The West has waded neck-high into Libya's civil war, and what happens next is anyone's guess, writes Mohamed Anis Salem* On the face of it, Gaddafi is finished; he has violated too many of the new rules of democratic change in the Arab region. First, his legitimacy was irreparably broken, by his very own actions when he insulted and threatened his people and then, crucially, when his military attacked fellow Libyans. Second, after many years of poor stage performances, sometimes tragic but mostly comic, his persona has been condemned in the court of Arab public opinion, dismissed as the butt of jokes; few, if any, return from that fate. Third, as if that was not enough, like many of his brother autocrats, notably Saddam Hussein, he has managed to mobilise an unbeatable array of forces against him; nobody comes back from that path. The future geopolitics of the region may well include a democratic belt extending from Tunisia, through Libya and Egypt, across the Red Sea to Yemen (taxiing now on the runway towards ending a lengthy one person rule, that was lined up for family succession). Iraq, Lebanon, even Syria, may well join into a new cluster of nascent democracies. Like other Arab regional alliances of bygone days (the progressive socialists of the mid-1960s come to mind), these states may well pass club membership rules, new codes of conduct and, thus, seek a long overdue reform of the Arab League. Such optimistic projections of current dynamics carry their own contradictions, like resistance by other regional parties (note that the dramatic changes are happening in republican regimes not in Gulf dynasties, albeit this latter bloc is being challenged), inter- state competition for leadership amongst the emerging group, and possible internal failures in building viable democratic systems. An alternative scenario could include elements of chaos, disintegration, and multiplying failed states. Other possibilities could be imagined between these two extremes. But this future is still a few steps away. More immediate issues cloud the horizon, including disagreements amongst the anti-Gaddafi coalition, a degree of fogginess on the goals of military operations, and uncertainties on the position of public opinion in many countries. These questions relate to structural realities, not only to a lack in diplomatic efforts, clashes of personalities, or the positions of minor actors. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: Two UN Security Council resolutions provide the international legal context for action against Gaddafi and company (resolutions 1970 and 1973). These were complimented by three regional resolutions, the more important one by the Arab League, the other two by the African Union (AU) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). The elements of these documents included calling for a ceasefire, stopping attacks on civilians, allowing humanitarian access, imposing an embargo on arms supplies, freezing the regime's financial assets, and unleashing the mechanisms of the International Criminal Court against the leaders of the Libyan regime. But most importantly, UNSC 1973 imposed a no-fly zone together with two provisos: "authoris(ing) Member States... to take all necessary measures... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in (Libya)," interpreted liberally by some members of the alliance to allow wider intervention against Gaddafi; but "while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory," used by critics and doubters to place a limit on military actions. These two diverging components reflected the divisions inside the Security Council, with five members abstaining on UNSC 1973, the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Germany -- a substantial segment of the globe. In the real world, military action started way before the French aerial attack of 19 March with aerial surveillance operations and Special Forces infiltrating Libya. And yet, much confusion still reigns on the objectives and strategies of the international intervention in Libya, even though some three weeks have passed since the launch of "Operation Odyssey Dawn", superseded on 27 March by "Operation Unified Protector" (we were told that the choice of the first code words had no intended meaning, something Winston Churchill in his day would have never allowed). TENSIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION: Torn between recent experiences and policies that have failed in the past, the coalition members, particularly the US, do not want to see a repeat of the messy, longer term quagmires of Iraq or Afghanistan, nor can they tolerate another Rwanda or Srebrenica. Not to be forgotten are the failures to predict, comprehend and act in response to the current Arab wave of change (witness Hillary Clinton's early assertions on the stability of Mubarak's regime and French Foreign Affairs Minister Ms Michèle Alliot-Marie offering Ben Ali her country's " savoir faire " on security as protests raged, let alone Western arms sales to Gaddafi, amounting to some $1.5 billion between 2004 and 2009, reaching some $500 million in 2009 alone). While these ghosts in the cupboard may have propelled the coalition away from certain choices, they offered little guidance on alternative options for action. So far, the statistics of war are awesome, including hundreds of aerial sorties and dozens of "strike sorties". And yet, the tension and bickering amongst the coalition members continues. Before UNSC 1973, and in response to Obama's hesitation (gaining him the title of the "Great Vacillator"), Cameron refrained from calling him for nine days. Whenever US Defense Secretary Gates appeared on TV, his body language told us he was unhappy to be involved in a conflict in a country that was not, in his words, a "vital national interest" for the US. He disagreed with statements by UK officials legalising attacks targeting Gaddafi, calling them "unwise". And he would not hear of the US training Libyan rebels. Germany, unsupportive of NATO involvement, pulled out its naval units and AWACS personnel from coalition operations. Holland's doubts limited its military contribution to policing the arms embargo. Turkey insisted on strict adherence to UN resolutions, warning that other actions "cannot be legitimised". In the other corner, Cameron leapt into a new leadership role, raising his tone in the face of doubters: "There are millions in the Arab world who frankly want to know that the UN, the US, the UK, the French [and] the international community care about their suffering and their oppression." Sarkozy, his approval ratings plunging below 30 per cent, and conscious of the criticism directed at French diplomacy for several faux pas in the context of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, more than matched Number 10's enthusiasm: talking tough, recognising the Transitional National Council, and opening air attacks on Libyan ground targets. POLITICAL COVER, INTERNAL AND REGIONAL: Interestingly, there was little said over the last fortnight about the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the UN-promoted international security and human rights norm to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity approved by the Millennium Summit in 2005, due perhaps to the complexity of the idea, which reduces its usefulness in response to the internal challenges faced by many coalition leaders. And yet, the problem remains that intervention in "humanitarian wars" comes with its own baggage: favouring the weaker side in a conflict, sensitivity towards civilian casualties and, most difficult, the strong possibility of aiming for regime change and nation building. These last two components generate longer term, complex commitments, which may translate into election losers -- anathema for leaders in democratic countries. But even in the earlier phases of intervention, the key actors were already severely challenged internally and externally. Obama, criticised by Downing Street for dragging his feet, was also attacked by his own Democratic colleagues for not obtaining congressional approval for military action, while Republicans felt he was fuzzy and hesitant. Before the opposition rallied to the support of Cameron, he told the House of Commons that he did not "want to take a lecture from Labour about dealing with Gaddafi". Divisions spread into countries opposing the intervention, with Russia's Putin likening the intervention to the medieval crusades, only to be slapped down by Medvedev. While some coalition leaders are probably happy to see their approval ratings going north, they must be concerned at surveys showing concerns about the costs and duration of the conflict. In this environment, the Arab League resolution calling for a no-fly zone (again, carried despite significant dissent) and the symbolic participation of Qatar and the UAE in military action was received by coalition leaders as heaven sent political cover. But even here, Arab public opinion remained suspicious of the intervention while official statements lacked conviction. Alarm bells sounded in Western capitals when Arab voices were raised against civilian casualties, although the Vatican had issued stronger statements. CLARITY ON OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES, TACTICS: The key contested issue remains that of the ultimate objective of the coalition. While there have been many statements denying that it is all about regime change, the reality is that herein lies the elephant in the room. Look at this statement by UK Defence Secretary Liam Fox on 21 March: " the international community wants (Gaddafi's) regime to end... (but) Regime change is not an objective." On the same day, the leader of The Times was "Regime Change", saying: "UN Resolution 1973 is a humanitarian mission whose ultimate goal must be regime change." French Foreign Minister Juppe said that while "it is not written in the UNSC resolution that (Gaddafi) has to go, it is obvious; lets not fool ourselves." Retired General James Jones, Obama's previous national security adviser, asserted that ousting Gaddafi was the ultimate goal. In contrast John Kerry, the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee said that, "This operation is not specifically geared to get rid of Gaddafi." These conflicting views on objectives, the varying degrees of commitment by the coalition members and the gaps in international support make it even more challenging to design military strategies and tactics. The fist steps were relatively easy (mobilising international support, building the alliance, and imposing the no-fly zone). By the time the London conference convened (29 March), "Participants agreed that Gaddafi and his regime have completely lost legitimacy and will be held accountable for their actions." So no more dealings with Gaddafi. Nevertheless, the difficult questions remain. Training the rebels? Arming them? What to do with the remnants of the regime? How long would the conflict last? Answers like that of a British official who retorted, "How long is a piece of string?" will hardly reassure the public. WITHER THE ENDGAME? The endgame, then, remains unclear. If Gaddafi stays in power, even in part of Libya, that will mean protracted military commitment by the coalition. A divided Libya, with an extended civil war, would be risky for coalition coherence and the political survival of its governments, particularly in view of the limited capacity of the Libyan rebels and the shifting sands of public opinion in the region and beyond. Also, there are other demanding issues generated by the multiple uprisings in the Arab world. Taken together, these factors may very well favour more aggressive action by the coalition. Another reason for concluding that Gaddafi is practically finished. Meanwhile, the stalemate continues. * The writer is director of Development Works (www.dev- works.org).
