Ayman El-Amir examines the mechanisms resulting in a new Security Council resolution on Iraq The United Nations Security Council is edging closer to adopting a resolution that will clear the way for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. With the US poised to submit an amended draft, and President Saddam Hussein hinting at cooperation, any resolution is likely to provide the arms inspectors with an iron-clad mandate to strip naked everything in Iraq in the search for concealed weapons of mass destruction. It will also set a timeline for the inspection team (UNMOVIQ) to report on the disarmament of Iraq and warn the latter of the serious consequences that would follow any attempt at obstruction. When the amended resolution is passed, as it probably will, the differing parties will celebrate it as a victory. In the Security Council vernacular this is called "unanimity" -- which means a majority of affirmative votes, with no veto cast. Meanwhile, the US continues to assemble its awesome war machine in readiness to strike Iraq and the Security Council's resolution, in the end, may prove to be nothing more than the opening shot in the US military campaign to forcibly oust President Saddam Hussein and re-shape Iraq. In reaching unanimity the Security Council will have performed a delicate balancing act. Protracted negotiations inside the Council's secretive chambers, and among key capitals around the world, focused mainly on a clause the US wanted to incorporate in the resolution, which UN diplomats have dubbed as "automaticity". Under this provision the US would assume the right to automatically launch a military strike against Iraq, without further recourse to the Security Council, should Iraq be deemed not complying with inspection requirements. France, Russia and China balked, knowing Washington was seeking a fig-leaf to cover its determination to go to war. For these three veto-wielding members the purpose of the resolution is to dismantle Iraq's unproven but suspected weapons of mass destruction. For the US the ultimate objective is to change the regime in Iraq. The French, in particular, favoured a two-tier resolution. If the inspection team faced obstacles in fulfilling its mission the matter would be referred back to the Security Council for further, but unspecified, action. The US also wanted to introduce conditions so stringent as to make Iraqi compliance virtually impossible. So who won? Unanimity, by definition, means almost everyone. There will remain the potential for a self-serving interpretation of the resolution's provisions, largely by the US. But the work of the Security Council is particularly meticulous. Its experts and diplomats are positively Talmudic in drafting resolutions. The resolution on Iraq will remain a win-win situation, at least for the time being. For the US it will place Baghdad on notice, strengthen the hand of inspectors and, in Washington's interpretation, give it a free hand to act unilaterally should efforts to disarm Iraq flounder. For France, Russia and China the resolution will be seen as successfully confining the US within the multilateral fold, leaving the matter of war and peace in the hands of the Security Council and sparing Iraq a devastating blow that would also undermine their own strategic and economic interests. It is no secret that both France and Russia are anxious about the repayment of Iraqi debts they are owed. They also want to roll back the threat of US hegemony over the region. Arab countries too will breath a sigh of relief and for some the resolution will be seen as the crowning success of the subtle game of confronting misguided US policies. The Security Council -- the power-house of the UN -- is a strange animal. In the words of the UN Charter it has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". For idealists it is a noble mission that serves the interests of all member states, especially the weak and the vulnerable, and on occasions it has done so. But in reality this noble mission is more often about big power politics, myopic national interests, diplomatic and semantic manoeuvring. Its anachronistic structure, with the powerful veto-wielding five permanent members (the P-5), and the veto-less elected 10 members (E-10), is almost a caste system. But the relations between the permanent powers and the transient ones, who are elected for a two-year term, are more complex. For the Security Council to pass a resolution it must have a two-third majority, that is, nine votes of the Council's members, including the consent of the P-5s. So coalition-building between the two constituencies, depending on who needs what from whom, is an endless game. In this weird dance US cajoling, arm-twisting and intimidation is common. Why did the US show so much patience with this exasperating and complex process, especially when President George W Bush already has congressional authority to attack Iraq? Three factors have been in play. First, the warring factions in the administration have had a chance to reconcile their differences. The warlords of the Department of Defense have given the anti-war diplomats of the State Department, and the more savvy generals in the military, a chance to exhaust their arguments and efforts. Secondly, it provides an opportunity to dispel scepticism, both domestic and international, about Washington's commitment to multilateral efforts. Thirdly, it has been a chance to play for time until the slim coalition and the military build-up needed to attack Iraq are completed. And if, for the time being, we need no longer hold our breath, this does not mean the war jitters are over. 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