Saif Abu Gulal examines the rise of Muqtada Al-Sadr, his movement and its implications for Iraqi politics The rise of an armed violent faction from among the Arab Shia led by Muqtada Al-Sadr is neither an accident nor a surprise. Thirteen years of economic sanctions destroyed the Arab Shia middle class and harmed its intelligentsia in Iraq, thus creating mass poverty among its population. This is the same middle class and intelligentsia that academics and policy makers bank on to establish sustainable democracy. Despite the fact that Shia control under 60 per cent of Iraq's oil reserves, they remain in poverty. The Arab Shia viewed Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party ruthless policies of mass graves and the United Nations sanctions alike as direct reasons for their hardship and agony during the past decades. From this very harsh environment and daily trauma, a new phenomena start rising to exploit an opportunity that wishes to influence the course of Iraq's future. Therefore it was only natural that during the first year after Saddam's demise, Iraq witnesses the rise of a few radicals with religious tone. The road was paved for the fiery popular religious-patriotic rhetoric, echoed from the young cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, to rally the impoverished, deprived and disenfranchised masses in Saddam city, a slum of Baghdad with nearly 2 million Shia inhabitant, as well as developing some following in Kofa, Karbala and Nasseriya in the south. Capitalising on the degrading living standards in these areas, Muqtada Al-Sadr renamed Saddam city (previously Madinat Al- Thawra or Revolution City) after his family, calling it Sadr city and promised its people cash and jobs if they joined his Jaysh Al- Mehdi or the Al-Mehdi Army. To broaden his Shia constituency, he followed a new type of politics inside the Arab Shia house. Soon he started attacking the American presence in Iraq through his newspaper and later moved towards armed confrontations using his Al-Mehdi Army. This placed the moderate and liberal Arab Shia in a difficult position. In one way Al-Sadr policies focussed its efforts to neutralise the moderate and liberal Arab Shia politicians and challenge their position in major Shia cities. Al- Sadr conducted street politics that could only bring negative repercussions for the political and economic interests of the Arab Shia population in the new Iraq. The low-ranking young cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr declared his first war on the Shia exiles because he viewed them as posing real danger to his political ambitions. He targeted and harassed the exiles and moderates. Faleh Jabar notes "the line of confrontation against the forces returning from exile got Muqtada Al-Sadr bitterly entangled with the moderate, rational and influential Khoei Foundation, and the Khoei family." Moreover Jabar confirms the mob violence politics that Muqtada has been following since the liberation of Iraq to intimidate Shia exiles and cow those moderate elements among the Shia within Iraq "Single-handedly, he is waging a war against what he termed 'traditional clerics' as against 'non-Iraqi' clerics, and against pro-Baath clerics -- in a word, against all but himself. His followers allegedly killed the custodian of Najaf (Haydar Al- Kilydar Rufaii) and assassinated Abdel-Majid Khoei. His second was to pressure the old Ayatollah Mohamed Said al-Hakim into paying allegiance to him. His forces also besieged Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani's house in Najaf, but Al-Sistani's followers rushed in from nearby towns to remove the mob." Muqtada Al-Sadr was bent on challenging the most revered Iraqi Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Hussein Al-Sistani. With armed gangs he attacked the gravesite of Ali Bin Abi-Taleb in the holy city of Najaf seeking to confiscate the site and control its revenues. His armed followers went to provoke Karbala, the second holiest city for the Shia, and clashed with the Shia Badr brigade of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Al-Sadr went on to threaten Al-Sistani surrounding his home with armed militia and declaring the birth of Al-Hawza Al-Natiqa (Vocal Hawza) to rival and undermine the main legitimate Shia Hawza in Najaf accusing it of being merely Hawza Samita (Silent Hawza). The young cleric opened another front when he realised he was not included in the new political arrangements in Iraq where 13 of his Shia opponents reached vital positions among the 25 members of the Interim Governing Council (IGC). In general, Muqtada's position on the American presence in Iraq varied. At first he welcomed the Americans and called them the friends of the Iraqi people. However, his ideology, which is very close to that of Iran, made the Americans and with them many Iraqi Shia distrust him. As time passed, Muqtada realised that he had no chance of being included inside the political landscape of the new Iraq. With apprehension of not gaining any foothold in the political process, Muqtada Al-Sadr opened a broader front; his bid to rule Iraq and increase popularity became more militant. He declared a shadow Iraqi government; with an independent cabinet and army in clear challenge to the existing IGC, which contains in it 13 respected and educated members from the Shia community. Then he escalated his provocations to attack the coalition forces and focussing his rhetoric against the United States. He hoped by that to broaden his recruitment base to include the alienated and frustrated from the one-year experience under occupation. But last month US occupation administration has clamped down on Al- Sadr's offices. This resulted in the arrest of tens of his followers and the closure of his newspaper Al-Hawza. It also motioned a case against him that alleged he was a culprit in the killing of Abdel-Majid Al-Khoei that took place a year ago. Such provocative actions led to the recent showdown between Al-Sadr followers and the occupation forces. Even though he managed to recruit some of the policemen the United States had trained earlier, Muqtada Al-Sadr influence on Shia decision-making was minimum. The highest religious Shia establishment in Iraq (Marjaiya) does not trust him or even agree with him due to his minor religious stature and political inexperience. Most importantly Arab tribal sheikhs refused to support him or join his movement and called recently for his groups to quit the escalation and confrontation to prevent the destruction of the holy places in Najaf and Karbala. Thus, he failed to ignite a mass Arab Shia uprising in Iraq despite his more than a month standoff with the American army. Regardless of the fact that he is a Shia, Muqtada's phenomenon is not widely endorsed by the broader Arab Shia in Iraq or the region. Thus it lacks the authoritativeness to speak out on Shia issues or influence its politics. Therefore, the recent clashes between Al-Sadr followers and the American forces cannot be called a Shia uprising. This would be an oversimplification of what really is taking place inside Iraq today. One sensible policy to follow at this critical stage is to reach out to and encourage the more moderate Shia religious figures and Arab tribal sheikhs to join the political process at the same time help revive the Shia secular middle class, business community and intelligentsia. Greater investment in the south to restore services and encourage the business more tolerant culture will influence this and later generations to develop a new Iraqi nation that will accept democracy and safeguard its sustainability.
