some Shia lawmakers tried to link the recent deadly attacks to Al-Hashemi's dispute, suggesting that the vice president's defiance to stand trial and his fiery statements against Al-Maliki could have fuelled Sunni anger. Meanwhile, the attacks drew outrage from ordinary Iraqis, especially as they came on the same day lawmakers passed a bill approving the purchase of 350 armored vehicles for their personal use, worth more than 50 million dollars. As in numerous previous attacks the lawmakers paid lip service in condemning the government's negligence but the parliament failed to take any action to probe the insecurity that continues to plague the country. However, the blasts and the overall campaign to destabilise the country have exposed a crippling weakness in Iraq's government's strategy to wind down the war against Al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups. Last month a wave of terrifying attacks hit Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, killing and wounding hundreds of the country's Shia. Al-Qaeda in Iraq also claimed credit for the blasts which it said was meant to avenge a crackdown on Sunnis led by the country's Shia-led government. The government has repeatedly said the war against Iraq's Al-Qaeda and its umbrella Sunni groups, who proclaim the ousting of Shia from power, is in its final phase. Following Thursday's assaults the Interior Ministry said police arrested several people in connection with the attacks and discovered sachets of explosives prepared to be used for further attacks. The ministry said the attacks are "a message to its supporters that Al-Qaeda is still operating inside Iraq". Iraqi officials claim that there is a drawdown in violence and attacks are at their lowest level since the beginning of the US invasion. They say that is partially due to the departure of Al-Qaeda-affiliated foreign fighters from Iraq to other countries where radical Islamic groups have resurfaced, empowered by the Arab Spring. The officials say many of the fighters, including hundreds of Iraqi insurgents, are believed to have left Iraq to join the rebellion against the Alawite regime of President Bashar Al-Assad in Syria. They claim the impact of the departure has been especially apparent in Iraq's Sunni dominated western provinces which border Syria and have long been a haven for Al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents. Yet it is difficult to tell if any of that has an impact as long as the Iraqi government continues to lack a coherent political and military strategy to end the insurgency. Its only strategy seems to be buying time and outmanoeuvring Sunnis to adapt to Shia control of power in post-Saddam Iraq. Indeed, the Iraqi security forces on the trail of Al-Qaeda seem to lack an adequate strategy to defeat the group, and the results are tied up in accusations of inefficiency, corruption and infiltration. One basic criticism of the government in its handling of the continuous violence is that it has no counterinsurgency doctrine, which means its tactics to end the rebellion remain more a hope than a fact. On the other hand, Al-Qaeda in Iraq seems to thrive despite the crackdown. Its emerging strategy is built around plans to exploit the country's security vacuum to further disrupt the shaky political process and embarrass the government. Al-Qaeda has a key advantage: the incubation given to the group in the Sunni areas where a sympathetic population gives them cover. The group is not poised to launch conventional guerrilla warfare, but rather a hit-and-run offensive, that keeps the Iraqi security forces exhausted and off-balance. Yet Al-Qaeda's dream of dragging Iraq into a large scale sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shias, as expressed by Al-Adnani's rhetoric, remains far-fetched. That approach carries a tremendous risk to Sunnis because it carries the possibility of a new round of fraternal brutality that characterised the civil war in 2006-2007 which left thousands of Iraqi's dead. In the end, only a solid and broad-based national reconciliation and political reconstruction will end Iraq's problems, including turning off Al-Qaeda's terror crusade.
