In Focus: Confusing maps from a stormy spring Institutionalised democratic government, a key aim of the 25 January Revolution, seems to be receding from our grasp, writes Galal Nassar Some nine months after the 25 January Revolution, the political climate in Egypt has grown stifling and absurd. The level of political, social and economic dialogue in the country has sunk, and Egypt, a land of honour and conscience, and one where the noble aims and values that the revolution stood for, and for which so many patriotic men and women fought and died, has become a kind of free-for-all for opportunists of all stripes. Personal ambitions and the narrow factional interests of various political and religious trends have become so dominant and shrill that they are threatening to divide the country between diverse prospects, each worse than the next. It is impossible to know which will gain the upper hand: will there be a reproduction of the Mubarak regime, the continuation of a military rule run by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) or by a faction within the military establishment that stages a coup, or an Islamic theocracy with its eyes fixed on the Arabian peninsula in the seventh century CE? Or will there be total chaos and civil strife, like in Iraq or Somalia? Whatever now comes to pass, what seems certain is that the option of institutionalised democratic government is now becoming increasingly out of reach in an intensely charged climate in which all the parties lack the will to work towards the realisation of what was one of the central aims of the revolution. One thing that perhaps best exemplifies the current situation is the futile, yet heated, debate that has taken place over the "constitutional principles paper" presented by the deputy prime minister, Ali El-Silmi, to a conference that was supposed to be discussing fundamental constitutional principles and the selection of the constitutional assembly. Held on 1 November, the conference was attended by representatives of the various political parties and forces. The vast majority of the Islamist forces present opposed the paper on the grounds that it was an attempt to circumvent the will of the people, as expressed in the March referendum on various constitutional amendments. These forces said that the present government is a non-elected caretaker government and that it therefore does not have the right to deliberate on important matters such as those contained in the deputy prime minister's paper. They also objected to the timing of the presentation, as it came in the run-up to the parliamentary elections and could therefore generate confusion. One can not help but observe that our compatriots who represent the Islamist trend are being very selective here in their objections. Was not the amendment of Article 39 of the Constitutional Declaration in order to make it possible for Egyptians abroad to vote in the forthcoming elections also a "circumvention" of the referendum? According to the same logic, were not the amendments to the same document with regard to the electoral system and the use of proportional and individual lists also an attempt to subvert "the will of the people", as this was expressed in the same referendum? There is no connection between the constitutional articles amended in accordance with the March referendum and the principles presented for discussion by Ali El-Silmi. Moreover, the current government is not the only non-elected body that is currently in charge of the country's affairs. The same applies to the SCAF. Is it not curious that those same forces that are demanding that both these bodies take steps towards meeting this crucial demand are those that draw a line at the arrangements for drafting a new constitution? One can only agree with the argument of poor timing, however. It is unreasonable to start discussions on a subject of such critical importance in the midst of an electoral campaign that will produce a new parliament that will elect an assembly charged with drafting the country's new constitution. Perhaps the primary reason behind this poor timing is the country's current institutional failings. In fact, El-Silmi's paper was brought up for discussion some time ago, but it had to be deferred due to the deputy prime minister's illness. In a system having stronger institutions the discussion would not have had simply to be put on hold. Someone would have stepped in to perform the deputy prime minister's functions until he had recovered. Yet, to be frank the Islamists' objection to the timing was spurious. At no time since the beginning of the national dialogue have they found it convenient to discuss the question of a set of constitutional principles, which they regard with great suspicion. The real reasons behind the controversy have yet to be officially acknowledged, these being that the country's civil political elite fears the type of constitution that could be formulated by Islamist forces if they obtained a majority in the forthcoming elections or led a majority coalition in the People's Assembly. No one objects to Islam being used as a source of inspiration in drafting the new constitution. The problem is that the Islamist forces may use their understanding of Islam as an instrument for imposing their particular ideology and outlook on the whole of society. Now that a historic opportunity, made possible by the inverted roadmap that has governed the political process since the referendum, is within their grasp, the Islamists have no real intention of sharing it with anyone else. Certain aspects of this conflict seething beneath the surface of the country's political life have begun to be addressed with a degree of frankness. In the course of discussions on the criteria for forming the constitutional assembly, one proposal stated that "in the event that the draft constitution prepared by the constitutional assembly contains one article or more that conflict with the fundamental components of the Egyptian state and society, and with the civil rights and freedoms established under previous Egyptian constitutions, including the constitutional declaration of 30 March 2011 and subsequent constitutional declarations, the SCAF will ask the constitutional assembly to revise the articles within a maximum of 15 days." "In the event that the assembly refuses this revision, the council will submit the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which shall issue a verdict within seven days. This verdict shall be binding on all the parties and all the authorities of the state." A spokesman for the Salafist Nour Party has been blunter yet: "the Egyptian constitution is a red line. We will not allow the secularist trend to monopolise the drafting of its principles." There was never any suggestion of excluding certain political forces from this process, a possibility ruled out by the simple realities of the country's political spectrum. Against this background it should be pointed out that the paper submitted by the deputy prime minister was generally acceptable. Above all, it offered reassurance to the Copts that the provision that the principles of Islamic law would be the primary source of legislation in the country would not conflict with their right to appeal to their own religious statutes and principles concerning personal status issues and religious affairs. Yet, it also contained a number of disturbing points. Articles 5 and 9 regarding the status of the judiciary and the armed forces are a case in point. When one considers that some Arab countries, such as Somalia and Sudan, have been geographically fragmented, and that others, such as Iraq and Yemen, are threatened with this prospect, these two articles raise the spectre of the "functional fragmentation", so to speak, of the Egyptian state. According to Article 5, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary would be empowered to deliberate on all matters pertaining to the country's judicial bodies, and, according to Article 9, the SCAF would enjoy the same powers with respect to armed forces affairs and the military budget. In addition, the SCAF would have the authority to approve any legislation concerning the armed forces prior to its promulgation. In other words, the legislative authority would be divided between the People's Assembly, in which legislative authority should be invested, the higher judicial councils and the SCAF. Another curious provision has found its way into Egyptian constitutions, and so far it has not received the attention it merits. This provision places the armed forces above the executive authority of the state, since it stipulates that the president of the republic can only declare war after obtaining the approval of the SCAF and the People's Assembly. While it is obvious that the approval of the armed forces is needed in order to go to war, to include this provision in the constitution gives the military the right to intervene in the gravest possible decision that can be undertaken by the political authority. Nevertheless, this issue is one thing, and the question of the role of the armed forces in safeguarding constitutional legitimacy is another and one that requires more extensive discussion. Against the arguments against what has been termed the "political involvement" of the military in this case, it should be borne in mind that nascent democracies are often extremely vulnerable. The German elections of 1933, which gave rise to Hitler, who subsequently subverted German democracy in order to create one of the most horrific totalitarian systems in modern history, should serve as a constant reminder of this fact. Authorising the army to safeguard constitutional legitimacy, therefore, would not so much confer a political role on the armed forces as give it the role of defending the constitutional state and the rule of law. Conversely, it could be argued that the inclusion of such a provision in the 1971 Constitution did not prevent the army from ignoring it and siding with the 25 January revolutionaries instead of with the Mubarak regime. In other words, as the most powerful force in the country, the army can intervene in politics with or without a constitutional provision (to which the July 1952 Revolution testifies), and therefore it is safer not to tempt the armed forces by including such a provision in the constitution from the outset. This is a subject that requires more thorough deliberation, especially when one considers the suggestion that the SCAF would have the right to form a new constitutional assembly independently and in accordance with the agreed-upon criteria that would have three months to draft a constitution in the event that the original constitutional assembly failed to produce a draft constitution in the six months accorded for this task. Not surprisingly, virtually all the political forces across the spectrum have rejected this proposal. Admittedly, El-Silmi made some modifications to his proposal, but these seemed insufficient. He struck out the terms that would have given the SCAF "exclusive" control over its budget and reworded Article 9 in order to confer the power to review the military budget upon the National Security Council. However, the other negative points remain. Nevertheless, last Saturday's newspapers indicated a possible shift in the Islamist position, with the representatives of this trend airing a number of conditions for accepting the El-Silmi paper. Certainly this would have been a positive development had it been true or had the reports been accurate. But the following day's newspapers made the Islamists' position explicit: they would give El-Silmi and the SCAF until Wednesday to withdraw the paper, or they would stage a million-man march on Friday and an open-ended sit-in. The country could have been spared all these headaches if the roadmap had proceeded in a logical direction: a constitution first and then presidential elections followed by parliamentary elections, after which the army could have returned to barracks. There would have been no need for futile contention over issues that, as important as they are, only serve to fuel tensions in an increasingly acrimonious climate. Still, in spite of the bitterness and gloom that a majority of Egyptians share at this stage, the only way forward is through dialogue. Dialogue is still possible, and it could lead us to the consensus we need, unless certain parties have hidden agendas.
