The remnants of the Mubarak regime must be rooted out once and for all, everywhere they hide and exert influence, writes Ayman El-Amir* Never since the downfall of ousted president Hosni Mubarak has Egypt been so close to the brink of chaos. After one year, the revolution of 25 January 2011 seems shaky and confused. Despite the election of a parliament, the change of three governments and the marathon trial of Mubarak and his top aides, the old regime remains intact. Its ability to disrupt progress towards democracy, of which very little has been achieved, was clearly demonstrated on several occasions. Most recently the football game in Port Said between Al-Masri team, the host, and Al-Ahli was another example. At the end of the game, an inexplicable clash erupted. When the dust settled, 74 people were dead and several hundred injured. This time, the cronies of the Mubarak regime overplayed their hand. In the aftermath of the Port Said bloody clashes confrontation reignited between a motley crowd of protesters and security forces that were barricaded inside the interior ministry, resulting in more casualties. This was yet another episode in a series of episodes of street warfare between protesters and security forces that has been a recurring phenomenon since the start of the revolution. Each side saw the other as the enemy that has to be beaten back. It is a fulfilment of the forewarning of Apres moi le deluge that Mubarak, in the vein of Louis XV, sounded in order to cultivate fear and foreboding as the only way to take revenge on the revolution that toppled him. In his first response to the revolution, Mubarak told Egyptians in a televised nationwide speech in February 2011 he was concerned that the protest movement that sought his ouster could lead to chaos. More than being the premonition of a concerned leader the statement reflected a premeditated plan that was soon picked up by his loyalists. They realised that they could not roll back the revolution but they could create pandemonium that would wreck state institutions, make the country unruly and thwart the objectives of the uprising. It is no coincidence that in this volatile environment security was poorly organised in the Port Said game, leaving wide gaps and failing to provide protection for the two competing teams and the 13,000 fans that attended. No one knows how the clashes started and how the weapons that were used, including knives, fireworks and guns, were smuggled in. However, early indications from the fact-finding mission of the People's Assembly strongly suggest that the whole event was pre-planned and that elements of the Port Said government and security command either collaborated or were grossly derelict. The protests and clashes that followed at the interior ministry in Cairo were less serious in the number of casualties but had more grave implications. Protests against the shady involvement of high- ranking elements of the ministry and its affiliated state security apparatus are developing into a confrontation between sections of the people and state institutions. Not only are the free wheeling agents of the toppled Mubarak regime still active, but also their scheme to undermine state institutions and spread chaos is working. People do not trust state institutions anymore, especially the interior ministry and the ruling military council because of their perceived foot-dragging in matters of urgent national interest. Slow court action on criminal offences committed by Mubarak, his sons, top aides and his business coterie is a case in point. Cases of rampant corruption, the strong suspicion people have that the principal Tora Prison inmates are still directing certain subversive activities, money laundering and the illegal smuggling of funds, the planting of thugs to disrupt peaceful demonstrations and turn protesters against each other, and the fact that Suzanne Thabet, wife of the former discredited dictator, is free and blameless and her protégés at the Alexandria Library and other institutions remain untouched and unaccountable, fuels the outrage of the nation. Many believe that justice delayed is justice denied. Few of the Mubarak conspirators are on trial, more will face trial in the years to come, convictions will lead to appeals and appeals will end up in the Court of Cassation which may or may not order retrials, going back to square one. This is why people are frustrated and are losing faith in state institutions. It is an effective weapon of the counterrevolution -- frustration will set people against the state. This is the recipe for the civil war that decimated Somalia for over 20 years and tormented Lebanon for 15 years. Both were precipitated by the breakdown of state organs that led to mass chaos. That was what Mubarak contemplated when he warned in his speech before he stepped down that the downfall of his regime would lead to anarchy. During his 30 years in power he worked to ensure that his regime was so intertwined with the state that they became inseparable. The Mubarak regime became the state of Egypt and he controlled both and all the institutions deriving from them. He presided over the National Democratic Party (NDP) that fraudulently filled the majority of seats in the legislature and that directed the executive branch. He commanded the military, the police, managed appointments to the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and manipulated the business community through government contracts and the distribution of land. After the downfall of Mubarak on 11 February, Egyptians erupted in jubilation as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took charge of safeguarding state institutions. It was a wobbly transitional period characterised by misjudgement and hesitation, inadvertently feeding into the state of chaos that the Mubarak regime wanted to craft. The council was more reactive than proactive to the requirements of the transitional period and to the order of priorities. Tahrir Square set the priorities and the council together with its appointed governments provided half measures. That was when the masses of Egyptians began to lose faith in the council and its governments. For example, despite persistent rumours and some evidence that the Tora Prison super-inmates were micro-managing the counterrevolution, only after the Port Said massacre did the military council move to disperse those inmates to different prisons. The case of Suzanne Thabet and her appointed robber-courtiers has yet to be investigated. There is clear evidence that Mubarak and NDP thugs have been behind many acts of violence. Those are believed to be moved by some officers of the interior ministry, which a year into the 25 January Revolution is yet to be purged and restructured. It is mind-boggling that three successive governments have failed to do this job. It would seem that the revolutionary mentality has failed to penetrate the stultified mechanisms of government. Consequently, it is a fair assumption that the Mubarak regime still manages state affairs by remote control. Egyptians continue to pay dearly for daring to oust Mubarak and his regime. They see too many promises and too few rewards for their revolution. They are outraged that the revolution they waged, and for which they suffered so many casualties, has been stolen by people who claim they are the prophets of democracy and progress. In the parliamentary elections, Egyptians voted for the loudest voice, the biggest banner and the most pious slogan, for anyone who promised to deliver them from decades of poverty, illness and hunger under the Mubarak autocracy. Mubarak and company are desperately trying to deny the people they oppressed these simple aspirations. It is the obligation of those now in power to wipe the Mubarak slate clean, with no apology or obligation to the old regime. * The writer is former corespondent of Al-Ahram in Washington, DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
