Sanctions remain Washington's preferred strategy for dealing with Iran -- even though they are not working, writes Graham Usher Negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme in Istanbul ended on 22 January -- as most observers said they would -- in impasse. European Union Foreign Policy Chief Baroness Ashton -- speaking for the so-called 5+1 countries (the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany) -- said she was "disappointed" by the outcome but that the "door remained open" to diplomacy. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on 23 January, said he was "hopeful" talks between Tehran and the six would resume. But no date was agreed in Istanbul. Instead each side went through its usual repertoire of position and grievance. Led by the US, the six urged Iran to "engage constructively" on "core concerns" with its nuclear programme, above all those parts the UN atomic agency suspect may have a "military dimension". They also submitted "confidence building" proposals to reduce Tehran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which, once enriched, can be used to fuel power stations or make atomic weapons. Iran said its programme was in compliance with its obligations as a signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), a claim correct to the letter of the treaty if not quite the spirit. It also tacked further talks on the six recognising Tehran's right under the NPT to enrich uranium for civilian purposes and the lifting of all sanctions, international, national and other. That's a non-starter. However glacially, Washington is convinced sanctions and covert action -- euphemistically known as "pressure" -- are "slowing" Iran's nuclear programme. Sanctions are hurting Iran's economy, particularly banking and export industries, say watchers. Nor -- following exposes in The New York Times -- is there any doubt that the US and Israel were the authors of a recent malware programme, the Stuxnet, that obliterated up to a fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges at its Natanz plant. Combined with recent assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists (for which Iran blames the US, Israel and the UK), the Stuxnet sabotage is probably the reason for the "reassessment" of Iran's "nuclear military capability" by retiring Mossad head Meir Dagan. He said this month Tehran would not have the bomb until 2015: earlier Israeli projections had said 2011. Washington agrees. "We have time, but not a lot of time," said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier this month. "But the real question is how do we convince Iran that pursuing nuclear weapons will not make it safer and stronger but just the opposite?" Not by pressure it seems. There is zero evidence that sanctions or covert ops have either weakened the Iranian regime or eroded the central place the nuclear programme holds within it. Eighteen months after thousands took to the streets to protest his rigged reelection, Ahmadinejad seems only to be growing stronger. He has crushed the opposition Green movement (on 23 January two Iranians were hanged for circulating anti-government images on the Internet). He has extended his power base beyond the military and intelligence organisations to civilian bodies like the Foreign Ministry, once the pillars of the "traditional conservatives". And he is making bold domestic moves. Earlier this month, he slashed state subsidies on fuel and other essential goods that generated waste and depressed export earnings for oil and gas: perhaps the most important economic reform in the Islamic Republic's 30-year history. This makes Iran less vulnerable to sanctions on fuel imports. But so far from causing outrage on the street the reforms enjoy broad popular support, particularly among the poor who were granted cash handouts by the state to cushion them against price rises. This may strengthen Ahmadinejad even more, says Iranian analyst Ray Takeyh. "Ahmadinejad's calculations stem as much from his desire to disenfranchise middle-class critics. In due course more targeted subsidies are likely to reward the lower classes that support his regime". And the stronger Ahmadinejad feels at home the more "confrontational" will be Iran's "diplomacy" abroad, he predicts. Iran's regional clout is exaggerated, not least by Washington, Israel and certain Arab rulers. But there is little chance sanctions will make Iran buckle like a pre-invasion Iraq. It is now the single strongest foreign power in Iraq, and an increasingly important one in Afghanistan. It has circumvented the worst of the sanctions by hiking trade with China, and warming ties with emerging powers like Turkey and Brazil. And this month it watched its closest regional Arab ally -- Lebanon's Hizbullah movement -- expose the limits of US regional power by bringing down a pro-Western Arab government even as its prime minister was seeking support from Barack Obama. The West and other powers should stop making the mistake of ignoring Iran's status as a regional "heavyweight", Iran's UN ambassador, Mohamed Khazee, told journalists in New York before the Istanbul talks. Instead of focussing only on Iran's nuclear programme they should sit down with Tehran as "equals" and cooperate on issues of mutual concern such as regional nuclear disarmament and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Western diplomats answer that before "comprehensive cooperation" Iran must come clean on its nuclear programme. The result is a regional wrestling match between the US and its allies on the side and Iran on the other but with neither being quite strong enough to floor the other. In diplomacy the result is impasse; in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's local wars fought by proxies; and in Lebanon, it's a very dangerous brinkmanship. "We told the Iranians privately that it's a big mistake not to talk to the US," a European diplomat told the New York Times in Istanbul. It may be an even bigger mistake for America not to talk to Iran.
