The defeat of two of the most sympathetic US lawmakers to the Arab cause was a setback for Arab, Muslim, African Americans and the Democratic Party, argues Manar El Shorbagy* In the two United States Congressional primary campaigns that were decided by Middle East politics, the defeat of Representatives Earl Hilliard and Cynthia McKinney was clearly a setback for Arab and Muslim Americans. But in the long run, the loser may turn out to be no one but the Democratic Party which chose to distance itself from both McKinney and Hilliard. Both African American incumbents, Earl Hilliard and Cynthia McKinney have for long angered the pro-Sharon forces with public statements or votes in Congress. The latest vote they cast was against the House Resolution in Solidarity with Israel last May. The two members' districts were re- configured after the 2000 census providing opponents chance to remove them from office in this year's election. In Alabama, pro-Sharon forces poured huge amounts of money from outside of the state into the campaign of the relatively unknown Arthur Davis who was challenging Earl Hilliard. The latter was defeated in June after a campaign that was described as a Middle East "proxy war". After ousting Hilliard, the pro-Sharon forces focused their efforts on Georgia's fourth district to defeat McKinney. However, in this case, the huge sums of money that poured into the campaign of Denise Majette, were accompanied by a fierce campaign accusing McKinney of taking campaign contributions from Arab and Muslim Americans under scrutiny by the FBI for "possible financial ties with terrorist groups". Majette accused McKinney of taking money from "people who have been named as Arab terrorists". In the post 11 September environment, the US media quickly repeated the accusations with no additional scrutiny of the claims. It did not matter whether those donors were charged of any crimes, or even how many of McKinney's Arab American donors were in fact under investigation. "Racial profiling" as McKinney described it has actually been allowed to extend from airports and investigations into electoral politics. This campaign marks a dangerous turn in US politics that is reminiscent of the 1970s and early 1980s when candidates for public office used to return campaign contributions to Arab Americans, in fear it would alienate the pro-Israel forces. But the targeting of McKinney reached yet an even higher level, through a mobilisation campaign urging Republican voters to cross the party line and vote in the Democratic primary for McKinney's challenger, whose base of support came mainly from White and Republican neighbourhoods. The defeat of the two African American members has further strained black-Jewish relations, especially in the South. It has created a rift between black and Jewish members of congress, which took a new turn when a senior black member threatened to fight aid for Israel in retaliation for what is perceived as "outsiders" choosing the representatives of black America. But these two campaigns have also created tension between the black members of Congress and their own party. The Democratic Party is home for all but one of the current black members. The party did not aggressively intervene, as it usually does in cases such as this, to support both incumbents. This position by the party may prove to be the action with the most serious repercussions. It seems, that the Democratic Party's strategy based on courting and not alienating Jewish voters. Given Bush's unconditional support of Sharon, this is no time to alienate the Jewish voters lest they break their conventional pattern and start voting Republican. But there is one problem for the Democrats. This strategy may alienate yet another solidly Democratic constituency -- black voters. The stand taken by the Democratic Party in both campaigns actually extends to a general strategy for elections. The strategy formulated by the centrist Democratic Leadership Council, which worked for Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996. While this strategy was focused on appealing to Southern white voters, it directly took the black vote for granted. The argument for supporting this strategy is that blacks will vote Democrat anyway since they have no where else to go. But the reason why this strategy worked in previous elections was Bill Clinton's politics and persona not the theory that blacks will vote Democratic by default. In fact, this strategy which worked for the "first black President" was not workable for other Democrats, including Al Gore in 2000, let alone congressional elections and especially those for House seats. The defeat of two black members by non- black forces in black majority districts may convince angry African Americans to simply stay home on election day. In a close election a weak black turn-out could mean a Republican victory. But above all else, the reluctance of the Democratic Party to support its two incumbents, its decision not to speak out when the Arab and Muslim American "minority" was roundly discredited in absolute terms, and even its deafening silence on Iraq is all based in a strategy aimed at not losing any votes in November. But for the Democratic Party to win the next election by compromising its values means that, for us, as well as for many Americans -- it may not matter much which party will win in November. * The writer is assistant professor of political science at the American University in Cairo
