The West's embrace of regime change has isolated Bashar Al-Assad but there is a way to go before it becomes fact, writes Graham Usher at the UN On 18 August United States President Barack Obama switched his country's policy towards the Syrian crisis from a pulpit urging reform to a principle demanding change -- at least for the leader he had once tried to coax as a reformer and peacemaker. "The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar Al-Assad is standing in their way," he said. "For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Al-Assad to step aside." Within hours near identical statements were issued by Britain, France, Germany, Canada and the 27-country European Union, whose foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, also insisted on "the necessity for him [Al-Assad] to step aside". The Western chorus came on the back of a report by the UN Human Rights Council. In increasingly desperate attempts to quell the democratic aspiration of its people, the Syrian regime since March had killed 1,900 civilians and lost 260 soldiers, it said. In doing so it had used summary execution, torture and the abuse of minors, including a 13-year-old boy whose mutilated body was returned to his parents several weeks after he disappeared. Such human rights violations "may amount to crimes against humanity", the report concluded. It recommended the UN Security Council refer Syria to the International Criminal Court for prosecution of the alleged atrocities. Al-Assad shrugged off calls and charges as "meaningless". They are not. Aside from "friends" like Iran and Iraq -- and uncertain allies like Hizbullah -- the Syrian regime is now facing its greatest diplomatic isolation since Al-Assad's father took power in a coup in 1971. The pressure won't end with isolation. EU states on the Security Council, backed by the US, have said they will draft a new council resolution with sanctions. Asked what these may mean British Deputy Representative Philip Parham referred to penalties recently passed by the EU. These include not only asset freezes and travel bans but an embargo on Syrian oil and gas exports. That could hurt. Syria earns a third of its state income from oil exports, with most of its crude purchased by Europe. An EU embargo would tip what is an already parlous economy into freefall. A global ban could mean collapse. For this and other reasons veto-wielding states like Russia and China will probably block any energy-related sanctions being passed by the council. Russia in any case has said Al-Assad should be given more time to implement reforms. Non-permanent council members like India, South Africa and Brazil are also wary of any action that would hasten the end of the regime and, in their eyes, precipitate civil war. They are also aware that, unlike Libya, there are no calls emanating from the region for regime change. Until recently this had been Washington's position. "It's not going to be news if the US says Al-Assad needs to go," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on 16 August. But "if Turkey says it, if [Saudi Arabia's] King Abdullah says it �ê� there is no way the Al-Assad regime can ignore it." The reason Obama switched policy was because he believed key powers in the region were starting to "say it". On 6 August Abdullah called on Al-Assad to "stop the killing machine" and recalled the Saudi ambassador to Syria. This was followed in quick succession by the recall of ambassadors from Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Tunisia. The Arab League woke from its slumber to express "growing concern" about Syria. And the Egyptian Foreign Ministry warned that the conflict there was reaching the point of no return. Most significantly Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan dispatched his foreign minister to Damascus for the umpteenth time with what seemed like a final ultimatum: either "immediately and unconditionally" end attacks on protesters or face the consequences. Al-Assad didn't bat an eye. "We made our calls to Libya's Colonel Gaddafi but unfortunately got no result," said a weary Erdogan on 17 August. "The same thing is happening with Syria." Erdogan's comments were cited by administration officials as evidence of a new regional consensus on Syria. Since Ankara is Syria's largest trading partner, its collaboration would also be essential for any effective sanctions regime. But Erdogan has ruled out sanctions. His government has also distanced itself from the new US-led policy of regime change. "Turkey is not at the point mentioned in President Obama's speech," a Turkish government told The New York Times on 18 August. Neither is any Arab state. Writing in the Lebanese Daily Star newspaper this month analyst Rami Khouri said three "critical elements" must prevail if an authoritarian regime is to change its behaviour: there must be popular sentiment, a consensus among key regional actors and international legitimacy as expressed by the UN Security Council. In Libya all three elements obtained, with foreign intervention legitimised by a Security Council resolution. In Syria only one of the three prevails: there is a genuine, mass, national and popular movement that seems impervious to repression. But there is no regional consensus and no international legitimacy to be agreed through forums like the Security Council. Al-Assad's fate in the end may be as irreversible as Gaddafi's. But the lack of the three elements suggests the finale of the Syrian regime will be longer, bloodier and a lot more dangerous.
