While the political horizon in 2010 is still open, few are expecting much from America's current president, writes Hassan Nafaa This time last year Barack Obama was getting ready to start his first term as US president. He looked so different from all preceding American presidents. With his African and Islamic origins, he brought hope to many. He came to the scene in the aftermath of wrenching neocon policies and in the midst of a grinding economic crisis, and yet his message of change was cheered across the world. But the high hopes Obama once generated inside and outside the US have wilted, giving way to bitterness, misgiving, and foreboding. It is true that the neocon era is over. It is also true that military power is no longer acceptable as a sole basis for resolving international conflicts. And yet, the change the Obama presidency once promised is no longer at hand. This is why there is so much ambiguity in today's international scene, as if we're still open to all kinds of possibilities. It is true that most political analysts knew from the beginning that the road of change wouldn't be easy. We knew that the heavy legacy of George W Bush would take years to remedy. We knew that finding alternative ways and more effective politics would be a tremendous task. And yet, the way in which Obama has dealt with various aspects of US foreign policy, especially those related to Middle East issues, is disappointing. And one cannot expect a drastic change to happen in these policies in the foreseeable future. From the first moment in the White House, Obama must have realised the extent of change that was needed. He must have realised that the US has to alter its policy towards the Middle East, especially with regards to its relations with Israel. Because of the exceptional treatment the US has given Israel over the years, the latter has become accustomed to getting away with anything -- to act like a spoiled brat. As soon as he took office, Obama appointed George Mitchell as his special envoy. He also called on Israel to stop completely its settlement activities. However, the arrival into power of the Israeli far right, led by Netanyahu, threw a wrench in Obama's works. No one expected Obama to lock horns with Netanyahu. No one asked Obama to use economic sanctions against Netanyahu, although George Bush Sr did just that to force Shamir to attend the 1991 Madrid Conference. We knew that the new US administration had other priorities, most important of which was to address the economic crisis, reform healthcare, and figure out a timetable for a honourable withdrawal from Iraq. It made sense, therefore, for Obama to play it safe and avoid an early clash with Israel that may antagonise the all-powerful Jewish lobby. Still, many expected Obama to resort to indirect pressure on Israel, for example by mending fences with Iran and Syria, two countries that can help him get American troops safely out of Iraq. Also, Obama could have started talking to Hizbullah and Hamas, something that could have helped improve the image of the US in the Muslim world. As time went by, it became clear that Netanyahu was running circles around Obama. As soon as Netanyahu sniffed the storm that was brewing in Obama's speech at Cairo University, he took action. Within weeks, Netanyahu had mobilised Jewish pressure groups in America in an effort aiming to obstruct all attempts to change the course of US policy in the Middle East. Netanyahu's success was as spectacular as it was immediate. Not only did he make Obama eat his words on the freeze of all settlement activities, he also stopped all efforts by the American president to start dialogue with Iran and Hamas. Obama learned his lesson quickly. From then on he acted more like a man concerned about his second term in office than like a leader concerned about his role in history. Granted, Obama is in an unenviable position. On the one hand, he doesn't want to do anything that may disrupt the outcome of mid-term elections slated for November 2010, or presidential elections slated for November 2012. On the other hand, he cannot allow himself to be pushed around by regional actors seeking to promote their own agenda. As turmoil continued in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, Obama was forced to increase American military presence overseas and open up new battlefronts. As a result, the Obama administration looked as if it were pursuing the same old war on terror, albeit with a new lexicon. And the ability of Obama to influence the course of Middle East events seemed to dwindle. Meanwhile, regional players, especially Iran and Israel, kept pursuing their own agendas. There is nothing to suggest that Iran would change its position on the nuclear question. In fact, the Iranians are likely to press on with the enrichment of uranium while denying any intention to make nuclear weapons. At present, the Iranian regime is facing real and growing challenges at home because of the presidential elections crisis. These challenges may end up making the regime more paranoid and intransigent. And it may use current events as an excuse to crush the opposition that the regime accuses of collaboration with the West. Because the Iranian opposition hasn't yet gathered enough strength to bring down the regime without outside help, the regime may try to use this situation to its psychological and political advantage. In the absence of Western recognition of Iran's credentials as a regional power, Iran is likely to push on with its nuclear programme. The Iranians are also likely to maintain close links with Hamas and Hizbullah regardless of the political and material cost. As for Israel, it is clear that the rightwing government of Netanyahu looks at Iran as the greatest threat to its national security. Israel sees Iran as a peril not only to its security but also to its very existence. That's why an Israeli military strike on Iran cannot be ruled out. So far Israel has not exhibited real interest in settling the Middle East crisis. And it has denied the Palestinian Authority any breakthrough that may have strengthened the hand of moderate Arabs. The absence of peace in the region provides a fertile soil for extremism. The absence of peace, therefore, doesn't help the US in its war on terror. The Netanyahu government is but wasting time through endless talks-about-talks. Israel is procrastinating on peace while biding its time for a strike on Iran. In the Arab world, the scene is one of a complete power vacuum. We no longer have a central issue to rally around. And those who are supposed to fight for the one and only cause are now fighting each other. Civil wars have spread across the Arab world, from Iraq to Sudan, from Somalia to Yemen. As those who are spared the inferno of civil war are plagued with political and social instability, or engaged in border fights with neighbours. We're not prepared, individually or collectively, to take initiative on any matter, however crucial it may be to the region. Some Arab countries have retreated into their shells, choosing to focus on their domestic problems. Others are trying to compensate for their weakness through alliances, explicit or implicit, with non-Arab countries, sometimes at the expense of higher Arab interests. The one country that stands out in the region today is Turkey, apparently the only one having cordial ties with all conflicting parties. Turkey has close ties with all Arab countries, especially Syria, as well as the US, Iran and Israel. This gives it a great opportunity to act as mediator on many regional issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. Considering the region's current instability, 2010 may bring about some interesting changes, especially with regards to Iran's nuclear programme and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel would do everything it could to get the US to take part in a military strike on Iran, or at least to throw its weight behind the so-called reformists in the hope of toppling the mullahs. But it knows that this cannot happen unless the Arabs are given something to keep them busy, perhaps another round of talks-about-talks. Maybe Obama would approve a strike, assuming that such a move would help him stay in office for another term. And maybe he would come to an understanding with the mullahs at the expense of the Arabs.
