The Sharon sidestep

Ariel Sharon uses diplomacy to avoid politics. Graham Usher writes from Jerusalem
One of Ariel Sharon's preferred military stratagems is "unbalancing" the enemy. This is a sudden and unexpected thrust that takes his opponent unawares and leaves analysts scratching their heads.
Last week he used the gambit in the diplomatic realm. On 30 January -- under cover of night -- he invited Palestinian Speaker Ahmed Qurei, PLO leading negotiator Mahmoud Abbas and Yasser Arafat's economics adviser Khaled Salam to his West Jerusalem residence.
It was his first meeting as prime minister with representatives of the Palestinian Authority, "an entity infested with terror," according to his own designation.
Publicly the parley was for Sharon to lay down his conditions for a return to negotiations with the Palestinian leadership. These are for the PA to arrest "terrorists;" dismantle the infrastructure of terrorist organisations (i.e. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah Vanguard and the Force 17 presidential guard); collect arms from the "terrorist organisations;" make "serious counter-terrorist operations" and end "incitement."
Less publicly it was an opportunity for him to run by "pragmatic" Palestinian leaders his idea of a "long-term interim agreement of non-belligerency" as a way out of the impasse.
According to Israeli sources, Abbas rejected any interim arrangement that was not connected to at least the principles of a final status deal. Qurei was reportedly less categorical in his refusal. Either way, Sharon was clearly "negotiating under fire" and to the chagrin of his right-wing constituencies.
But to what purpose, given that Sharon's stated conditions for negotiations are plainly impossible? There are three reasons, say Israeli analysts.
One is to sink the "agreement" Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has been brewing with Qurei and Salam. This calls for the Mitchell-Tenet cease-fire to be linked to Israel and the Palestinians' mutual recognition of their "states." Negotiations toward a final settlement would then follow over two years.
Sharon says he has no problem with a Palestinian "state" on 42 per cent of the West Bank and a bit more in Gaza, which is all the territory the Palestinians would get in their first flush of "statehood."
But he does have a problem with any sort of timetable. He has a more immediate problem with the Mitchell-Tenet cease-fire, which requires a freeze on settlement construction. This would almost certainly lose Sharon the right flank of his coalition, probably to his nemesis, Binyamin Netanyahu.
Second, Sharon knows he will need something in hand when he meets President George W Bush in Washington on Thursday. He knows demands that the US "ignore" Arafat and tighten the diplomatic and economic noose around the PA are unlikely to be granted without some vision of what comes after or instead of them.
That "something," he hopes, is the interim agreement, together with an ongoing dialogue with Palestinian leaders "pragmatic" enough to countenance its long-term implementation.
It is unclear whether the Americans will buy this merchandise, but it is possible. Bush has so far bought into Israel's blueprint for the "war against terrorism" as well as Sharon's translation that a national liberation struggle is Arabic for "terrorism."
But the third reason is perhaps the deepest: for the first time since he was elected, the wall-to-wall Israeli consensus Sharon has built behind his policies is starting to crack.
The fractures are clear. One is Sharon's slump in poll ratings, down from 57 per cent in December to 48 per cent in January.
Another is the slow, dawning realisation among more and more Israelis that there is not a military solution to their conflict with the Palestinians.
Israeli journalist Nahum Barnea caught this mood on 28 January, describing a West Jerusalem rocked by its second armed Palestinian attack in six days. "People ... knew their prime minister was no better than they were: neither they nor he have an answer," he wrote in Israel's Yediot Aharonot newspaper.
Finally there is the growing movement of Israeli reservist officers who -- 16 months into the fighting -- are refusing to serve in the occupied territories and participate in "war for the peace of the settlements."
Sharon knows this movement well and how ominous it can be, especially in an Israel unlit by hope. Long-time anti-occupation activist and political analyst Peretz Kidron explains the resonance:
"The first refusal to serve in a campaign was in Lebanon in 1982, which was not a very good year for Sharon. One of the reasons Israel pulled out of most of Lebanon in 1984 was the awareness of the army that thousands of reservists would refuse to serve if it didn't. In Israel the soldiers' opposition to occupation is always the cutting edge of the political opposition -- they lead, the people follow and the politicians come last."
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