To avoid disaster, Arab governments need to stop dawdling and embrace comprehensive development programmes for the disadvantaged and peripheral areas, writes Sameh Rashed* Everywhere you look around you in the Arab world, there is a chunk falling off and another hanging by a thread. As opposition movements get territorial and insurgents get more stubborn, the much-vaunted stability of the region is becoming shakier by the day. Opposition movements and rebellions are nothing new in this region. But it used to be that the rebels would have specific demands and the opposition would press for a bigger slice of the political cake. Now everyone is going for broke. The sharks of dissent have smelled the blood of secession. And bickering is increasingly being replaced by a resolve to go it alone. Where did all this come from? Looking at the map of the region, one can identify the changing shape of political discontent. The ultimate form is what you see in south Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan. In Sudan, secession is only a step away, hinged only on the 9 January referendum that is starting to look like a formality on the road to partition. To be honest, south Sudan has practically been a separate region for years now. It has been running its own affairs for some time, and even before that it had for years asserted a distinct cultural and ethnic identity. In Iraqi Kurdistan, self-rule is firmly in place and for the past two years or so the regional government has flown its own flag on public buildings. Again, secession is a word that comes easily to mind. Formal international recognition, and a seat in the UN, and you've got yourself a new country ready to go, complete with national paraphernalia and a sense of solidarity and common purpose. In south Yemen, things are not that developed yet, but the writing is already on the wall. The same goes for southern Iraq, western Sudan, and the whole of befuddled Somalia. In all of the above, dissidents have entertained the idea of secession, but the moment hasn't come yet to say it aloud. In Darfur, the moment may not be as far away as we'd like to think. Minorities with grievances are common across the Arab world. We find them in Nubia in southern Egypt, in the Shia-dominated areas of Saudi Arabia, and in eastern Sudan. Often, secessionist calls arise from ethnic, religious or linguistic discrepancies. The Kurds have a claim to ethnic and cultural cohesion. The south Sudanese are culturally and ethnically different. And the Nubians, who speak Arabic with ease, still have their ancient language. What makes people want to secede is alienation and distrust. When you feel you're not being treated as an equal and that your government is not listening to you, the idea of having your own country begins to sound appealing. This sense of heightened alienation is what one sees in certain parts of Yemen, Sudan, Iraq and even Egypt. In Yemen, the southerners are complaining of marginalisation, of being sidelined politically and economically, of being barred from key posts in the armed forces and the government, as well as of poverty and government neglect. Similar grievances are voiced in northern Yemen, especially the Saada area and have already triggered the Huthi rebellion. In Sudan, a cultural and psychological gap has always existed between the north and the south. Southern grievances date back to the time Sudan was part of Egypt, and little has been done to address them since. In Iraq, the shoe is now on the other foot. Before the US-led invasion, the Shias and Kurds were kept down by the Sunnis; now they're running the show. In Egypt, the Nubians are treading carefully, but they persistently voice their disapproval of the government's policies and want to regain control of the areas from which they were evacuated in the 1960s. Now to the thorny bit. As it turns out, most of the disgruntled minorities, especially in border areas, have established questionable relations with foreign powers. For some reason, most of the secessionist cases, with the notable exception of Nubia in Egypt, have common borders with non-Arab countries. In Iraq, the grievances are most acute in areas bordering Iran and Turkey. In Sudan, the temptation of secession is clear in areas bordering non-Arab countries. In Yemen, communities living close to the straits of Bab Al-Mandab seem to be having second thoughts about the merits of unity. Nearly all of the secessionist cases appear on the peripheries of the Arab world, which makes them more potent, and makes the region more vulnerable. Which is also why we need to take action before it is too late. Secessionist calls don't come out of the blue. They fester before they surface, and they linger before they explode. The warning signs have been ignored in the past, and at great risk. From now on, these warning signs must be detected. If you don't want people to secede, you have to take them seriously when they start complaining. For a long time, certain regions have come under discriminatory policies by governments. In Iraq, the Shias and the Kurds harboured grudges long before the US occupation gave them the power to avenge themselves. In Yemen, southerners walked voluntarily into unity, only to feel cheated and ignored. The way Arab countries react to the demands of minorities is deplorable. And the way Arab governments treat peripheral regions is questionable. It is common in Arab countries to go on ignoring pressing issues for too long. Also, governments tend to see any regional or ethnic demand as an assault on their authority. Even when the demands are legitimate, they're routinely ignored and belittled. Arab governments justify their position by saying that all their citizens must be treated equally, majority or minority, mainstream or ethnically different. One of the reasons that governments are reluctant to take care of disadvantaged communities or areas is a lack of resources. If you notice, ethnic and regional dissatisfaction is at its greatest in countries with low- performing economies. All of the above makes it easy for foreign parties to step in, citing humanitarian or other reasons. The problem is that foreign parties don't just try to help the disadvantaged communities. They reinforce their grudges, encourage them to take a hardline stand, and eventually use them as a bargaining chip, as leverage against the governments in question. Sometimes foreign powers support the rebels in a subtle way. Take, for example, the case of the Huthi insurgence in Yemen. Officially, Iran has distanced itself from the Huthis, except when it objected to Saudi military intervention. But the Yemeni authorities have captured Iranian weapons with the rebels. In other cases, the foreign role is blatant. In Iraq, Washington made it clear that it favoured a loosely structured country. The new Iraq that the Americans sought to create is disconnected, socially and politically decentralised, and constitutionally prone to partition. On top of that, Washington gave a boost to Shia domination of the country when it supported the reappointment of Nuri Al-Maliki as prime minister although his coalition failed to secure a majority in the March 2010 elections. In Sudan, the US is encouraging southerners to secede in the 9 January referendum, and it has opposed any attempt to postpone the referendum despite all the political and logistical difficulties involved. In the June 2006 issue of the US Armed Forces Journal, a retired US intelligence officer, Ralph Peters, details a plan to alter the borders of Arab countries, Iran, and Afghanistan. The point he makes, in an article entitled "Blood borders: How a better Middle East would look," is that border changes would defuse ethnic and religious tensions and free disadvantaged minorities from the "injustices" inflicted on them by their compatriots. His plan, curiously enough, is starting to take shape, especially in Sudan and Iraq. Peters also proposes to divide Saudi Arabia, allowing the eastern area to secede and form a Shia state. He wants the Iraqi Sunni triangle to join Syria. And he believes that the Shias in southern Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq should go independent. Lebanon, Gulf countries, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan also have their borders amended in his map. I would say that this is not just Peters's idea. Such ideas are shared by many politicians in Washington and Europe. We've seen it all before in the heyday of the British Empire. It is colonialism plain and simple. I know it sounds like a conspiracy theory, but then again the evidence is too clear to ignore. That said; we have our own homework to do. The seeds of discontent are all local, and we can do something about them before they sprout in fury. If you want outsiders to stay out, you have to keep your house in order. We have lost a battle, or more, for secession already. So let's reverse this trend with immediate action to allay grudges and address mistrust. We need to adopt comprehensive development policies that help disadvantaged groups and revive peripheral areas. We need to follow earnest programmes for political and cultural integration. Unless we turn our countries into a melting pot, they may break at the seams. We already have a sense of belonging born out of common history, culture, and geographical proximity. But that's not enough. We need to reinforce our unity through political, economic, and human bonds. We need to build bridges across our troubled waters. * The writer is assistant editor-in-chief of Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya published by Al-Ahram.
