Blowing in the wind

Shifts in the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict have become as commonplace as changes in the weather, writes Mohamed El-Sayed Said from Washington
In spite of having become accustomed to changing approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are still capable -- on occasion -- of being surprised by a sudden turn. US Secretary of State Colin Powell's suggestion of an international conference on the Palestinian-Israeli situation is only the most recent surprise.
The idea of holding an international peace conference has been floating about for some time. But for President George W Bush's administration suddenly to endorse it less than a week before the official visit by the Israeli prime minister is a different matter altogether.
While this sudden change of heart by the US administration cannot be directly linked to Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's visit to the US in late April, the announcement was understood among Arabs as a symbolic victory for Arab diplomacy and for those who want the US to play a more balanced and active role in finding a political solution to the present conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis.
In fact, the idea of convoking such conferences was the brainchild of Arab diplomacy, having first been implemented in December 1973 when an international conference with somewhat vague goals was held in Geneva in the immediate aftermath of the October War. Then, in the context of US Secretary of State James Baker's shuttle diplomacy after the Gulf War, Arab states pressured the US for a full- fledged international conference to implement the UN resolutions and empower Palestinians to form their own political entity. Israel managed to water down the starting points for that get together, meaning that the 1991 Madrid Conference was more to its liking than to that of the Arab states.
Consequently, 1991 marked the second time that an international conference mandate commensurate with Arab demands was diluted.
Powell's announcement for a conference "in the summer" came at the end of a meeting by the four powers in Washington at the beginning of this month. The meeting of "the quartet" -- the UN, European Union, US and Russia -- was its second recent get together, coming as it did following the meeting in Madrid last month at the beginning of Powell's visit to the Middle East. While overlooking the swift action that was required to halt Israel's barbaric assault on West Bank cities and refugee camps, Powell is to be credited with bringing together the quartet to explore a joint role for resolving the crisis unfolding in the occupied territories. Evidently, the proposal to hold an international conference owes a great deal to those consultations. Bringing the powers together in Washington again represents a major shift in American thinking on the Middle East conflict whereby the US had traditionally monopolised its management, alienating not only Russia and the UN, but also Europe.
We have no confirmation as to whether the conference idea was revived in the context of Saudi-American negotiations or as a decision made at the meeting by the four powers. The Saudi-American consultations and those among the quartet appear to have common causes. The most important of these is probably the mounting pressures on the United States to take the lead in fostering a commitment among concerned parties for the pursuit of a viable and internationally endorsed solution to the Palestinian Israeli conflict.
These pressures appear to have persuaded the Bush administration to end the US's isolation within the international community and to adopt a less imbalanced and more positive approach to the conflict.
In a strong indication of responsiveness to the pressures, President Bush framed the endeavour as being aimed at building a Palestinian state that "must be achieved through negotiating an end to occupation". Bush made those remarks the day of Powell's announcement. Notably, the secretary of state began using the term "occupation" more frequently. The administration's use of the same term indicates a partial departure from the extremely biased position it had taken on the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off and the stance that Congress continues to take.
The significance of Bush and Powell's statements is to be seen in light of the clash of interests that the American press reported had taken place in the meeting between the American president and the Israeli prime minister. In fact, the idea of holding an international conference under the auspices of the quartet eclipses the only political proposal ever made by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, when he suggested the holding of a regional conference and developing a long interim agreement with the Palestinians without Arafat. The opposition between the two themes is obvious at the diplomatic level, but it failed to materialise in the Bush/Sharon meeting last Tuesday.
Banishing Arafat is only one of perhaps many points of conflict between Sharon and President Bush. The US president has periodically lashed out at Arafat, but he repeatedly emphasised the latter's central role in the political process. Much more importantly, to my mind, is the "international" character of this process -- if and when it is initiated. This is particularly significant because Israeli diplomacy has always rejected the internationalisation of a political and diplomatic resolution of the conflict.
Having clearly understood the underlying message of Powell's announcement about the international conference, the Israelis displayed enough savvy not to dismiss it outright. In fact, the cornerstone of the Israeli strategy is to shift the agenda rather than to oppose it. The campaign to discredit Arafat continued with renewed vigour as the Israeli embassy in Washington took the occasion of Sharon's visit as an opportunity to circulate a large document which points the finger at Arafat as the source of all Israeli problems. However, as the American press reported, the theme did not dominate the prime minister's talks with American officials. It seems that the Americans have made clear to the Israelis that while they do not trust Arafat, they are unwilling to entertain Israel's bashing of the Palestinian Authority leader as a substitute for a serious political discussion on solving a crisis that Israel would not be able to extricate itself from without US assistance.
If an international conference materialises it will bear the mark of the various conflicting ideas about such an event. The principle of holding such an conference enjoys a large measure of support by the international community, and the idea of a conference obtains its momentum from several sources. These sources are outlined in the following points.
First, there is a general recognition that the approach traditionally pursued by the United States, under which the Israelis and Palestinians were to come up with a political solution through direct bilateral negotiations, has failed. Various intellectual and political forums in Europe and elsewhere are saying that the latest wave of violence has made the two parties less capable of extricating themselves from the throes of conflict. Hence, a solution somewhat forced from outside by a powerful coalition of major powers -- like the quartet -- may provide the only means available for advancing the cause of peace in the region and bringing the conflict to an end.
Secondly, while the American Congress along with many other influential forces in the American political landscape have declared unconditional support for Israel, there is, indeed, something that resembles a general revolt against unconditional loyalty to Israel among Americans in general and even among American Jews. Evidencing this is the formation of groups of American Jews who seek a more critical stand on Israel and seem determined to dissociate themselves from the country in general, and Sharon's right-wing government in particular. Indeed, there is an unprecedented level of criticism against Israel -- even in the American press. Following from this there is a new level of sympathy for the Palestinians' plight and a recognition of the practical impossibility of reaching a meaningful peace without minimal respect for Palestinian rights. A number of top administration officials have made this point in public.
Third, there is a new mood among people of the Arab and Islamic worlds. The anger amongst these peoples was created by Israel's brutal aggression against the Palestinians. Arab leaders have communicated this sentiment during their meetings with American leaders. An strong threat to American interests in the region is being felt for the first time in decades owing to mounting protests not only in the Arab world, but also around the globe. The American administration cannot risk a head-on clash with the both the Muslim and Arab worlds -- not to mention Arabs and Muslims in the United States.
Fourth, there is also the Iraqi factor. As revealed by the American press, this administration is determined to rain down fire and brimstone on Iraq. This situation makes it imperative that the US find a solution to the Palestinians' predicament before mobilising a new coalition against Iraq.
Another set of factors mitigates against an effective international conference. Paramount among these is Israel's anticipated opposition. As we have clearly discerned from past responses, Israel rejects the internationalisation of conflict in the Middle East and it is expected lash out if it feels isolated or besieged by the emerging international consensus on building a Palestinian state and finding a political solution to the crisis. Nonetheless, it should be conceded that Israel, somewhat surprisingly, has not yet attacked the idea.
Equally puzzling is the lackadaisical response by Arab states to the conference idea. The Egyptian position, as stated by Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, was rather reserved. Maher focused on calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the recently occupied cities and camps. And the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, in his statement yesterday after meeting Powell, refrained from supporting the idea until the details of the conference are clarified.
Unilateralists within the present American administration may also manage to sabotage the idea. Given that they are intent on launching a war against Iraq and asserting US hegemony around the world, they feel far from comfortable with the idea of joining ranks with the UN, the EU and Russia on a Middle Eastern agenda. One possibility of reconciling contradictory pressures falls within the pattern of vacillation and equivocation that plagued this administration for the last two months, and to an extent since Bush took office. Should such a pattern take hold, the idea of an international conference might simply vanish with the passing of time like many other international initiatives that failed to be adopted by a powerful coalition of regional and international forces right from their inception.
Another possibility is that other currents of change in such a volatile political environment will render the idea untenable. In Israel, the Likud central committee will convene mid-month to determine its platform, and consequently Sharon's fate. And if the Likud should choose former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to replace Sharon as its leader, Israel could embark on another political course upon which the conflict might escalate to an unprecedented level.
However, the main starting point for exploring the future of the conference idea is the tendency to reconcile conflicting claims in a way commensurate with the currents of pressure brought to bear on the administration.
The issues the administration mentioned for the conference agenda include humanitarian aid, political reforms by the Palestinian Authority, economic development and the construction of a so-called market economy institutions and the rebuilding of infrastructure destroyed by Israeli troops.
At the very least we should expect that there will be attempts to manipulate the agenda, and it is possible that the agenda might be hijacked altogether and be filled with all manner of business other than the Palestinians' right to immediate self-determination and statehood.
The press conference held by Sharon and Bush after their talks at the White House focused exclusively on non-political issues. Interestingly, Sharon made no mention of the international conference idea. He reiterated his position, calling for a regional conference as though the US president's remarks had made no impression on him whatsoever.
Sharon's conduct at the press conference may well be a preview of Israeli tactics in the immediate future whereby it ignores any ideas that it disagrees in the hopes that they will simply fade away.
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