Beyond the Intifada? (2)

By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
In a desperate bid to stave off the fall of his shaky minority government, a beleaguered Ehud Barak has pledged to revive the peace process before the early elections he was forced to call following his government's loss of majority support in the Knesset. To that end, he offered the Palestinians a deal in the form of a transitional agreement under the terms of which they would receive 10 per cent more territory plus Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state. But, in exchange, the crucial issues of Jerusalem and the resettlement of Palestinian refugees would be deferred for up to three years. The deal was categorically rejected by the Palestinian Authority, on the grounds that they will never accept a return to the old "transitional" situation.
In coming forward with his proposal, Barak has not drawn the necessary lessons from the disintegration of the peace process and is still clinging to the obsolete and now obviously inadequate step-by-step approach. That is not to say that the incremental step-by-step approach has in all cases been negative. For example, at a previous stage it was the only way to get the peace process moving forward on the Palestinian track. In the absence of a state of their own, the Palestinians could not adopt the all-or-nothing approach of the Syrians. Unlike Syria, which could refuse to recognise or negotiate with Israel unless and until it withdrew to the 4 June 1967 borders, the Palestinians had no choice but to take whatever part of their territory they could restore, bit by bit, step by step.
However, the situation today is very different. To begin with, the adoption of an incremental approach to the Palestinian track is inconceivable after the Camp David summit. The summit marked a point of no return, as it were, being the first time the most contentious issues between the protagonists, including the final status of Jerusalem and the resettlement of Palestinian refugees, were openly discussed in the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian problem. It is hard to see how the various component elements of the problem can once again be separated and addressed in a piecemeal fashion.
It can be argued that Camp David failed precisely because it discarded the incremental approach in favour of a comprehensive approach, and set itself the overly ambitious task of resolving all the points of contention between the parties at one stroke. Even if that is the case, Camp David has changed the rules of the game and there can be no question of reverting to the old step-by-step mechanism.
Second, the replacement of Iraq by Jerusalem at the forefront of Arab concerns has gone far towards healing the breach in Arab ranks. The new-found Arab cohesion is reflected in a shift in the regional balance of power to the advantage of the Arabs. Where the issue of Iraq had a divisive effect on them, Jerusalem has had a unifying effect. Thanks to this change, it became possible for the first time since Iraq invaded Kuwait, to hold a full Arab summit, including Iraq.
Indeed, the emergence of Jerusalem as the main focus of struggle in the Arab-Israeli conflict has not only helped overcome inter-Arab divisions but has also highlighted the need to merge the various strands of the conflict into a single indivisible whole. The issue of Jerusalem has exposed the bankruptcy not only of the step-by-step mechanism but also of the piecemeal approach that deals with each aspect of the conflict in isolation from the others. This development is graphically illustrated by what is now happening in Lebanon. The battle waged by Hizbullah in Shebaa cannot be seen in isolation from those waged by the Intifada in Palestine; both are part of the same struggle. Separating the various stands of the confrontation has become meaningless, and it is now patently obvious that a comprehensive outlook to the whole process is required.
Third, two of the principal players in the Middle East game are on the verge of disappearing from the scene: Clinton and Barak. In the meantime, there is a dangerous power vacuum not only in America, where constitutional problems stand in the way of naming the new president, but also in Israel, where Barak's minority government is steadily losing support from many Israelis. The political turmoil in the United States and Israel coincides with a shift in the European Union's stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Europe, whose support for Palestinian rights has often angered Israel, is now trying to establish its credentials as a honest broker by adopting a more "neutral" attitude, in a bid to take over America's mediating role. Russia too is looking to play a more forceful role in the Middle East peace process, although it stands little chance of filling America's shoes.
What is now certain is that the negotiation process can no longer remain confined to three players only, with the United States calling all the shots. Some Arab parties, like Egypt, could play a role in "internationalising" the quest for peace by involving more parties in the process. What is also certain is that Clinton's dream of engineering a final Middle East peace deal before leaving the White House will never see the light of day. But these are the only certainties in a situation shrouded in uncertainty. How the Middle East will fit in to the new American president's agenda is anybody's guess. In the unlikely event the election crisis is resolved in Al Gore's favour, the Arabs will have to contend with a Jewish vice-president for the first time ever. On the other hand, if Bush wins -- which is becoming increasingly likely -- many of his close associates, notably his vice-president, Dick Cheney, have close ties with the oil lobby and hence with the Arab Gulf states.
In all events, we can expect to see an entirely new situation in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, a situation that will no longer be characterised by exclusive US sponsorship of the peace process by the step-by-step mechanism, by a piecemeal approach that addresses the various aspects of the conflict in isolation from one another or by acute inter-Arab tensions. Does this mean that we have reached the end of the road towards a peaceful settlement, with war the only alternative option?
The possibility of war breaking out, even by mistake or miscalculation, cannot be altogether discounted, especially that the failure of the peace process has created a vacuum at the regional level which is compounded by the vacuum at the global level. This could encourage Israel to launch military strikes against this or that Arab party. Israel has always feared that peace with its Arab environment would bring an end to the siege mentality that has successfully held it together since its creation and pave the way to its internal dislocation. Constant escalation of tensions through confrontation with its enemies has served it well in mobilising and strengthening cohesion on the internal front. In the same logic, it has adopted a military doctrine of pre-emptive strikes to compel the opponent to accept its terms for a settlement. From here stems the danger of war, and it is up to the Arabs to avert the danger by coming up with a "third way" that is neither the peace process in its traditional form nor an inevitable slide into a war situation. Such an alternative scenario would have to enjoy the support of popular forces and draw all ideological schools -- nationalism, political Islam, the class approach -- to work together under the umbrella of a pan-Arab approach.
There was a time, not so long ago, when some Arab regimes believed the Palestinian problem could be conveniently shelved so that they could get on with joining the globalisation process undistracted by a problem that remained resistant to any solution. But now that the Palestinian problem has re-acquired its former status as the heart of the Arab world, these regimes will have to revise their positions. They would do well to throw their lot in with the pan-Arab movement instead of exposing themselves to upheavals by ignoring what can no longer be ignored.
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See US Election 2000
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