By Graham Usher Prior to his recent trip to Washington, Yasser Arafat held court with one of his confidants in the Israeli opposition, Labour MK and Oslo architect, Yossi Beilin. Beilin had gone to Gaza to counsel the Palestinian leader against declaring a Palestinian state when Oslo formally expires in May 1999. "Hold me back," a despairing Arafat reportedly told Beilin. "Don't push me into a corner where I have no choice but a unilateral declaration," he added. Arafat rehearsed the same line in his Washington meetings with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and President Bill Clinton. They "held him back" by pledging to reinvigorate US involvement in the peace process and by arranging a meeting with Binyamin Netanyahu in Washington in the middle of this month to iron out an agreement on Israel's long delayed second West Bank redeployment. Naturally, American aid did not come without a price. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 28 September -- and under US pressure -- Arafat refrained from any mention of a unilateral declaration of statehood save that he expected "the source of international legitimacy and peace-making [the UN]" to "stand by our people, especially as the five-year transitional period provided for in the ... agreements will end on 4 May, 1999 and our people demand of us to shoulder our responsibilities and they await the establishment of their right to self-determination." More galling still, Clinton squeezed from Arafat a public admission that he had agreed to Israel's modification of the US plan that three per cent of the proposed 13 per cent second redeployment would be a "nature reserve" under Israel's military control and with a ban on any Israeli or Palestinian construction. This latest concession means the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be entering the final status talks with less than 40 per cent of the West Bank under its full or partial control. This is in line with Netanyahu's final map for a settlement on the West Bank, which allows that only 10 per cent of the land should be transferred to the PA now and 60 per cent should remain in Israel's hands to safeguard its "security interests". It is, consequently, unclear whether the upcoming Washington meeting will realise any agreement. On his return to the occupied territories, Arafat played down talk of a breakthrough, stating that "no substantive progress" had been made in his meetings with Clinton and Albright. But does Arafat's readiness to try again with Netanyahu mean he has abandoned his threat to declare a state? No, says the PLO's head of Jerusalem Affairs and West Bank Fatah leader, Faisal Husseini. "To let 4 May come and go like any other day will not be acceptable to the Palestinians," stated Husseini. "Arafat has no choice then but to end the negotiations and declare a Palestinian state. We know it won't be a free state; it will be a state under occupation. But it is the only choice we have if we are to establish a Palestinian state," he added. More significantly, the current status quo in the occupied territories of no further redeployment but massive settlement construction -- there are presently 2,000 settlement units being built in the West Bank and Gaza compared to 1,000 units built in 1997 -- would mean that "the interim arrangements" are rapidly becoming "the permanent reality," said Palestinian political analyst Khalil Shikaki . Given such a scenario, Arafat's preferred response is likely to be the controlled crisis brought on by a unilateral declaration of statehood. It would be controlled because, as Arafat implied and Beilin stated in their meeting in Gaza, the threat of statehood would be conditional. "Were Israel to commit itself to not changing the status of the areas [of the occupied territories] under its control and to recognising a Palestinian state, then the negotiations could be extended" beyond 4 May, says Husseini. Other Palestinian sources say Arafat would drop the call for statehood and agree to move back Oslo's deadline in return for Israel recognising the principle of a Palestinian state, implementing the further redeployments and, critically, freezing the settlement drive. Should Netanyahu refuse such conditions, Arafat could then declare a state assured of wide international support, not just among the Arab states, but among African and European countries as well. Even the US would have some discomfort defending an Israeli refusal of terms that, for the most part, its prime minister has signed, the Knesset has endorsed and the Americans have guaranteed. But Arafat has other reasons for wanting to keep the threat of statehood on a low flame. One is the domestic support that declaring a state could muster behind his discredited regime in the West Bank and Gaza. Five years after Oslo, the PA and Fatah have delivered neither a good government nor the hope of sovereignty to the Palestinians. The result is waning faith in Arafat's leadership and dissension within Fatah, as witnessed by the public demonstrations in August against the PA's security forces in Gaza. Most ominously of all, as far as the PA is concerned, is a rise in sporadic and unclaimed military attacks on soldiers and settlers in the occupied territories as a whole. By making 4 May a sacred date, Arafat is deliberately creating a mood of national emergency in the occupied territories, born out of the fear of Israeli reprisals that any declaration would bring. And, as Arafat knows full well, crises breed unity. All wings of Fatah are in support of a unilateral declaration of statehood on 4 May, as is the PLO's anti-Oslo Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). And while Hamas is scornful of the idea of "a state under occupation", it is unlikely to sabotage any declaration, especially if public opinion is in favour. Current polls show 58 per cent of Palestinians in support. Rallying the masses around 4 May would, in the short term at least, enable Arafat to retrieve some of his lost revolutionary allure. This is because May 1999 coincides with the run-in to the next Israeli elections and with the celebrations planned for the millennium. Thus while Netanyahu would be under pressure from the right to react aggressively to a declaration of statehood, there would also be countervailing pressures. With a majority of Israelis still behind some form of peace, Netanyahu would not want to enter the electoral campaign perceived as the man who destroyed the Oslo process. Neither do most Israelis want to enter the new century with an undeclared war prevailing in the occupied territories. Under these circumstances, Israel may feel compelled to act with restraint to any declaration or, better yet, work out a deal with Arafat beforehand to avert one, which may be why Beilin was so keen to see Arafat in Gaza. Either way, the Palestinian leader is likely to view 4 May as the best chance he has to proceed with Oslo on his terms rather than Netanyahu's.
