Mohamed Sid-Ahmed considers the implications of the breakdown of the Iraqi state Shortly before the war on Iraq began, a number of Egyptian human rights activists issued a statement condemning not only the evils of war but also those of a regime based on tyranny, in other words, the policies of both Bush and Saddam Hussein. This earned them the wrath of some members of the Egyptian opposition, who argued that the statement should have confined itself to condemning war and not criticised the Iraqi regime at a time it was bracing itself for a military onslaught. But had the signatories of the statement heeded this advice, they would have been hard pressed to explain the scenes of jubilation in the streets of Baghdad following the downfall of the Iraqi regime. Having said that, I must admit that my reading of the situation was, like that of most observers, not devoid of errors of judgement. The undeniable signs of resistance we saw throughout the early stages of the war gave the lie to America's claims that the Iraqi people would see the coalition forces as liberators and greet them with flowers, and raised expectations, mine included, of a very different course, if not outcome, for the war. I realised, of course, that the resistance of the Iraqi people was motivated not by loyalty to the Iraqi regime or to the person of Saddam Hussein but, first and foremost, by Iraqi patriotism in defence of the fatherland. But if so, how to explain the fall of Baghdad with practically no resistance by the people of the city? Nor is the about-face of the Iraqi people the only inexplicable development in recent days. Much is still shrouded in mystery and many questions need to be answered before we can fully understand what really happened in the last crucial hours of the war. Is Saddam Hussein dead or on the run? What happened to his ubiquitous information minister, Mohamed Said Al-Sahaf, who remained upbeat in the daily press conferences he gave to journalists even as coalition missiles were raining down around him? What is behind the disappearance of Tareq Aziz, Ezzat Ibrahim and the rest of Saddam's closest collaborators? Could they all have been killed by a single coalition strike on a venue in which they had gathered for a meeting? How to explain their disappearance at the very time the Republican Guards ceased to exist and all organised resistance suddenly crumbled? How true are the rumours of a secret deal between the Iraqi leadership and the coalition powers, to allow the takeover of Baghdad without any serious resistance in exchange for the lives of Saddam Hussein and other members of the Iraqi leadership? Why did the resistance of Umm Qasr, Basra and Mosul go on for weeks while that of Baghdad was overcome in a couple of days? But perhaps the biggest question of all is what happened to the alleged cache of weapons of mass destruction that was cited as the prime reason for invading Iraq. With the exception of limited pockets of resistance, the coalition forces now have the run of the country, and yet have failed to locate any stocks of biological or chemical weapons. Unless they can establish the presence of these weapons, and hence the existence of a casus belli, the war is illegitimate. It can only acquire legitimacy through a new Security Council resolution. But given that a majority of the veto-wielding members of the Security Council were strongly opposed to the war, it is unlikely that they would now be ready to legitimise it retroactively. Meanwhile, the fall of the regime in Iraq has created a security and political vacuum that shows no signs of being filled up any time soon. The total absence of state authority in Iraq has led to widespread looting in the streets of its major cities. What is still more serious is that after long years of living under the iron-fisted rule of Saddam Hussein, totally excluded from public life, most Iraqis feel they are not qualified to participate in the decision-making process. Decades of coercion have deprived them of faith in themselves, and in their ability to assume responsibilities and overcome challenges. They cannot imagine that an ordinary citizen could be elected, become accountable and govern according to the rules of democracy. Instead, they pin their hopes on the emergence of a legendary figure like Saladin or Nasser to lead them to a better future. The situation in Iraq is a lesson for the entire Arab world. In the face of chaos, the natural inclination is to resort to repression and coercion, not to the rule of democracy, however vital this may be. How to face this dilemma? The tendency towards repression must be resisted if we want to get out of the vicious circle. The clearest manifestation of this "natural inclination" is Washington's choice of Jay Garner as the man entrusted with planting democracy in Iraq. How can Washington be taken seriously when the instauration of democracy is left to a retired American general who is not bound by a time-frame and who is, moreover, known to be a close friend of Sharon's, a great admirer of the Likud Party and a strong supporter of the hawkish policies of the Israeli far-right? A friend recently challenged my assertion that democracy could not be forcibly imposed on any society by force of arms, citing the examples of Japan and Germany to prove that it could. But Iraq is very different from the two Axis countries occupied by America after World War II, and General Jay Garner, whose only claim to fame is that he is a protégé of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, is not in the same league as General Douglas MacArthur, who, for five years as the supreme commander of the Allied occupation forces in Japan, supervised the reconstruction and democratisation of the country. As developed industrial states, Japan and Germany were ready to adopt a form of democracy based on a market economy, even if neither had a solid tradition of democracy. In contrast, Iraq is a developing country and we all know that, with the exception of India, developing countries are not receptive to the notion of democracy. For developing countries in the Middle East, the situation is complicated by the perception of Israel as a bastion of Western imperialism which justifies a permanent state of emergency detrimental to democratic practice. The end of the regime in Iraq is seen by many governments as a chance to start mending the fences broken in the acrimonious debate over the war, because the reason for disagreement between them has disappeared. But how realistic are the hopes of a quick reconciliation? Efforts to restore harmonious relations between Britain and Germany, between France and Britain, and even between Britain and America are currently underway. The coalition partners do not see eye to eye when it comes to who will conduct the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. Blair met Bush last week in Belfast to discuss the issue, specifically, what role the UN will play in the future of Iraq. Jacques Chirac spoke for most European leaders when he said the United Nations is the sole repository of legitimacy for such a venture, but the Americans are determined to run Iraq themselves, in other words, to keep the reconstruction of Iraq, like the war on Iraq, outside the aegis of the United Nations and hence outside international legitimacy. It seems the Blair-Bush summit did not produce the positive results both parties hoped for. Bush insisted that General Jay Garner govern Iraq throughout the interim stage, while Blair insisted on the need to go back to the United Nations. The compromise they settled on was a joint statement that the UN will play a "vital role" in post-war Iraq. But the word "vital" was described by Bush to mean responsibility for "humanitarian" aid to reduce the suffering of the Iraqi people. In other words, the rights-and- obligations equation will be as follows: the UN will assume obligations, including financial obligations, while the US will enjoy all the rights! Before the outbreak of the war, the main confrontation was between the United States and France. Is it now being replaced by a growing divergence of views between the United States and Britain? Tony Blair has suddenly realised that his diplomacy is satisfying neither the requirements of the American administration nor those of the European Union. On the domestic front, the harsh criticism he is facing both from British public opinion, and, even more seriously, from his own party, threatens his political future. Another issue over which the Anglo-American alliance may not see eye to eye is whether the regime change agenda should stop with Iraq or extend to other countries. Washington has warned Syria against concealing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or of offering asylum to the Iraqi leadership. Will this be used as a pretext to go after Syria, which is already a member of Bush's "axis of evil"? Will the US use its decisive victory over Saddam to go forward with similar attacks against other powers in the Middle East. Then there is another issue simmering and coming close to boiling point as chaos spreads, and that is the Kurdish problem. How can the aspirations of the Kurds, now scattered among four different sovereign states, for a separate homeland not be met in the context of a genuine democracy? In a way, Saddam's autocratic rule prevented the Kurds from taking their struggle for independence beyond a certain threshold. Can Erdogan's Turkey go on containing the Kurds after Saddam's elimination? The occupation by Kurdish Peshmerga fighters of cities in Northern Iraq has angered the Turkish government. Can the American invaders find a solution that would satisfy both the Kurds and the Turks, or will this conflict become another reason to expand military operations beyond Iraq?
