In ideas they may appear dogmatic, but in practice Egypt's Salafis will be required to be as pragmatic as everyone else, writes Khalil El-Anani* The growing influence of Salafis in Egypt has given rise to concern over their future role in parliament and what it may mean for Egypt's institutions and social fabric. Few paused long enough to ponder the silver lining; the mere possibility that the Salafis may actually have something to offer, or even learn from their current experience. Conventional wisdom has it that Salafism is the exact opposite of secularism. This may be true insofar as each seems to feed on criticism of the other. Looking beneath the surface, however, one may discern the ways in which the Salafis are not much different from the seculars, and may become less different as time goes by. This is a point that is often missed, especially by the seculars who tend to portray the Salafis, and all other Islamists, as irrational if not outright sinister. Such views may soon become outdated, for since the 25 January Revolution, the Salafis have been revising their ideas on politics and society at an unusually fast pace. Seculars like to think of themselves as sensible people, rational and pragmatic, willing to face the facts and assess matters in an objective manner. The Salafis, many believe, are just the opposite: fanatical and irrational, backward and misinformed. This judgement is erroneous in at least one aspect. The Salafis are not a monolithic group that is inure to dogma and immune to change. Indeed, they are showing every sign of being as willing to learn and change as everyone else in the country. They are prepared to become part of public life, with all the negotiations, the disputes, and the media exposure that come with it. In terms of pragmatism and rational decision-making, the Salafis have been as open to compromising and as concerned about their public image as any other politician in the country. Recently, the official spokesman of the Salafi Nour Party, Yosri Hammad, gave an interview to Israel's army radio to say that his party is committed to the 1979 peace treaty. This is remarkable on two counts. First, that no Egyptian secular politician has ever given an interview to that radio, which shows you at least that the Salafis are not as fanatical as they often sound. Second, Hammad made it clear that his party wanted to toe the national line with regard to Israel, "acting in accordance with the interest of the Egyptian state," as he put it. The Salafis keep saying that they must "weigh the harm against the benefit," just in the same way a rational person -- secular if you wish -- would weigh the "pain against the gain". Also consider the way the Salafis define "benefit". It is not what matters for one individual alone, or for a group of individuals, but what matters for the country. Not the unsociable, un-Egyptian behaviour one would associate with foaming-at-the-mouth fanatics. A key figure in the Nour Party recently said that his party supports the Egyptian stock exchange (a bastion, you may notice, of secular capitalism). This is the kind of comment one has to consider carefully. The Salafis can rant all they want against the sins of interest rates and Western banking, but when push comes to shove, they know how to back down. Ultra-orthodox as they are, the Salafis crave political power, and seem to be willing to do what it takes to stay in the game. This is why they are so far playing by the rules of a game designed initially, as you all know, by non-Muslims. Elections, the nation state, parties, parliament, and all the rest of it are now part of the daily vocabulary of Salafist life. It is a new experience, with a steep learning curve, and they are learning from it, as well as from the exposure to public opinion that comes with it. This is not the way it used to be. The Salafis used to live in a cocoon, almost shut off from the outside world. Then they had their opportunity to break into the political scene. And what a great timing this was for them. The Mubarak regime, having stamped out any organised opposition, left them a political arena that was devoid of competition, one that they could venture into with relative ease, thanks to the increased religiosity in the general population. Before the 25 January Revolution, Salafist discourse was mostly dogmatic, dealing with abstract matters of sin and virtue. There was no dialect, no revision, no need to weigh "harm and benefit". Now it is a different situation, one in which they should be more pragmatic, as Sheikh Youssef El-Qaradawi said. Since the 25 January Revolution, the conservative supporters of the Salafis have become more outgoing. They have been talking about who to vote for and what they want from the parliament, and the debate has been changing the way they think. Followers of the Salafist movement are changing. No longer satisfied to be recipients of dogma, they seem to cherish their newly won role as contributors to a debate. In religious terms, one may say that the power of the sheikh over the flock is waning. Consequently, the Salafist discourse is drifting from the absolutism of the past to the relativism of the present. It is remarkable how Salafi candidates have based their electoral programme not on concepts of sin and virtue but on urgent matters of public interest. The case of Abdel-Moneim El-Shahhat, the Salafi politician, is worth noting here. His flamboyant antics have just lost him the elections. If he had reckoned that bashing democracy, art and culture would win him brownie points in ultra- religious streets, he was wrong. Not only did the flock shy away from him, but also his friends in the Nour Party took distance from him, hoping to avoid negative publicity in the midst of elections. Call it opportunism, but this is secular politics for you, and the Salafis are ready to step out of dogma to stay in the game. Not only are Salafi leaders forced into less dogmatic positions, the Salafi public is now demanding more of their religious mentors. They are pushing the sheikhs to try harder, to stay relevant to the political game, and the latter are feeling the pressure. Also, there is a newfound openness in the religious market, so to speak. There are more players on the preaching scene, more debate and more vitality. Eventually, the dogmatic preachers may find the scene of preaching getting more competitive as time goes by. The sudden openness in society following the 25 January Revolution has affected everything, including the religious scene. There is a sense of fluidity in the Islamist camp. There is no longer a dominant group on the Islamist scene, but several groups, competing and challenging each other's position. As a result, the average citizen has more choice, both in political and religious matters, and even the most zealous of religious groups have to make sense to the public, have to be accountable. Does this remind you of something? Does it, for example, remind you of secular politics? In this country we have a significant part of the economy that is purely Islamist. Part of the fashion industry, part of the publishing industry, the printing houses, the recording business, have taken on an Islamic veneer. This comes with social ramifications. People who invest in this economy and who work for it have political interests, a social network, family connections, and professional ties, and they are becoming part of the current debate. This, too, adds to the vitality of religious discourse in the country. I am not saying that the Salafis are going to go liberal, but only that they will become pragmatic enough to be able to work with everyone else, including the liberals. The more Egypt becomes politically open, the more the Salafis would gravitate to the political middle. They will become Salafist-lite if you will, more practical and less dogmatic. It will not happen overnight, but it will happen. * The writer is a researcher at School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University.
