Post-revolution, Egypt has the chance to realign its foreign relations, if the right people with the right vision take the lead, writes Mohamed Anis Salem* Sooner or later, the question of reviewing Egypt's foreign policy was going to crop up. In the early days of Tahrir, observers noted that the uprising did not occupy itself with international affairs. When Israel voiced concerns about the future of its relations with Cairo, Egypt's Higher Council of the Armed Forces (HCAF) reaffirmed the country's commitment to all international agreements, inter alia the Egyptian- Israeli Peace Treaty. Later, criticism of the two Egyptian governments formed after the revolution (one led by Ahmed Shafik, the next by Essam Sharaf) focussed, amongst other things, on retaining a number of the ancien regime ministers in office, including foreign minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit. Abul-Gheit had irritated his critics -- some would say the general public as well -- by his statements on the Egyptian uprising, as well as his earlier positions on Palestinians crossing over from Gaza into Egypt, Hamas and Iran. His replacement, Nabil El-Arabi, a seasoned diplomat with legal expertise, positioned himself as part of Egypt's new outlook to the world. He signalled that relations with Iran would be upgraded, Gaza's Rafah Crossings would be opened, and relations with Israel would be managed on a tit-for-tat basis. If the peace treaty with Israel required revision, there were clauses that allowed for that. Egypt would join the Rome Statute (the legal basis of the International Criminal Court) and other human rights instruments. The Iranian aspect did not rest there. While Tehran responded positively, several Arab countries in the Gulf, already in bitter confrontation with Iran over Bahrain, felt that the new minister's timing was off. In Cairo, experts supported an opening with Iran, as it would allow Egyptian diplomacy to exercise more influence over issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Gulf security and establishing a regional nuclear free zone. But, at the same time, several voices expressed concern at the style of handling this issue. It seemed that no prior coordination or consultation was undertaken with Gulf countries. Why now? Was this a response to discreet Gulf suggestions that ex-president Hosni Mubarak should be treated more leniently? In a hastily arranged Gulf trip, Prime Minister Sharaf reassured his hosts that "Gulf security was a red line for Egypt" and that the opening with Tehran would not be at the expense of relations with Gulf Arabs. But these reassurances seemed to have limited effect as the Gulf Cooperation Council moved to expand its membership to include Jordan and Morocco. The new regional order aligned Arab royal regimes in a cluster that left out countries experiencing uprisings (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen) or facing instability (Iraq, Somalia and Sudan) or extreme poverty (Djibouti and Mauritania) -- hardly a winning hand. Enter the Palestinian issue. The previous year had not ended well for the Palestinians. While Israel continued with its settlement policy, the mediation efforts of the US administration were going nowhere. The bid to reconcile Fatah and Hamas had failed and tensions were high between Hamas and Cairo. Then, suddenly, Egypt closed a reconciliation agreement between the Palestinians. The Israeli prime minister reacted negatively. The US was worried, insisting that Hamas needed to recognise Israel before being admitted as a partner. But Europe, more wisely, saw the agreement as a positive development. Then Egypt announced it was opening the Rafah Crossing; it would have nothing to do anymore with the siege of Gaza. Taken together, these signals were received enthusiastically by Egypt's revolutionary youth, intellectuals, media and political movements (mostly, perhaps, by the Muslim Brothers) as a sign of a more independent foreign policy. But life is complicated. Arab League Secretary- General Amr Moussa was leaving his post to contest the Egyptian presidency. After some hesitation, Egypt withdrew its initial candidate for the Arab League position and forwarded the name of a prominent politician, Mustafa El-Feki. When this nomination stumbled in the face of Qatari competition, it was replaced with Egypt's newly appointed foreign minister who was given the job by consensus. Which brings us full circle to the foreign policy questions presently being debated: What are the tenets of Egypt's new foreign policy? What should the objectives be? What strategies should be deployed? What is the job description for the new foreign minister? THE NEW FRAME OF REFERENCE: For some 60 years, Egypt presented its foreign policy with reference to three circles: Arab, African and Islamic. The prolonged focus on the confrontation with Israel, and the bipolar international order helped set priorities and select strategies. In reality, Egyptian policy functioned with flexibility, embracing neutrality from the 1940s onwards while, at the same time, moving from quasi alliance with the USSR in the 1960s to a very close relationship with the US since the 1980s. The three circles were always anachronistic and limited intellectually; they did not elaborate on Egypt's priorities, nor did they explain how they would be pursued in a complex world. Moreover, the goalposts were moved with the collapse of the USSR, the Arab-Israeli peace agreements, and the withering of the Non-Aligned Movement. On top of that, over the last few months, the regional landscape has been changed dramatically -- particularly in the way it informs foreign policy. The multiple Arab uprisings emphasised democracy, human rights and participation. Egypt, now a model for change, felt the need to formulate a policy towards the tsunami wave of change hitting the region. So far, its foreign minister has considered popular uprisings in the region to be an internal matter for concerned countries. Indeed, he told the BBC that the "official position on this question was: no comment!" In the case of Libya, Egypt's position was explained in terms of ensuring the safety and livelihood of the large number of its citizens working there. But some analysts, like Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, were critical of the licence the Arab League gave NATO to intervene in Libya. Could not the Arabs have issued a stern warning to Gaddafi to abdicate? Shouldn't Egypt have played a more assertive role in directing events in this next-door neighbour? Why has the Arab League fallen silent since the Western intervention in Libya? How shrewd was it to send an Egyptian delegation to Muammar Gaddafi as late as May, without visiting the rebels? To the south, another set of forces demand Egypt's attention: ensuring the continued flow of the Nile waters, responding to Sudan's fragmentation, and reducing the fallout from the chaos at the southern entrance of the Red Sea. While Egypt's newly energised political and civil society leaders launched "popular diplomacy" visits to Ethiopia and Uganda, it is clear that resolving contested issues will need more than such ice-breakers. Also on the southern front, the Egyptian navy has remained aloof from the 25-nation Combined Maritime Forces focussed on Somali pirates, themselves an offshoot of a neglected 20-year conflict. Egypt's foreign minister announced that his country wanted to achieve a full-fledged Arab-Israeli peace, not perpetuate the peace process. While the inter- Palestinian reconciliation was a first step in this direction, and a movement is underway to gain UN recognition for a Palestinian state, the reality is that stagnation looms ahead, at least for the next 18 months when the US presidential elections are behind us. What are the options during this period? In the Egyptian-Israeli context, it might be possible to open negotiations on improving access to Gaza, strengthening security arrangements in Sinai, and updating the price of Egyptian gas exports. If the Syria situation calms down (a big "if"), then Damascus may be interested in energising its own peace negotiations, as suggested recently by former US government adviser Bill Quant. Indeed, this possibility partially explains the gentler US treatment of Bashar Al-Assad in the face of a popular uprising. But there remains obscurity over how to deal with Binyamin Netanyahu's obstructionism, recently described by Thomas Friedman as the "Mubarak of the peace process". Meanwhile, non-Arab states of the Middle East have created a brand of diplomacy where ideas are energetically pursued with a variety of hard and soft power strategies. Both Turkey and Iran, in different ways, have increased the level of their interaction and influence in the region. The former established visa free travel zones with several Arab countries, expanded its Middle East trade relations and interceded on issues ranging from Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations, to mediating on Iran's nuclear programme and the Libyan situation. The stars of Turkish soap operas are household names in the region. Iran, albeit under a cloud due to internal repression and the refusal of Arab uprisings of Tehran's patronage, still has huge influence in Iraq, an alliance with Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas, and a nuclear programme that attracts popular admiration to the extent it appears to respond to Israel's atomic monopoly. A more dynamic Egyptian diplomacy will be measured against these standards. IT'S THE ECONOMY: Beyond this challenging landscape, Egypt's reaction to the new regional dynamics will be heavily conditioned by two critical factors: the economy and internal politics. Facing a serious downturn of revenues from tourism, a slackening of investment inflows and disrupted industrial production, IMF experts estimate that Egypt will need up to $12 billion over the next financial year in external assistance. The critical partners that have the capacity to respond to this requirement are the US, the EU and Gulf countries. At their recent summit at Deauville, the G8 pledged a combination of debt relief, aid and assistance to Egypt and Tunisia to help build their democracies. Earlier, speaking at Oxford, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem revived the idea of establishing a Middle East Development Bank to address "the lack of economic diversity, added to the high rate of unemployment among the youth sector". Cairo will need to ensure close, productive relations with this group of countries. The second factor will be the growing influence of internal politics on the foreign policy production process. For the past six decades, Egypt's foreign policy was designed and implemented through a closed system largely controlled by the president of the day and the elitist foreign affairs machinery. Gradually, after 25 January, a wider foreign policy debate has unfolded with inputs from political parties, independent experts, research centres and media, as demonstrated at the recent National Dialogue Conference in Cairo. In the near future, many predict that bodies like the proposed National Security Council, parliamentary foreign relations committees, and the Council of Ministers will institutionalise this role. Politically, the two currents of Islam and liberal democracy will come to bear on this debate. The danger here is that the growth of populist postures will impinge on a policy guided by principles and national interest. In recent policy debates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreign economic assistance, activating Egypt's Nasr Export and Import Company in Africa and moving Egyptian farmers to Sudan. And yet, what is most needed at the moment is a new reading of tectonic changes in the region and internationally. For example, in the African context, Egypt needs to consider the new players on the field and the scale of their operations. Here, there has been a rapid growth of interaction with Asian powers. Currently, the volume of China's trade with Africa is over $125 billion annually, while trade between India and Africa has jumped from $1 billion in 2001 to almost $50 billion last year. India is the largest foreign investor in Ethiopia (with $4.78 billion invested last year) and its annual volume of trade with Addis Ababa is $272 million. At the recent India-Africa summit, India's prime minister pledged $5 billion over the next three years to support African countries in reaching the Millennium Development Goals, in addition to $700 million for developing institutions and another $300 million to building a Djibouti- Ethiopian railway. India also offered 22,000 higher education scholarships and funding for the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Meanwhile, South Africa has joined the BRIC grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Such developments have changed the terrain and the possibilities for Egypt's movement in Africa, demanding closer engagement, innovation, and sustained effort. The job description, and the ongoing head hunting, for Egypt's next minister of foreign affairs will need to take these factors into consideration, with emphasis on the ability to develop a new vision for the country's foreign policy. As French novelist Marcel Proust once said, "The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new lands, but in seeing with new eyes." Perhaps this, more than anything else, is what Egyptian diplomacy needs at the moment. * The writer is director of Development Works (www.dev-works.org) and coordinator of the UN Working Group in the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
