Successful reform of the security forces can come only alongside reform of other state institutions, writes Jailan Halawi 2011, a year of contradictions, saw Egypt prey to a succession of mixed feelings, not least as regards the country's security situation and the performance of the police. For decades the security apparatus's practices had been the subject of domestic complaint and international condemnation on the part of human rights organisations. The various security forces, it was said, operated solely to secure the regime and its cronies. Their absence from the streets in the aftermath of the 25 January Revolution, however, was and is an issue of concern. Since the Friday of Anger on 28 January, when security forces escalated their confrontation with the rebels and, after failing to impose their will collectively disappeared, a sense of insecurity has prevailed among Egyptians. Tales of horrific crimes became daily talking points, a situation that only improved when the Armed Forces made their presence felt in the streets. But the military cannot be expected to act as a police force for a sustained period, leaving the public wondering when the police will return, and what can be done to restore public trust in a force that for a generation at least acted as the iron fist of the hated former regime. In the heat of rebellion, in cities and towns throughout Egypt, police stations were burned to the ground as the people took revenge of their persecutors who had for so long acted with arrogance and impunity. Attacks on police stations left scores of police officers killed or injured. Large numbers of weapons were stolen and subsequently used in attacks on churches, shopping centres and residential buildings. In the absence of the police crime rates spiralled, and many people voiced the suspicion that the security apparatuses were orchestrating the chaos in a last ditch attempt to convince the public that only an iron fisted approach -- including draconian emergency laws -- could guarantee safety. The accusation was denied by then minister of interior Mansour Eissawi who insisted that the poor performance of the police was a result of the material losses -- burned out police stations and vehicles, destroyed computers and communication equipment -- sustained during the course of the revolution. Eissawi was removed in November, to the delight of the protesters in Tahrir Square, and replaced by Major General Mohamed Ibrahim Youssef, but not before he had overseen the replacement of the much loathed State Security Intelligence (SSI) by a new body, the Homeland Security Sector (HSS). The latter has fewer powers than its predecessor and is theoretically restricted to dealing with cases involving terrorism or espionage. While the move was welcomed by scores of rights activists the dissolving of SSI has, claim security experts interviewed by Al-Ahram Weekly, left the Interior Ministry with no "nerve centre". Political experts, however, say the SSI's replacement by the HSS is a cosmetic move. "A change of name does not mean a change in working practices automatically ensues. What is needed is a change in personnel, new leaders," said one political analyst speaking on condition of anonymity. "You have to ask, given that political prisoners have been released and once banned organisations are now legal, just what the HSS will do. For decades the department's main role was to keep the regime's opponents under surveillance. It's the only job they had for decades. Now they have to learn how to work for the benefit of the public, not the regime." HSS officials insist clear policy guidelines are now in place regulating the way its personnel operate. Many departments within the sector have been overhauled, they say, though the main guarantee that old ways do not return is the sector's own determination to work within the rule of law and its new understanding that maintaining good relations between the public and the police is a prerequisite for maintaining security. Officials also say that they have introduced mechanisms to monitor the performance of all personnel and have discovered, in the process, that younger officers are proving most adept at adopting the new guidelines governing their work. The evaluation process, they say, is ongoing, and any staff who fall short will be removed. Such reassurances, however, are having a hard time winning over a sceptical public. That the first two rounds of parliamentary elections passed without any major incident led many to question why, when security could be maintained at such a sensitive time, it cannot always be maintained. Security officials have resorted to blaming the increase in crime on the ongoing revolt, a causality that the state-owned media seems more than happy to endorse. Many activists point out that amid all the talk of thuggery -- the thugs being criminals paid to cause disruption and chaos, the storm troopers of the oft mention hidden hand -- it is the police's duty to identify the thug, and find out just who, if anyone, is paying them. Ironically, some political analysts interviewed by the Weekly suggest that the only officers capable of containing the situation are those from the dissolved SSI and from the Criminal Investigations Department. Yet, say security experts, to accomplish the job such officers need be given a free hand and guarantees that they have the full backing of the authorities, something the public is likely to view as a return to the bad old days. "The security apparatus is part and parcel of the nation and it can only be reformed alongside all other institutions of state," said one police officer. The security situation has improved in recent months and many commentators are hopeful it will continue to do so with the appointment of Youssef as minister of interior. He has a reputation of being tough yet fair, and is not tainted by accusations of corruption.
