Barak takes the low road

By Graham Usher
A few weeks ago Ehud Barak was advised by senior figures in his Labour Party that a safer exit from the political mess he was in would be to have a vote simply for prime minister rather than full-blown parliamentary elections. The Israeli leader scorned the counsel. It would be seen by the Israeli electorate for what it was, he said, a cynical manoeuvre to prevent former Prime Minister and Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu running against him. He (Barak) would take the "high road."
On 9 December, and trailing Netanyahu by 20 points in the polls, Barak took the low road. "Due to the emergency situation in the country, the confusion in the Knesset and the need to end the violence, I have decided to ask again for the mandate of the people of Israel," he told a packed news conference in West Jerusalem.
"I will present the president with my resignation and go to special elections for prime minister in 60 days."
Barak is known to be an admirer of Machiavelli, and the ploy of "special elections for prime minister" was Machiavellian in its attempt to take out a whole flock of adversaries with a single stone. On the one hand, it removed Netanyahu, since under Israel's "direct" elections law only sitting Members of Knesset (MKs) can run for prime minister. And following his defeat in the 1999 poll Netanyahu resigned his seat.
On the other, it brought to ground a whole brood of Labour doves. These had been threatening to revolt against a leader who had brought an Intifada where there was supposed to be peace and failure in virtually every other sphere of government policy. Within hours of his resignation, Labour's tightly controlled Central Committee convened to endorse Barak as the party's candidate for prime minister, and the "doves" turned into rabbits. Some, like former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, simply did not bother to show up.
Finally, Barak's move paved the way to what many Israeli analysts believe is his sole remaining destination -- a national unity government with Likud under the leadership of Ariel Sharon but with himself as prime minister. The Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv on 10 December even went so far as to report there had been "coordination" between Barak and Sharon over the manoeuvre, since in blocking Netanyahu from the office of prime minister, Barak was also blocking his challenge to Sharon for leadership of Likud. Sharon rigorously denied the allegation.
For good reason, it didn't work. Denouncing "the most cynical trick in the history of the nation," Netanyahu returned from the US and made straight to his own press conference on 10 December. "I am presenting my candidacy for the leadership of the Likud movement and for the leadership of the state of Israel," he said.
Asked how he could do this when, technically, he was disqualified from running for prime minister, Netanyahu said there were two ways in which "the will of the people" could be expressed. One was for the Knesset to amend the election law to enable non-MKs to run. The second was for the parties in the Knesset to ignore Barak's "transparent trick" and press ahead with the second and third readings of the early elections bill, turning the prime ministerial contest into Israel's second elections in two years.
It is clear which road Netanyahu prefers. The polls not only put him miles ahead of Barak and ahead of Sharon within Likud. They also show that were elections held today Likud would increase its mandates from 19 to 34 in the 120-member Knesset and Labour would fall from 26 mandates to 20. This would give Israel's right-wing parties a majority of 64 seats against the left's 40 -- the right's biggest electoral victory since 1977.
As for the political differences between Barak and Netanyahu (should he run), these are the differences between the devil and the deep blue sea. While vowing that he would "not stop looking all the time for a way to renew negotiations," at the 9 December press conference, Barak laid down lines as red as those he asserted in the 1999 campaign.
Thus in any final agreement with the Palestinians there would be no withdrawal to the 1967 borders, no right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel and the annexing of 80 per cent of settlers in the West Bank "under Israeli sovereignty." The only slight revision was on Jerusalem, which, post-Camp David, is now no more the "eternal undivided capital of Israel" but rather a "large Jerusalem with a Jewish majority, recognised by the world as Israel's capital." As for ways of ending the Intifada, "we will not give a prize for violence," he said.
Netanyahu was more sober. There will be a "cold peace" between Israel and the Arabs, he said. This realistically was the best Israel could hope for since "we are not in Scandinavia." As for the Palestinian Intifada, he would not use "military force in the main" to quell it but rather "directed military, economic and administrative measures" to "make the Palestinians understand they will gain nothing by violence."
Should Netanyahu get his way and stand as Barak's challenger, these policies would be the choice before the Israelis. As for the Palestinians, whether inside the 1967 lines or beyond them, there would seem to be precious little choice at all.
Related stories:
Facing facts
Blowing in the wind 7 -13 December 2000
Barak's last throw of the dice 30 Nov. - 6 Dec. 2000
No holds barred 23 - 29 November 2000
The cost of weakness 16 - 22 November 2000
Crushing the Intifada -- phase two 16 - 22 November 2000
See Intifada in focus 26 Oct. - 1 Nov. 2000
Intifada special 19 - 25 October 2000
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