The main problem Hamas faces is that the factors that make its life hard are all beyond its control, writes Saleh Al-Naami Ibrahim Alyan, 59, had good reason to be happy at the end of last week. At last, his daughter Riham had found a full-time job as a teacher at one of the schools in Central Gaza. Riham was one of 5,400 new graduates that Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh decided to hire for the second semester of the current school year. Not only that, but Haniyeh also announced that each teacher will receive a raise of $100 as a result of the drop in the purchasing power of the US dollar. It appears that despite the siege, the Hamas government has been able to continue doing its job, its agencies continuing to provide basic services to the public. Indeed, Hamas scored several achievements during 2010, but has also failed on several fronts. What does 2011 hold for the movement? HAMAS ACHIEVEMENTS: Among its achievements in 2010, Hamas was able to maintain domestic security unlike anything seem before it came to power; no longer is there domestic insecurity and organised chaos. This is clearly reflected by the policing of streets in the Gaza Strip until very late hours and a drop in attacks targeting the group's leaders and institutions, which some officials believe are the doing of Islamic jihadist groups that follow Al-Qaeda's doctrine. In 2010, Hamas reaped the rewards of its efforts in 2009 to thwart the leaders of jihadist groups after clashes in Rafah between these groups and Hamas security forces. At the same time, unlike in 2008 and 2009, the opposition secular movement, headed by Fatah, did not take any serious steps to challenge Hamas's control of the Gaza Strip. Over the past two years, security forces have uncovered many networks planning assassinations and bombings. An illustration of the confidence of the Hamas government is that for the first time since it came to power it executed two people convicted of collaborating with Israel, and another three who committed felonies. Hamas no longer awaits permission from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to carry out death sentences. This year, the siege on Gaza was relaxed, to a large extent because of the Freedom Flotilla and associated campaigns. Israel's attack on the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara, killing nine Turkish activists, resulted in a strong Turkish and world reaction that pressured Tel Aviv to change its policy towards Gaza. Sure enough, the government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, which was influenced by the strategic changes in its relationship with its former ally Turkey, had no other choice but to agree to largely lift the siege. Many food supplies were allowed through, instead of being smuggled through the tunnels. Although Israel was interested in only allowing consumer goods in and refused to permit construction material and fuel to pass, the partial lift caused prices to drop and nearly ended the need to smuggle goods through tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. The events of the Freedom Flotilla was a turning point in international support for Gaza and condemnation of Israel's crimes against the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the number of Arab, Muslim and international delegations that came to Gaza to express their solidarity with the Palestinians rose. Tens of European delegations visited the Gaza Strip, including European members of national parliaments and European Parliament MPs, as well as former politicians and security officials, some of whom discussed improving relations between Hamas and the West. The number of medical delegations visiting Gaza also rose and performed thousands of surgeries. Meanwhile, Hamas was generally able to maintain the tacit truce with Israel since most Palestinian groups are committed to the ceasefire, with the exception of jihadist groups that have very tense relations with Hamas. This reality allowed the group to rebuild many of its institutions despite limited resources, and it gave Hamas an opportunity to shore up its military power by continuing to smuggle arms, including weapons that arrived in Gaza for the first time. The group was also able to train its cadres and members, as well as build military fortifications and tunnels. HAMAS FAILURES: On the other hand, there is a long list of failures by Hamas in 2010. The wide international support after the events of the Freedom Flotilla did not turn into readiness by the world and Arab capitals to recognise Hamas's government. The group continued to be subject to a political boycott with the exception of a few Arab and Muslim states. All other world countries refuse to deal with Hamas, and the biggest setback for the group in 2010 was further deterioration in relations with Egypt after it refused to sign the Egyptian reconciliation proposal. Egyptian authorities stopped the privileged treatment of Hamas officials as they exited or entered Gaza; many times Hamas officials were even prevented from leaving the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia refused to deal with the government of Hamas or coordinate travel during the hajj and omra seasons, but was very cooperative and helpful to the Ministry of Religious Endowments in Salam Fayyad's government. The staff in Haniyeh's government became subordinates to Fayyad's government. Continued internal divisions left Hamas's government incapable of achieving much since the government in Ramallah made it very difficult for Haniyeh's cabinet to function. Many Gazans cannot leave the Gaza Strip since they do not have passports, because Ramallah's Ministry of Interior has refused to issue them. Also, even after Israel permitted the entry of fuel to operate the sole power station in Gaza, Fayyad's government refused to pay the bill to the Israeli importer. There are many other ways by which the Ramallah government can pressure the Hamas government. HAMAS IN 2011: The year 2011 will be a very challenging year for Hamas and threaten the very existence and future of the group in Gaza. For example, Hamas knows that it is in its interest to maintain the unofficial truce with Israel, even if only temporarily. It knows that although for two years it has fortified its military arsenal, this is not enough to deter Israel from launching another war like the last one. If war were to break out, it is likely that Hamas would be aggressively targeted. Hamas's dilemma is rooted in the fact that it knows it cannot prevent other Palestinian factions, especially smaller jihadist groups, from launching missile attacks and it is easy for these groups to accuse Hamas of defending Israel. Although attacks by these jihadist groups do not affect Israel much, they do give Tel Aviv pretext to wage war on Gaza. Israel has said that it holds Hamas responsible for any military action inside Gaza because it is in charge. In fact, Israeli Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi announced that he had ordered the targeting of Hamas members in response to operations by other Palestinian groups. Hamas will be in a very delicate position because it will be difficult for it to prevent the small Islamist groups from launching missiles. It is ironic that the only reason why Israel will not try to topple Hamas through waging an intense offensive on Gaza is because there is no Palestinian or Arab alternative to manage the affairs of the Strip. Of late, Israel has been considering retaking the reins in Gaza after reoccupying it. While continued inter-Palestinian fractures loom over the Gaza Strip and negatively impact the people's livelihood, all indicators point that next year will not see the end of disputes. The gap between the positions of Fatah and Hamas is unbridgable, and one of the biggest challenges facing Hamas is a continued boycott by three important states -- namely Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This greatly impacts the group's ability to rule. Hamas's problem right now is that its troubles are unsolvable not because it is willing or unwilling to do something, but that they depend on domestic, regional and international developments over which Hamas has very limited control. Accordingly, the group's leaders are relying on two basic factors: the Palestinian people's patience and resilience, and regional developments that will recover the group's losses as a result of internal divisions and that will limit Israel's ability to hurt it.
