A no-fly zone has yet to fly at the United Nations Security Council, writes Graham Usher in New York Two weeks ago the UN Security Council came together to impose sanctions against the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, referring it to the International Criminal Court for possible war crimes against the Libyan people. On 14 March the council met again to address a request from the Arab League to impose a no-fly zone (NFZ) over Libya "to protect the country's civilian population". But this time there was no coming together, despite a turn in the war in Libya that has seen pro-regime forces drive out the rebel Libyan National Council (LNC) militia from forward bases in Zawiya, Ras Lanuf and Brega. There may be increasing international consensus on the need to isolate the Gaddafi regime. But there is none on the council over how to do it -- especially if it means a military intervention authorised by the UNSC, NATO or an Iraq-like coalition of the willing. The council broke up without agreement. "Fundamental questions need to be answered, not just what we need to do, but how it's going to be done," said Vitaly Churkin, Russian ambassador to the UN. "If there is to be a no-fly zone, who's going to implement it? Without those details or answers to those questions, it's very hard to take a responsible decision". Russia is not alone in erring on the side of caution. At meetings of European Union leaders and NATO Defence Ministers last week there was no consensus on Libya beyond the delivery of humanitarian assistance and enforcement of the arms embargo called for by Security Council on 26 February. Contingency plans for a possible NFZ would continue, said US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Brussels. "But that's the extent of it". The messages are similarly mixed in the region. On 10 March the African Union Peace and Security Council condemned the "indiscriminate use of force" by Libya but rejected "foreign military intervention". It also called on all parties to respect Libya's "sovereignty and territorial integrity". Even the Arab League "request" to the Security Council was not unanimous. Algeria and Syria objected, "because we do not want another Iraq," snapped a Syrian diplomat at the UN. And while calling for a NFZ, the Arab League rejected "foreign intervention" in Libya. This is an oxymoron: non-Arab states like Britain, France and above all the United States would have to "intervene" in some way since only they would have the air power to enforce a zone, say analysts. "These are questions that have to be discussed, these are not clear signals being sent [by the Arabs], because a NFZ would be a military intervention," said German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle on 14 March. He also said the Arab League would need to "not just support but participate" militarily in any action that went beyond sanctions. The divisions are reflected on the council. The most zealous advocates of a NFZ are France and Britain. Both believe the recent shifts on the battlefield in favour of pro-regime forces could leave Gaddafi "dominant" in much of Libya, in perpetual war with the rebel held east and a "pariah state" at odds with Egypt, Tunisia and southern Europe. This presumably is the reason France has rushed to recognise the LNC as the "legitimate" representative of the Libyan people, together perhaps with the prospect of lucrative deals should the rebels regain control over the eastern oilfields. And both Britain and France feel a NFZ would not only protect civilians: it would turn the war back in favour of the rebels. It's not a prognosis shared by permanent council members like Russia and China or non-permanent members like Germany, South Africa and Brazil. They believe France's precipitous recognition of the LNC has only raised regional fears of a Western- engineered partition. Nor would a NFZ change the balance of power in a war that has been fought mainly on ground. The US shares this scepticism. Like France and Britain, President Barack Obama wants regime change in Libya. But he wants it via "tightening the noose" on Gaddafi and his loyalists through sanctions and other actions, not yet through military intervention. "I have not taken any options off the table," he said on 11 March. But, "when it comes to US military action, whether it's a NFZ or other options, you've got to balance costs versus benefits". And there is precious little benefit, according to his military. There is no evidence a NFZ would protect civilians. And it could be counterproductive, whipping up an anti-American backlash in a revolt that has seen little overt anti-Western sentiment. Worse, it conjures up what Ross Douthat and others have called America's "Iraq syndrome" against any more foreign wars. In the New York Times on 14 March he wrote: "And if the civil war [in Libya] dragged on, what then? Twice in the last two decades, in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, the United States has helped to impose a no-fly zone. In both cases, it was just a stepping stone to further escalation: bombing campaigns, invasion, occupation and nation building". Despite the lack of agreement, a resolution calling for a NFZ will probably be soon put [or has been put] to the Security Council. Lebanon, Britain and France are said to be working on a text [or worked on the text]. But short of a documented massacre of civilians by Gaddafi or the fall of the LNC in Benghazi, it could [will] only be endorsed on the most humanitarian of grounds. First most council members will want a ratcheting up of sanctions on the regime, stricter enforcement of the arms embargo and perhaps greater cooperation with the LNC. There is a possible consensus on the council for all these things. There is no consensus for the start of another Iraq. (Libya's hanging future, pp.8-9)
