Yes, that's what the mainstream in Tehran call it, though it seems to be inspiring both camps there, notes Amani Maged in Tehran The Arab Spring has undoubtedly cast its shadow over the Islamic Republic of Iran and, perhaps, sent refreshing breezes through the streets of the Iranian capital and other cities. Certainly, too, the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen have had a direct impact on the bilateral relations between Tehran and each of these countries and even countries with diplomatic relations with the revolutionary countries, such as Turkey. Such large and politically central countries as Egypt and Syria would certainly be central to Iran. Egypt is the most pivotal nation in the Middle East and Iran has long been looking forward to resuming normal relations with Cairo. Tehran is waiting until the new Egyptian parliament convenes and then discusses a bill to revive bilateral relations. In the several rounds of talks that have taken place between the two countries, Egyptian representatives expressed their readiness to resume relations but on the basis of a parliamentary decision, the implication being that the former regime had stood in the way of the resumption of this relationship. Tehran believes that Egypt's revival, in a new Islamic garb, will give extra support to Hamas and the Palestinian cause. Also, it thinks, Egypt may join the rejectionist front and revise its position on the Camp David accord. It is little wonder, therefore, that Supreme Guide Ali Khamanei declared his support for the Egyptian revolution from the outset and delivered an address in Arabic to the Egyptian people. Iran also supports the revolution in Bahrain, although for different reasons. Bahrain falls within Iran's strategic depth and, with its majority Shia populace, within Iran's doctrinal depth as well. In part because it feels responsible for its coreligionists and in part because it is keen to brace the island kingdom against Saudi and Western intervention, it has been adamantly defending the right of the Bahraini people to change their monarchical form of government. But even as it champions the Bahrainis' struggle to "regain their usurped rights", Iran just as steadfastly defends the Syrian regime. Most if not all Iranian officials feel that since that regime is part of the rejectionist front it must survive, regardless of how brutally it represses its people. Syria offers Iranian influence a vitally important foothold in the Arab Levant. In addition, Syria has long served as Iran's window onto the Mediterranean, a safe route to Lebanon and a reliable partner that has enabled Iran to become a direct party in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also, the Iranian-Syrian alliance has served as a major basis for Iranian influence in Iraq. Tehran seems oblivious to the popular reactions in Syria and elsewhere in the Arab world against its position on the Syrian crisis. To officials in Tehran, the survival of the Al-Assad regime far outweighs the fallout from popular outrage. Its attitude contrasts starkly with that of Turkey, which has gradually disengaged from the Syrian regime over the past few months. Now, Ankara is almost at the point of open rupture with Damascus, after having opened its doors to the entire spectrum of the Syrian opposition, welcomed huge numbers of Syrian refugees and turned the Turkish-Syrian border zone into a safe refuge for dissidents from the Syrian army. From the standpoint of its current position, the most the Iranian regime can do is to offer advice. The advice, moreover, can extend no further than urging Al-Assad to undertake limited reforms that would inch Syria in the direction of a more open and pluralistic system of government, but one that remained fully controllable and that did not substantially curtail the vast powers of the president and the executive agencies. At the same time, as the crisis steadily escalates and Arab initiatives fall by the wayside, the Iranian general commander of the Revolutionary Guard and current military adviser to the Iranian Supreme Guide, Yehia Rahim Safwi issued a stern warning to Ankara. If Turkey did not revise its policies toward Syria, "it can expect a lot of trouble from its people and its neighbours," he said. Among the "policies" implied in the Iranian official's statement were the deployment of a NATO anti-ballistic missile shield in Turkey and Ankara's promotion of "Islamic secularism". The Syrian revolution brought an abrupt end to the long Turkish-Iranian honeymoon that peaked with the nuclear fuel-swap deal a year and a half ago. As the Syrian death toll climbs, relations between Ankara and Tehran have grown increasingly acrimonious. The mounting tensions between the two have undoubtedly strengthened Tehran's resolve to do all in its power to prevent the fall of the Al-Assad regime and the rise of a government that would be closer to Ankara. As the various regional parties act, manoeuvre or posture, the situation on the ground in Syria shows no sign of resolving itself, whether in favour of the regime or the mass protest movement. The grave ramifications of this festering crisis should compel these parties to undertake an urgent reassessment of the situation. This applies especially to the Arabs, who have yet to adopt a position as explicit and resolute as that of Iran or Turkey. As detrimental as the Syrian revolution has been to Iranian-Turkish relations and to Iran's image in the Arab world because of Tehran's double standards with respect to the Bahraini and Syrian revolutions, Tehran still feels that the Arab Spring is generally working in its favour. Certainly, it will gain from the overthrow of pro-Western/US regimes and the rise of new regimes that will be more prepared to back the Palestinian cause and, perhaps, to join the overtly anti-American camp. Already the emerging Islamist regimes in the Arab world have expressed their readiness to normalise relations with Iran, albeit with an element of caution. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, for example, has stated that it would welcome the revival of Egyptian-Iranian relations, but without importing the Iranian model of government. From the Iranian perspective, the Arab revolutions could impact favourably on issues of central concern to Tehran. For one, they offer the prospect of alleviating the pressures of the economic sanctions on Iran. In addition, the revolutions have offered Tehran an opportunity to speed up its uranium enrichment activities and open new reactors. Nevertheless, it is too earlier to determine whether, in the final analysis, the Arab Spring -- or the Islamist Spring, as some have begun to call it -- will prove a net gain or a net loss for Iran's status and influence in the region. Any precise forecast will depend on the final political outcome of revolutions that have succeeded in toppling regimes and the developments of uprisings that are still in progress.
