By Ibrahim Nafie Events within the region tend to monopolise our focus with the result that far too often we pay scant attention to those events that are shaping the post-Cold War international order. It is important, though, that we pay particular attention to on-going developments in Asia, events that will have important ramifications for the 21st century which many had prematurely dubbed the Asian century. Recent economic predictions have tended to emphasise the belief that the Asian economies would continue to grow at the rate they have over the past quarter century, rendering the continent a key-player in the international economic and political order. Yet given the events of the past twelve months or so, such predictions appear to have been a gross over-simplification of reality. The much heralded Asian economic miracle has spun off course, in a manner that had eluded commentators and experts. The continent, as well as suffering economic set-backs, must further contend with the complications arising from the emergence, among its states, of two new nuclear powers. There are, then, a number of threats to its stability that the continent now faces, threats that must be carefully considered. The first destabilising factor is economic: the crisis, which began last summer, engulfing the seemingly invincible Tiger economies, continues to reverberate. Japan has felt the effects, and international institutions were compelled to intervene after the stock markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea were brought to the brink of collapse. In the wake of the crisis, a reassessment of the criteria by which we measure success was inevitable. Some attributed the crisis to accumulated budgetary deficits maintained alongside rising levels of short term foreign debt. In 1997, for example, Thailand was servicing a debt of $89 billion and South Korea $120 billion. Others saw the roots of the crisis in the weakness of the banking sector, which extended loans on ill-considered bases. Political and personal considerations all too often came into play. The situation might, indeed, be summed up in a single word -- corruption. Land and currency speculation also played a part in the crisis, a point emphasised when the Malaysian prime minister blamed the collapse of his country's currency on George Souros, the American based speculator in international currency markets. Economic collapse was inextricably linked, particularly in Indonesia, with political disintegration. In recent years Indonesia had achieved growth rates of up to 17 per cent. Now it faces negative growth of a predicted minus 10 per cent. The Indonesian experience posits important questions regarding the interconnectedness of political and economic structures. Nor are such questions likely to be answered by the dismissal of Suharto, after 33 years in power. They concern far more complicated issues, regarding democracy and its development within specific contexts. Indonesia, once a model of backwardness, was heralded as an exemplar of the Asian economic miracle. Such was the level of political instability in the sixties that a military coup was provoked, which brought Suharto to power. The political stability he achieved by the early '70s allowed the kind of economic reforms that attracted large sums of foreign capital. Social and economic structures were thus transformed, though the political situation remained stagnant. Yet as the economy grew, increasingly large numbers of people began to demand a participatory political role. The old-guard, though, was entrenched and refused to share the exercise of power. In the absence of accountability or transparency corruption spread like a cancer, leading eventually to the massive political and economic upheavals of recent months. In addition to the economic and political crises raging through Asia, the picture has been further complicated by the emergence of both India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. India's five nuclear tests, between 11 and 12 May, set the ball rolling. Before the end of the month Pakistan had itself completed six tests, and a full grown security crisis had developed. Within a single month two nations had openly declared that they were nuclear powers. The number and types of tests conducted, and the short duration between them, indicate that these countries have already built considerable stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the cadres capable of further developing and refining the use of such weapons are obviously well-established. Both countries, in addition, possess the missile systems necessary to deliver such warheads. The implications of the Indian and Pakistani tests are enormous. Confidence in both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and test ban treaties has been severely shaken. The international community, it seems, lacks the power to enforce either. Given the history of conflict, religious tensions and border disputes that have characterised Indian-Pakistani relations, the danger is of a dangerously escalating nuclear race on the sub-continent, a race that will occur against an already highly inflammable backdrop. The Asia to which we had become accustomed no longer exists. If the leopard cannot change its spots, the tiger has certainly realigned its stripes. The continent which was expected to march confidently into the next century is beginning to stagger. In assessing the future prospects for the continent, though, it would be foolhardy to depend on the sound-bites, the euphoric optimism, the instant pessimism, purveyed by the Western media. Rather, we must objectively assess the situation in the continent. And this is the reason why Al-Ahram has decided to send a team of investigative journalists to five nations -- Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Singapore and China -- each a key-player in the continent's future.
