The speed of democratisation must be determined by the maturity of all the players in the process, writes Ibrahim Nafie Mention political reform and people prick up their ears. They look around furtively, as if the subject can only be discussed in whispers. One result of this sense of the clandestine is that it unnecessarily places the existing political regime on the defensive. There is no denying that Egypt is in urgent need of political reform. But, to me, the more complex and urgent priority is to clarify what we mean by reform, and then to pinpoint what we want to change and in what order. Modern political systems must all possess in-built mechanisms that facilitate on- going reform, though the scope and pace of reform obviously varies from one country to another. Reform might target specific laws or institutions of government, or it might aim to overhaul the entire constitutional edifice of the state. In other words, reform can be partial or comprehensive. Nor must it always take place under the banner of reform. It is, more often than not, part of a much quieter process of natural evolution. If political reform is not confined to societies undergoing democratisation, it is the democratising societies that are most aware that their future welfare rides on the success of the transformation process. Hence the high temperatures that characterise the controversies that arise during the course of reform. Tempers flare and tongues let fly, sometimes unforgivably, in a pitched battle between those who want to step up the democratisation process and those who caution against unseemly haste. This latter point -- speed -- has always triggered the sharpest controversy in countries that are making the transition from a state party system to a multi-party plurality. Although differences of opinion on the issue often reflect where people stand on the political map, with the opposition pressing for faster change and those in power pleading for patience, the question goes far deeper. It is telling that independent intellectuals are frequently divided over the issue. Political reform does not take place in a vacuum. A reform programme, set down on paper in the form of documents and laws, must reflect the society to which it will apply. Society, in turn, is not a stagnant, immutable entity -- it is constantly in flux. It is over assessments of society at any given stage that people's opinions diverge according to their ideological and political outlooks. However, of greater importance, here, is how society interacts with the democratisation process. The response of a given society is determined by its prevailing culture. If that culture fosters respect for the opinions of others, society will interact positively and propel the reform process forward. If the prevalent attitude is that voicing differences is a parting from the norm, or a form of heresy, treason or rebellion, then society will respond negatively and obstruct the reform process and, perhaps, make the situation worse than before that process began. There can be no true progress towards democracy in the absence of a culture of tolerance, mutual respect and dialogue. It is impossible to contemplate free, fair and transparent elections if any of the parties involved refuse to accept the results of these elections, and the temporary mandate they confer on the victor. In such a situation the loser might attempt to foment disturbances and the victor, if undemocratic, might avail himself of the authority conferred to concentrate power in his hands, usurp the rights of his opponents and, perhaps, institute legal and constitutional changes to restructure the electoral system in order to guarantee his perpetuation in power. Democratic development implies that all parties involved in the political process are not only equal in their rights but also in their duties and obligations. The electoral process confers upon the victor no more than a temporary mandate that is understood to last only until the next elections. That mandate, moreover, is only partial. It does not entitle the victor to institute legislative or constitutional changes other than through procedures stipulated in the constitution. In Egypt, for example, in order to amend the constitution, a majority of the members of the People's Assembly must approve the notion of amendment in principle. The amendment itself must then be put to vote after discussion and receive a two-thirds majority, after which it should be placed before the people in a popular referendum. Thus, in Egypt, as in other democratic or democratising countries, the constitution can only be altered in the event of widespread popular demand as expressed through a range of democratic procedures. Any political party that comes to power through democratic elections must abide by this principle, regardless of the extent to which it might object to some of the provisions of the constitution. Should that party attempt to alter the constitution against the will of the people and established procedures it will have breached the mandate conferred upon it through the electoral process, violated the rules of the democratic game and usurped powers to which it is not entitled. Conceivably, therefore, elections in which the participants are not committed to democratic principles and processes can lead to the subversion of democratisation rather than its progress. However, let us bring theory down to earth with a concrete illustration from a country in the process of democratic development. In Algeria, in 1991, results of the parliamentary primary elections indicated that the Islamic Salvation Front (FSI) stood a good chance of winning a large parliamentary majority. However, some FSI leaders were impatient. Unable to wait until the second round of elections, they declared their intentions, which, in effect, would have entailed a violation of the partial and temporary mandate conferred upon them through the democratic electoral process. They mounted their podiums and announced to their supporters that now that power was in their hands they would waste no time and spare no effort towards the fulfillment of their holy mission to transform Algeria into an Islamic state, as though it had been a Buddhist state up to then. Nor did they conceal their plans for those political parties and forces they branded as heretic. Instead of the jubilation and relief that should have greeted the first free democratic elections in Algeria the atmosphere was ominous. It was obvious that to hand over power to a party that would not abide by the rules of democratic behaviour and had no inclination to respect divergent opinion opened the prospect of the gallows for all who opposed it. Therefore, the army intervened to cancel the second round of elections and in this it was supported by a large segment of society. Then, perhaps inevitably, wide scale rioting erupted, security broke down and terrorism spread. Thousands upon thousands of Algerians have paid with their lives for this state of affairs in the past decade. The case of Algeria exemplifies the dangers of hastening political reforms in the absence of a democratic culture. However, this does not mean that the process should be frozen or slowed down to such a sluggish pace that progress is imperceptible. Rather, a delicate balance must be struck and retuned as the process moves through successive phases. For there must be phases, each with its own function and each leading as smoothly as possible to the next. This is a principle upon which we must agree at this juncture in Egypt's political reform process. Against the complaints lodged by some that democratisation has moved too slowly over the past decade we must pit the fact that our country faced unusually difficult circumstances with the rise of terrorism. This peril endangered the entire nation and it was imperative that our government give it priority. This is what any government would do regardless of where the society it governed stood on the path to democratic development. Nothing could illustrate this more clearly than the restrictions on civil liberties the US administration pressed into action in the wake of 11 September, in one of the most democratic countries of the world. When people's lives are threatened, confronting that threat must take precedence. This is a lesson of history. However, once Egypt had recovered from the threat of terrorism, it could afford to give a stronger boost to democratic development. Evidence of this trend could be seen, over the past two years, in the 8th congress and then the first annual congress of the National Democratic Party. It can also be seen in the preparations for the national dialogue which will begin between the legitimate political parties and then gradually expand in scope to include other political institutions and independents. The importance of this dialogue cannot be overstated. It will contribute to creating a more harmonious climate for agreeing on the substance and timeframe of the forthcoming phases of political reform. Nevertheless, I believe that this is not yet the time to contemplate amending the constitution. To do so before society has matured in its exercise of democratic practices is to raise the spectre of ideological confrontations that have no bearing on the constitution or democratic development. My greatest fear is that such battles will home in on only an isolated few of the Egyptian Constitution's 211 articles, many of which conform to the highest standards of democracy, such as chapters three ("General Liberties, Rights and Duties") and four ("The sovereignty of law"). It is possible to foresee, for example, vicious and futile clashes over Article 2, which stipulates that the principles of Islamic Law are a major source of legislation, and Article 4, which states that the democratic socialist system forms the basis of the Egyptian economy. Rather than a precipitate overhaul of constitutional articles it would be more productive at this stage to focus on certain laws and articles of legislation affecting the electoral process, notably the Political Parties Law and the law on the exercise of political rights, lifting some of the restrictions on the formation of political parties and their activities. There are a number of political parties in the process of formation, and many of these express the opinions and aspirations of younger generations. The amendment of these laws should receive high priority on the current agenda of political reform, for such an action will stimulate a more vibrant and dynamic electoral process and lay the groundwork for the next phase of political reform.
