History shows that a united national front is vital if Egypt is to play a role in building a new multi-polar world order, argues Anouar Abdel-Malek The business of manufacturing new and exciting political terms is booming once again. "Roadmap" and "confidence-building" have assumed their place alongside "terrorism", whose etymological record reveals an ardent desire to shunt aside such notorious words as "imperialism" and "hegemony", and replace them with "preemptive warfare" and "democratisation", as prelude to military occupation. In this fabricated climate, an older term has been steadily gaining ground in Egypt: "united national front" or, in the abbreviation some favour, "united front". One is struck by the persistence with which this term now asserts itself, as though oblivious to the scepticism with which it is greeted in certain quarters. In its broadest sense, it emanates from the heart of our nationalist movement. The Egyptian revolution is invoked once more as our national imperative and necessary compass, as tensions at home intensify under the pressures of external aggression and siege. Yet this slogan also raises questions. Is it a banner which can be shared by all peoples and societies? Or is it the exclusive property of a few particular countries? Certainly, we haven't heard the term bandied around much in such advanced industrialised nations as the US and Britain. Nor is it a common rallying cry in sub- Saharan Africa. True, many western governments which are founded on the alternation of a ruling party and an opposition have at times appealed for common cause in the face of urgent contingencies. This was the case in Britain during World War II, and is the case again today as the US embarks on its global war against the future, starting with the Arab and Middle Eastern civilisational circle. Europe has also experienced "national fronts" and appeals for "national unity". Such a front existed between de Gaulle and the French Communist Party from 1945 until the communists were permanently expelled from government in 1949. And in Italy there was the brief "historic truce" between the ruling Christian Democratic Party and the Communist Party, which fell apart after the assassination of the Christian Democrat Prime Minister Aldo Moro at the hands of the Red Brigade in 1978. A survey of modern history tells us that the phenomenon is common in ancient societies with long histories, especially in the eastern civilisational circle -- societies such as China, Vietnam, Korea, Malaysia and Japan. More recently, these countries have been joined by the largest Latin American nation, Brazil, following the landslide victory of Labour Party leader Lula Da Silva in the last presidential elections. How, then, do we explain the constant appeal to a "national front" in Egypt during the period which preceded the emergence of the term itself in the 1940s? To answer this question, we must first turn back to the Egyptian revival, that astounding period which embraces both the reign of Mohamed Ali and the age of the Khedive Ismail and the 1881 Revolution, and which restored pride to Egypt after four generations of decline. After a period of neglect, this period began to receive the renewed attention of public opinion and of government in the wake of the 1973 October war. Mohamed Ali came to power in 1805, having been elected viceroy by the religious, political and guild leaders of Cairo following the expulsion of the Napoleonic forces. The new wali launched an ambitious programme to modernise and autonomise the state, and the means he chose to do this were unprecedented in history. The most striking aspect of the process was that men of ideas and men of arms were united in working for the advancement of Egypt. In particular, there was no discrimination shown in the selection and promotion of elites and their cadres, other than the criteria of proficiency and allegiance to the nation. This did not put an end to the "class struggle" between those affiliated to the old order, which was heir to the Mameluke feudal-military society, and those who belonged to the emerging modern society, especially its military-industrial sector. Indeed, tension between these two groups remained a constant throughout the Mohamed Ali era. One by-product of this division was a bifurcation in Egyptian thought, which split into a modernising or liberal trend, pioneered by Refaa El-Tahtawi in the first half of the 19th century, and a movement dedicated to the perpetuation of the ancient Islamic legacy in essentially fundamentalist form, articulated by Mohamed Abdou and Gamaleddin in the latter half of the same century. However, it must be stressed that this ideological bifurcation had no impact on the cohesion of the national unity movement (as the "national front" was called in those days). The front gave absolute priority to the cause of Egyptian revival, instead of allowing factionalism to disrupt and dissipate collective efforts, as has been continually the case in the second half of the 20th century. Following Mohamed Ali's momentous reign, Europe moved to hem in his successor Abbas I, having achieved which, it embarked on a process of penetration. Under the next viceroy, Said, guided by his friend and mentor De Lesseps, Egypt became encumbered with foreign debt on the pretext of the need to catch up with Europe. It was not until the Khedive Ismail came to power that the course marked out by Mohamed Ali could be resumed. The nationalist movement was soon widely adopted by the army, which was to provide the core of the 1881 Revolution, two years after the European powers had deposed Ismail. What is important, here, is that time after time, Egypt was only able to progress towards independence when all the components of the nation were merged into a powerful and cohesive national front which persisted in spite of periods of subjugation and dependency. Under the British occupation, which began in 1882, Egyptian society became progressively more fragmented and discordant -- or so the occupiers hoped and believed. However, it was not long before the vanguard of the nation reassembled within the framework of the National Party. Led by Mustafa Kamel and Mohamed Farid, the party quickly extended its influence to the remnants of the Egyptian army and officer corps, who rallied around the figure of Mahmoud Sami El-Baroudi. The party remained active until World War I, and this interlude was followed almost immediately by the eruption of the 1919 Revolution. The 1919 Revolution marked a pinnacle in the Egyptian people's drive to continue and develop the national revival initiated by Mohamed Ali and resumed by Ismail. Although the true significance of this revolution was largely forgotten after 1954, it has gradually reemerged into public consciousness since October 1973. Once again, the leadership of that revolution represented the broadest possible cross-section of Egyptian society and the overwhelming majority of the active forces in the nationalist movement. From the outset, the Egyptian Wafd sought to embrace the entire nation, and above all, what its historical leaders regarded as civil society at the time, in both its intellectual and economic branches. We find this spirit epitomised in Mohamed Talaat Harb's call to found "an Egyptian bank for all Egyptians". This project gave rise to the Bank of Egypt which, in turn, gradually evolved into the hub of a range of industrial and commercial enterprises spanning the whole economy, from the agrarian sector to the fields of transport, the cinema and the arts -- in short, all the sectors into which the emerging capitalist (and primarily urban) bourgeoisie was moving. This spirit manifested itself on a second level in the unity between Muslim and Coptic nationalists, which was later reflected tangibly in the Wafd Party leadership, in parliament and in all the Wafd-led governments until 1951. These two trends crystallised in the persons of the Minister of War Hamdi Seif El-Nasr Pasha who, in 1935, opened the doors of the military academies to the popular classes, and Makram Ebeid, the powerful secretary-general of the Wafd, who in 1919 declared, "Egyptians are Arabs", thus heralding Egypt's entrance onto the stage of pan-Arab nationalism. However, such maturity was not destined to last. As Egyptian society and its vanguard diversified, successive sectors of the major landowning minority broke off from the Wafd to rally around the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, and many members of the industrial-capitalist elite joined ranks with Ismail Sidqi in the Federation of Egyptian Industries, before going on to enlist in the Saadist Party. Thus, as the nationalist movement began to stumble in the 1930s -- for a variety of reasons, the Wafdist front was unable to fulfill the nationalist aspirations it had aroused -- there emerged new radical forces, such as the Misr Al-Fatat, or Young Egypt movement. Misr Al-Fatat called upon the nationalist forces to rally around its operational core, since the parliamentary system was no longer able to satisfy them. Egypt's second revolution was fundamentally committed to national unity, as embodied in the concept of a "national front". However, the parametres it had set for that unity proved unable to incorporate new developments, whether in the spirit of the movement, or in its modes of action. This situation was further aggravated by the global economic depression, which had begun to sap the achievements of the national economy. These events marked the opening of a new chapter in the history of Egypt's revolution, covering the period from 1936 to the present day. Henceforth, "diversification" was the watchword of the popular revolutionary organisations, from Misr Al-Fatat and the New Nationalist Party to the Egyptian Communist movement, the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood. It was on the basis of this historical groundwork and the social fabric forged at this time that the call for a "united national front" was launched in 1946. Born of the drive to rejuvenate the nationalist movement, the call issued from the National Committee for Labour and Students and from progressive cultural and political societies. It coincided with the rise of the Free Officers movement among the younger vanguard of the armed forces. In this new period, our people had to struggle against many adversities which converged upon us from all directions, and dragged us into the wars of 1948, 1956, and 1967, and the war of attrition which lasted from 1967 until the October victory of 1973. Let us return now to the present, where we find ourselves besieged by new concepts and expressions such as "roadmap" and "confidence- building" in an age of "terrorism" and "democratisation". A periodical, blue in colour and limited in circulation, was lying on my table the other day, when it suddenly seemed to clamour for my attention. Since 1946, the famous British Foreign Report has presented what it is permissible to publish of British Intelligence information and analyses. Issue 2737 of 22 May 2003 seemed determined to interrupt my train of thoughts on the united national front. But perhaps this was not so much an interruption, as a provocation to push my thinking further? "Israel's digital army," read one headline in this edition (p. 3), introducing a report on a "revolutionary reform plan" that the chiefs of Israel's armed forces will present to Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz in July. Its purpose: "to respond to the new military challenges resulting from the war in Iraq and a much tighter defence budget". What precisely are the components of this plan, and what bearing might they have on the subject of a "united national front" in Egypt? Let us read further: "The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) is the largest army in the Middle East. The central idea of the plan is to cut its numbers by a third so as to devote most of the budget to the air force, military intelligence and precision guided weapons. "According to the plan, 30 per cent of Israel's tanks will be slashed, and instead of using up to five types of tanks, the divisions will rely mainly on the Israeli-made Merkava Mark 4, considered by some Israelis to be the world's leading battle tank. "The new tank divisions will be equipped with integral intelligence units and modern radar that will allow commanders to assess battle threats from air-conditioned, computerised, command- and-control vehicles. Communications between tank commanders will be through a computerised online system. "More women will serve in the tank divisions, as physical skills will be less important and a higher priority will be placed on seeking out better-educated soldiers to operate digital tanks. "Beginning in January 2004, the Israeli air force will be cut by 20 per cent. At least five combat squadrons will be closed, and the pilots and the rest of the personnel will be sent home. But at the same time, the air force will be equipped with brand new F-161 'Storms'.... The latest tank-hunting helicopters will be merged into the digitalised air force." Beneath the caption "Special forces", the article reports: "At the moment there are at least 10 special forces brigades... According to the new plan, all Israeli special forces will be assembled into one powerful division for better coordination. The main mission of the 'Golden Division' will be to use home-made 'smart weapons' to destroy strategic targets and enemy tanks on the way to the front." The author then summarises the message conveyed by this digitalised army, which is to be ready for action in five years' time. By then, Foreign Report cites an Israeli military source as saying, "The IDF will be the best, most modern, sophisticated and lethal war machine on earth." Here ends the portrait of a possible future, which according to the internationally reputed periodical will be determined in July. Meanwhile, the Arabs find themselves surrounded by mounting efforts at "confidence-building" on all sides. It must be stressed that the same term "confidence-building" has not always been used to mask the kind of manoeuvres which go by this name in black times such as these. The true meaning of "confidence-building" has always been and will remain the building of bridges, of channels of communication and understanding, between the diverse and influential forces of the nation. It means that representatives of all the components of the country and of the Arab nation get to know one another better, while acknowledging that no one holds a monopoly on the truth or an exclusive right to determine policy. It also recognises the need to benefit from the experience and opinions of all, so as to raise the "social intelligence" of the nation, within a framework that guarantees the greatest possible respect for the requirements of national security and, simultaneously, for new ideas -- even if we may find some of those ideas repugnant at first. "Confidence-building" means introspection. It means that we begin by looking at ourselves and learn to accept ourselves. If "acceptance of the other" -- even when they are our adversary -- is legitimate and necessary, it is no more necessary than "self-acceptance", especially when the nation itself is under threat. Otherwise, "acceptance of the other" is merely a prelude to dependency and surrender. In our current circumstances, "confidence-building" will require that we stop crowning some as the "majority", and tarring others as the "opposition". Figures and percentages are relative matters, the product of circumstance and sometimes whim. Far better to take the opposite track and begin laying the foundations for a national convergence, rather than simply continuing to revolve as at present in a quasi-vacuum, peopled by the spectres of mutual disregard, discord, envy and exclusion. We have at our disposal today a set of ideas which could form the cornerstones for a united front as proposed by certain parties. We should also study other ideas, including those emanating from the ruling party, and those proposed by non-governmental organisations. In the course of this process, we should bear in mind that we cannot ignore opinions just because the premises on which they rest are opposed by a few, when those ideas are approved in essence by the overwhelming majority of the nation. "Confidence-building" has become an imperative by virtue of the threat to our national independence and security posed by a hostile front that will never give up, and that has just announced its destructive military plans for the future. All active forces in our society -- in both the majority and the minority, in both governmental and non-governmental sectors, both the advocates and the opponents of change -- must be aware of the looming peril that threatens our future, and also neutralises any outside power that might pretend to mediate between us and the Zionist state, let alone check its designs. "Confidence-building" entails putting aside all those precautions which presently prevent Egypt from drawing closer to other countries in the Arab world, and in the Middle East in general, so as to build a strategic alliance -- not only with the governments of this region, but also with diverse social forces, schools of thought and non-governmental institutions. It is important, too, to extend this process across the five continents, especially to the eastern civilisational circle, where more than two-thirds of the world's inhabitants live, with whom we have no history of acrimony, but rather, on the contrary, a legacy of friendship and convergence over many vital concerns and interests. In this regard, "self-acceptance", which as we said must take the absolute priority, should be linked to the "acceptance of the other" -- the "other", here, being our friend and companion on the civilisational road, our ally against the horrors of hegemony and, hence, our partner in building a just and peaceful multi-polar and multi-centred global order. In sum, "confidence-building" demands that we get our goals right. We must, as the proverb has it, "befriend those who are friendly to us and hate those who are hostile to us," not the reverse. I believe that a closer study of the concept and practices of the "united national front" during the third phase of our Egyptian revolution (1936-46) will shed light on many factors which have recently escaped our attention, yet which we desperately need. First, however, we must agree upon the need to realise national "self- acceptance" so that we can profit from the pooling of our riches -- of achievements, abilities and ideas -- that such a united front will inevitably make possible.
