Iranians are looking to the Arab Spring for signs of a real change in the region, one that brings them in from the cold, says Amani Maged How does Tehran stand with respect to the revolutions that have erupted in several Arab states? What kind of changes might they trigger inside Iran? How will they effect its foreign relations? Will they help add to or detract from Tehran's assets abroad? Of the Arab countries that have been swept by revolution, perhaps the one that will have the greatest and most immediate impact on Tehran is Egypt, the most pivotal country in the Middle East. For years the Iranians have been trying to revive normal relations, but to no avail. Therefore, barely had the Egyptian revolution begun than Iran declared its support and Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei delivered a speech, in Arabic, addressing the Egyptian people and asking the Egyptian regime to respond to their demands. Iranian leaders see the Egyptian revolution as an extension of their Islamic revolution and a new source of support for the Palestinian cause, which is why Iran was one of the first countries to welcome the Egyptian-brokered reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. Nor did it come as a surprise that Tehran made new overtures to Egypt and offered its moral backing to Egypt's African and Arab roles. In part this drive was intended to improve the Iranian image, which has been tarnished in the Arab region as a result of accusations of interference in Iraq and Bahrain. However, it has other advantages to gain from the restoration of its relations with Egypt after a 30-year hiatus. In the opinion of many observers, the Iranians are pleased by the rise of the moderate Islamist trend in Egypt and hope that Egypt will join the rejectionist front and, perhaps, revise its position on the Camp David accords. Iran's concern about Bahrain is of a different order. It regards Bahrain as an extension of its geographical strategic depth and it feels a sense of responsibility for the predominantly Shia sheikhdom. It is also very wary of Saudi and Western interventions in that country and has vigorously championed the right of the Bahraini people to change their monarchical system of government. However, its attitude towards the Syrian revolution contrasts sharply with its support for the revolution in Bahrain and the rights of the oppressed Bahraini people. According to all Iranian officials, safeguarding the rejectionist front must take priority over regime change, even if that regime brutally suppresses its people. Therefore, they say, the most that Tehran can do is offer brotherly counsel to the Syrian leadership, advising it to institute reforms. On the whole, observers are of conflicting opinions over the potential effects on Iran of the revolutions in the three countries above, as well as those in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. Several weeks ago, Iran convened a widely attended conference in order to analyse the revolutions in terms of whether they would enhance or curb Iranian influence, and numerous studies and seminars were conducted elsewhere to explore the same question. The conclusions, as a whole, fall into two categories. Those that hold that Iran stands to gain argue that the Arab regimes that the people have or are seeking to overthrow were effectively pro-West and pro-US and Israel, in particular, while the people themselves were against these powers. Iran will have a unique opportunity to rally the new governments to its side in a concerted campaign to support the Palestinian cause. In addition, according to this view, the revolutions herald an Islamic awakening, which Iran regards as an extension of its Islamic revolution of 1979, and the new governments therefore will be keen to establish good relations with Iran in order to win the affection of the masses. Those in the opposing camp hold that Iran is in a dilemma, especially because its actions in Iraq have stirred censure and fear of Iranian expansionist designs in the predominantly Sunni Arab region. They also point to Tehran's support for Hizbullah and the toll that this and other attempts to intervene in the domestic affairs of Arab countries have taken on the popularity of and support for Iran in the region. In addition, they say, the people fighting for democratic revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere still have a clear memory of the Iranian regime's campaign of repression in the wake of the 2009 presidential elections. Analysts, on the whole, expect that the Arab revolutions will effect a number of other issues connected with Iran, most notably sanctions. Some point out that there have been no new rounds of sanctions imposed on Iran since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Perhaps, they maintain, the revolutions have distracted Western powers from Iran, an opportunity that Iran may take advantage of in order to speed up its uranium enrichment programme and open new nuclear reactors. On the other hand, the results of the revolution in Syria will cast their shadow over the rejectionist front, in which Damascus is the keystone, as the Iranians like to call it. It is simultaneously difficult to separate the situation in Syria from the situation of Hizbullah in Lebanon and the future of the Iranian relationship with that organisation. Many Israelis believe that the current upheaval in the region will change the strategic environment in a manner unfavourable to Israel. They see the changes that took place in Egypt as a warning bell and hold that other US allies in the region have begun to question the extent of US commitment towards them. On the other hand, several reports mention that the missile shield that Israel has installed recently may strengthen Israel's confidence in its ability to respond to any retaliatory actions on the part of Hizbullah or Tehran and increase its willingness to resort to the military action against Iran, over which option it has long been equivocating. With respect to the situation inside Iran, some observers hold that the Arab revolutionary virus could spread to the Iranian people. They argue that the domestic climate is tense, especially in view of the mounting rivalry between President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, and that conditions in the country are far from being as stable as the Iranian authorities would like to project. Of course, so many of the conjectures are contingent upon the fates of the revolutions in progress and, perhaps, those of revolutions around the corner. The only certainty anyone can have is that there will be change, although it is still up in the air whether change will boost Iran or diminish it.
