Persia has always kept its own time. But followers of the Gregorian calendar must tip their hat to a scrappy fighter as we assess the year's events, says Amani Maged Whereas the end of 2010 is a holiday for much of the world, the Iranian year has a few more months to go. The Iranian Islamic Republic uses the solar hijri calendar, which takes as its starting point the vernal equinox, which generally coincides with 21 March, known as Nairuz Day in Persian. Yet, even though it is only 9 Dey 1389 in Iran and 1 Farvardin (Nairuz) is a long way off, I see no reason why we should let this keep us from taking advantage of the approach of 1 January 2011 to offer an assessment of the policies of Ahmadinejad over the past year. After all, it was an event packed year for Iran and there remains considerable debate over whether the Iranian president came through the year as a net winner or a net loser. One camp of observers maintains that in the final tally Ahmadinejad faired rather poorly last year, at least on the basis of an initial reading of events. Western economic sanctions, whether international or unilateral, squarely hit their mark. In the middle of the year, the EU passed a new bundle of sanctions that nearly brought to a halt new European investments in vital sectors of the Iranian economy. The sanctions blacklisted 41 persons and around 75 institutions, banks and companies, some of which are run directly by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and others of which are linked to them. The sanctions focussed, in particular, on preventing European oil and natural gas investments, tightening surveillance on Iranian ships and aircraft, closer monitoring of financial transfers to Iranian banks, and prohibiting the sale of equipment that might be used to manufacture missiles or in nuclear technology. A ban was also placed on the sale or transfer of technology or equipment needed for the exploration and extraction of oil and natural gas in Iran. Nor did the EU resolution omit mention of the need for 27 EU members to tighten their monitoring of activities of Iranian banks operating on their territory and to refuse to open any new branches of these banks. In addition, EU companies are now forbidden to offer Iranian companies or companies that deal with Iranian companies insurance services in Europe. The EU package of sanctions delivered another severe blow to Tehran. In response to displays of bravado at home, former Iranian president and current Chairman of the Council of Experts Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani felt compelled to declare that the sanctions were "not a joke", adding that they were the harshest the regime has faced since the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hailed the sanctions and praised their harm to the Iranian banking system. She noted that their impact on economic development had profoundly shaken Iranian society. Then came the Stuxnet virus attack, striking no less than 30,000 computers connected to the Iranian nuclear programme. The cyber attack sparked a wave of angry protests from Iran against what officials there called electronic warfare against their country. As if Iran needed more bad news, Russia then declared a ban on missile deliveries to Iran. Three years ago, Moscow signed a deal to deliver five battalions of S300PMU-1 air defence missile systems to Iran for $800 million. This year, Moscow banned the sale, saying that the systems were covered by the fourth round of sanctions against Iran. Meanwhile, reports were leaked to the media to the effect that Washington was expanding a missile defence shield in the Gulf in order to protect its allies in that region against any Iranian missile attacks. Some observers interpreted the leaks as a means to exert psychological pressure on Tehran. Although the US administration had not officially acknowledge the existence of such plans, there is little doubt that it wanted to alert Iran to a renewed toughening in the American stance. However, the main development that swung this camp towards the conviction that Ahmadinejad will emerge as a loser this year was his recent decision to lift subsidies on fuel and other commodities, which came shortly after his surprise dismissal of Manouchehr Mottaki as foreign minister while Mottaki was on a diplomatic tour in Senegal. The subsidy cuts could have a powerful impact on Ahmadinejad's popularity. However, other analysts believe that Ahmadinejad came out ahead this year, judging by a number of indisputable goals that he had scored against the West. They point to the Russian decision to supply Iran's first nuclear facility at Bushehr with fuel, leading to a renewed thaw in relations between Moscow and Tehran. They also point to the deal that Tehran had signed with Turkey and Brazil in accordance with which Iran would hand over quantities of low grade uranium (enriched to 3.5 per cent) to Turkey for safekeeping in exchange for nuclear fuel rods (enriched to 20 per cent) to operate its nuclear facilities. Then, there was the surprise announcement by Iran's nuclear energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi that his country has produced its first batch of yellowcake, the material used for uranium enrichment. The announcement was intended to signal that Iran was still determined to press ahead "firmly and resolutely" with its nuclear programme on its own conditions. Although the six powers negotiating with Iran had not expected a breakthrough in talks, diplomats were of the opinion that the mere agreement to meet again to discuss essential issues was a sign of progress. Western powers want Iran to halt its uranium enrichment activities, which they fear would enable Iran to produce uranium of a sufficiently high grade to enable it to produce its own nuclear weapons. The Iranian president, however, had insisted that the question of suspending its uranium enrichment activities was out of bounds and that he would not discuss it in the Geneva talks. And, indeed, the subject was not broached. Instead, Ahmadinejad lashed out against the West for failing to combat terrorism and for its silence in the face of the assassination of Iranian energy scientists. However, the goal that swung this camp of analysts in favour of proclaiming Ahmadinejad a winner this year was the fact that the Geneva talks produced no more than an agreement to meet again next month in Istanbul. They argue that his ability to leave the negotiating chamber without a single word being levelled against the Iranian nuclear programme marked a clear victory for Iranian strategy. They add that the appointment of Salehi, Iran's nuclear chief, as Mottaki's replacement as foreign minister was further proof of Ahmadinejad's success this year. If, indeed, Ahmadinejad came out a winner at the end of this Gregorian year will the same remain true at the end of this solar hijri year? For the answer to that we will have to wait through another yearend countdown, through the months of Dey, Bahman and Esfand.
