The US is hoping for a peaceful birth for Africa's newest state. Is Khartoum, asks Graham Usher Until recently the UN Security Council's fears about the south Sudan referendum on self-determination were over whether it would happen at all and, if it did, whether it would ignite a new war between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) government in the north, which opposed secession, and the autonomous Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) government in the south, which sought it. Today -- with nearly four million southerners half way through a vote that will almost certainly approve independence -- those fears have been replaced by a mood of cautious optimism and self- congratulation. Led by the Obama administration, since September the UNSC seems to have convinced Khartoum that -- in any free vote -- the south would secede; that the statesmanship-like thing to do would be to accept it; and that economic and diplomatic benefits would accrue if it did. It worked. The last six months have seen a dramatic fall in violence in the south, after a spike in 2009 which, if not orchestrated by Khartoum, was led by militia and renegade SPLM soldiers allied to it. An apparent metamorphosis has also come over the man whom southerners most hold responsible for their woes and whom the International Criminal Court in The Hague has indicted for alleged war crimes and genocide in Darfur, atrocities that were practised first in the south: President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir. "The preferred choice for us is unity but in the end we will respect the choice of the southern citizens," Al-Bashir told SPLM officials on 4 January on what may be his last visit to Juba as president. He said Khartoum would be "the first to recognise [a new state in] the south" and would be ready to give "technical, logistical and professional support" to its "southern brothers". These comments lightened furrowed brows in New York, Washington and other capitals. But they were not given for free, said a UN official. "For months the US and others have been telling Al-Bashir to pledge to respect the outcome [of the referendum]. Now he has, and he will want something in return, not only from the US but also from the SPLM." Al-Bashir flagged his wants in an interview with Al-Jazeera TV three days later. He said Khartoum would "never" surrender Abyei, a region that was supposed to hold a separate referendum on whether its people wanted to join the north or south. It was postponed after the NCP and the SPLM failed to agree which Sudanese could vote. Abyei lies north of the yet to be marked border between the north and south. In 2008 a court of arbitration in The Hague ruled that its largest oilfield belonged to Khartoum. Abyei is also grazing land for the nomadic Arab Misseriya tribesmen, seen as allies of the north, who want to vote in any referenda there. The SPLM has rejected both the ruling and the "right". On 7 January clashes broke out between the Misseriya and the pro-south Dinka tribes, leaving at least 30 dead, including some SPLM policemen. It's not clear if the NCP (or SPLM) fanned this fire. But unless it is swiftly doused it could suck in their two militaries. It's perhaps for this reason that Washington is telling Juba to accept Khartoum's terms for Abyei as part of the "price" of freedom. It is also telling the SPLM to be as generous as possible in finding a revenue sharing formula for Sudan's oil reserves, seen as critical if the south is to make a peaceful transition to independence. Three quarters of Sudan's crude lies in the south but it requires pipelines and ports through the north to be exported. Under the peace agreement that ended Sudan's second civil war in 2005 the revenue from oil was split equally between north and south, and both sides agree it would be "disastrous" if the pipelines were severed because of war. But with independence, Juba wants the share tilted in its favour. That's understandable says Suleiman Baldo, a Sudanese analyst. But the more gradual the tilt the more accommodating Juba will find Khartoum on issues like Abyei, citizenship and a new border, he predicts. Like the SPLM in the south, the NCP uses oil revenues to finance an inflated military and state bureaucracy. Already under fire from domestic opponents for "losing the south", the survival of Al-Bashir's regime may depend on them. And, ironically, the US wants the regime to survive. "The stability of the north is as critical as the outcome in the south," said Senator John Kerry, chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Juba on 9 January. Beyond survival, the fear of many is that Sudan is about to replace one failed state with two. Even if the SPLM can steer a way to independence -- and defuse potential mines like Abyei -- Africa's 54th state will be born in poverty, with mass illiteracy and often violent competition between its diverse ethnic groups. It will require foreigners for cash and skills, and probably ask the UN to manage the new border, provide protection to its people and help in the monumental task of nation building. The SPLM will also have to develop a far more representative form of government, if the resentment southerners feel today towards Khartoum is not to be transferred to Juba tomorrow. As for Khartoum, it is not clear whether it will learn from history or repeat it. Al-Bashir's acceptance of southern self-determination may be a late flowering of wisdom. Yet it has been accompanied by a clampdown on the opposition at home, threats of a more exclusivist imposition of Sharia law and a vow to use an "iron fist" against any armed rebellion. If this is how Khartoum intends to deal with its 30 or so other insurgencies, Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and South Blue Nile could go the same way as Juba.
