Why did the Americans rummage through the headquarters of their most trusted lackey in Iraq, wonders Saif Abu-Gulal* 20 May 2004 marked a turning point in Iraq's ongoing transitional political process from Saddam Hussein's totalitarian regime to parliamentary democracy. It was not a suicide attack that precipitated it, or a new prison scandal, but rather the unexpected use of force against the home and party offices of Ahmed Chalabi, a man widely regarded to be the staunchest "American connection" inside Iraq. What on earth has gotten into the Americans, targeting their main ally? Conspiracy theorists argue that the fracas with Chalabi was an American orchestrated plot to increase the popularity of Chalabi -- to broaden his Shia constituency so that his more liberal views would appeal more than those of the more militant Moqtada Al- Sadr to the Shia population. While his popularity might increase due to this unprecedented occurrence, talk of a clandestine American-Chalabi plot to win popular grassroots for liberal secular Shia forces inside Iraq is an underestimation of the political realities that are increasingly changing in Washington and Baghdad since April 2003. The United States has long sponsored and financed the Iraqi National Congress (INC) led by the Iraqi Shia liberal mathematician Ahmed Chalabi, and which was granted US patronage by the Clinton administration in 1998 under the Iraq Liberation Act. The Bush administration implemented the Act and "liberated" Iraq from 30 brutal years of tyranny, according to Chalabi. Before the US-led invasion of Iraq, Chalabi's militia were trained by the US and airlifted with him to southern Iraq in April 2003 to help stabilise the situation. This set the cat among the pigeons. Many Shia forces felt threatened by Chalabi's US-backed presence. With the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the hunt for a unifying Iraqi national leader gained momentum. Chalabi's close association with the US fuelled suspicions and anxiety among the competing political forces within Iraq who were organising to fill the political vacuum once Saddam was overthrown. Thus, in a strongly nationalist country such as Iraq, he was viewed by many as an American lackey, with intentions of favouring only Iraqi exiles, particularly his clan, to run Iraq at the expense of internal forces within the country. While he has not proven to be the sole political figure within Iraq enjoying American patronage, Chalabi was the leading source that convinced US policy makers of the existence of Saddam's deadly weapons of mass destruction. He certainly was one of the champions who managed to lobby Washington for a wider military commitment to liberate Iraq. In addition, he became a prominent figure inside exiled Iraqi opposition groups. He was the man of the moment. The war deposed Saddam Hussein and relations between Chalabi and the United States soared. The present breakdown in relations, however, can be attributed to deeper-rooted reasons whose symptoms surfaced during the first year of nation-building in Iraq. Interests diverged between the Chalabi and the US on shaping the new Iraq, especially over the role of the INC on the post-Saddam political landscape. Times and circumstances change. Chalabi and the US no longer share mutual self-interests in post-Saddam Iraq. Winning Iraqi hearts and minds is at the centre of this. On the one hand, Chalabi wants to distance himself and his party policies from the US. A member of the Shia majority, he initiated the De-Baathification Commission, which was a popular policy among the Shia who suffered from Baath Party cruelty and humiliation. Then he fiercely supported the powerful religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, in his calls for elections in Iraq, even going to Washington to lobby for Al-Sistani's demands. During the crisis on reaching a consensus on the "Fundamental Law" in the Interim Governing Council (IGC) in February 2004, Chalabi and his party walked out with seven other Shia council members in protest that the law had not included major Shia demands, especially those of Al-Sistani. Later Chalabi was a vital negotiator helping to convince Al-Sistani to abstain on the "Fundamental Law". Most recently, less than five weeks before the 30 June handover of power, Chalabi challenged the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and with it US policy in Iraq, demanding full sovereignty including full control of Iraqi oil, its revenues and the development of the country, calling anything short of that as "incomplete" sovereignty. In addition, Chalabi fiercely opposed and criticised the widely respected UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi for his plans to establish a new Iraqi government made up of technocrats, excluding most members of the IGC, as well as the INC. Judged against this background, it is clear that Chalabi and his party have been pursuing a policy not always in line with the US. Rather, it is arguable that Chalabi has been opportunistically surfing political currents, positioning himself and his party for the upcoming Iraqi elections in 2005. For the Americans specifically, Chalabi was a main source of tension for more than two years between the Pentagon and the State Department. After pictures of the abuse and torture of Iraqis in Abu Ghraib prison appeared in the press worldwide, the Bush administration decided to move the Iraq file from the Pentagon to the State Department, which believes Chalabi to be an untrustworthy individual who failed to drum up Iraqi support or win the acceptance of major Arab governments. A favourite of the Pentagon, Chalabi lost his key allies within the decision-making circles in Washington with this transfer. There is widespread belief today among senior decision- makers in Washington that Chalabi mislead the United States and over- exaggerated the threats of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. A decision was taken to cut the more than $300,000 per month in US aid received by his party, incorporate many of Baath party members back into the workforce and accept in principle the recommendations of the UN envoy on forming the next caretaker government. Hunted for embezzlement in Jordan, Chalabi this time stands accused by officials in Washington of nepotism, corruption and fraud in the business of reconstructing Iraq. This is America's effort to correct what they see as mismanagement by Chalabi during the first year of nation-building. Along with these criticisms, some senior American policy-makers have accused Chalabi of fostering a relationship with Iranian hardliners. Many Iraqis agree that Iran's influence and potential in Iraq has to be contained. Chalabi's relations with Iran -- if proven -- indicate further that Chalabi has been pursuing his own self-interests in post-Saddam Iraq. On the street in Baghdad, shocked at the news of the raid, the word is of infighting between Iraq's Interior Minister Samir Shakir Mahmoud Al-Sumaidy and Chalabi. Locally, Iraqis believe that the reasons for the raid are related to the busy efforts of both men to position themselves for elections next year, digging their heals inside vital government ministries in order to influence the new domestic political landscape of transitional Iraq. Such infighting, if proven, will put Iraq's political process in jeopardy. * The writer is an Iraqi academic based in the Netherlands.
