Persian patience seems infinite, marvels Amani Maged Despite the fact that Iran, Turkey and Brazil jointly submitted their uranium swap proposal to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), urging the international community and the Vienna group to endorse it rather than to push for a new round of sanctions against the Islamic Republic, there is a strong likelihood that the West will ignore this plea. In the opinion of some, the submission of the Brazilian-brokered Iranian-Turkish deal to the IAEA has squarely placed the ball in the Western court and will force Washington's hand and pre-empt harsher sanctions. However, a mere glance at the dynamics of the relationship between the West and Iran is sufficient to realise that mistrust remains a powerful determinant. The West has cited evidence against Tehran. It has discovered a newly built reactor in Qom that Iran failed to disclose to the IAEA. The IAEA has also reported that until seven years ago, Iran had kept major aspects of its nuclear programme hidden for nearly two decades. The West is equally uneasy over Iran's boasts that it has upgraded its centrifuges, built 10 new reactors and, more importantly, now has the capacity to enrich uranium up to 20 per cent purity in its Natanz plant. Moreover, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has pronounced his country a nuclear power capable of enriching uranium up to 80 per cent, the level that experts say is needed in order to produce a nuclear bomb. Indeed, Western sources predict that Iran will be able to produce highly enriched uranium enough to produce a single weapon within a year, although they add that it could take up to five years to actually be able to assemble a bomb. Assistant Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Paul Selva concurs, saying that it would take Iran another three to five years to reach the stage where it could produce a deliverable nuclear weapon that can actually be used. For the foregoing reasons few in the West are convinced by the protests of Iranian officials that they are not seeking a nuclear weapons capacity. Such doubts will probably haunt the recent Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian deal and continue to drive the West into trying to clip Tehran's wings. But if confronted with the choice between abandoning all its nuclear enrichment activities or facing another round of sanctions, how will Iran react? Will it simply withdraw the deal it submitted to the IAEA? Judging by its behaviour to date, Iran will persist in its defiance to the bitter end. If the deal is not endorsed, its first step will be to proclaim that it did all that it could to reach an understanding but that the West remained stubbornly set upon depriving Iran of its legitimate right to possess nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In the event of harsher sanctions, Iran will continue to press ahead with its nuclear policy. Iran will have some strong cards to play in the process. The most powerful will be to adopt a parliamentary resolution calling for the withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its supplementary protocol. These agreements oblige Iran to submit periodic reports on its nuclear activities, to open its nuclear facilities to routine and surprise inspections, to open its ledgers on uranium stocks and the stocks themselves to the scrutiny of IAEA experts, and to comply with other stipulated IAEA monitoring procedures. Therefore, in withdrawing from the NPT, a right accorded to all NPT signatory parties, Tehran would be depriving the international community of its contractual right to keep close tabs on any developments in its nuclear programme. This is Iran's last and most drastic option. Another card is to highlight its own readiness to defend itself against invasion. Several weeks ago, Iran staged a series of military manoeuvres and on Monday, the same day it presented the "Iranian declaration" to the IAEA, it initiated another series of manoeuvres in the Nasr Abad region of the province of Isfahan. Consisting of three phases, the Beit-ul-Moqaddas 22 manoeuvres staged a simulated confrontation against an imaginary enemy of superior strength. Engaging all land forces, the combatants used heavy and light armaments and trained in defensive and offensive tactics around the clock for three consecutive days. The land forces war games in Isfahan complemented the Great Prophet-5 naval manoeuvres held in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz in April. That five-day long exercise followed what Tehran described as an American nuclear threat against Iran. Iranian officials were referring to the Obama administration's exemption of Iran and North Korea from its recent pledge, issued earlier that month, not to use nuclear weapons against non- nuclear states. The 180 kilometre-long Straits of Hormuz, through which 40 per cent of the world's oil and 80 per cent of the oil produced by the Gulf at the rate of 20 to 30 oil tankers a day, represents Iran's third pressure card. Iraq would not even have to close this strategic waterway; by merely threatening to do so it would create turmoil in international markets. Iran is a chief oil supplier for Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and some European countries. This fact, alone, constitutes a large obstacle in the face of a campaign to rally support for harsher economic sanctions. Iran sits atop a vast sea of petroleum reserves, estimated at 100 billion barrels at least, and it produces four million barrels of oil a day. It also possesses a quadrillion cubic metres of natural gas, of which it produces about three trillion cubic metres a year. Nor is oil the last of the arrows in the Iranian quiver. Just as Washington announced that a draft resolution for a fourth round of sanctions was nearly ready, Iran announced that it would grant visas to the mothers of the three Americans who had crossed into Iran from Iraq and were arrested on the charge of espionage. The foreign affairs minister hinted it would appreciate to similarly receive information regarding the fate of Iranians detained in the US. Interestingly, Washington did not voice a demand for the release of its citizens on this occasion, or respond positively to Iranian concerns about their citizens detained abroad. Tehran still hopes to obtain the support of additional countries for the Tehran Declaration and a halt to the drive for harsher sanctions. One of these countries is Russia, which Ahmadinejad reproached for having sided with the move to impose a new round of sanctions. "Our country had believed that Russia would support the joint Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian declaration on the nuclear fuel exchange," he said. Iran is still awaiting the response of the Vienna group (the US, Russia and France) to the declaration. If it responds favourably, Iran will enter into direct negotiations with them over a complimentary agreement over the details of the uranium swap deal. In the event they refuse to accept the declaration, Iran will withdraw the fuel swap plan. Its next moves are probably to just keep staring down the implacable American foe. Is time running out, as the Americans would have it, or is time on Iran's side?
