The Bush administration's desperation to have an interim Iraqi government in place by 30 June is the tip of the iceberg, reports Khaled Dawoud from Washington Despite claims by US President George W Bush that he "had no role, zero", in picking members of Iraq's interim government, informed sources and UN diplomats point out that it was the White House, along with Paul Bremer, who were pulling the strings right up until Tuesday's announcement of the new government. In an attempt to secure a degree of international legitimacy for the caretaker cabinet that will oversee the government of Iraq until elections scheduled in January 2005, the US administration had been keen to stress its desire to transfer "full sovereignty" to an interim Iraqi government the selection of which, Washington insisted, would be left up to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. Ahead of his mission to Iraq Brahimi stated he would be seeking to form an interim cabinet comprising technocrats who had no relation to the political parties dominating the US-picked Iraqi Governing Council. Yet the UN diplomat, who has been involved in reaching settlements in conflicts in Lebanon, Haiti and Afghanistan, was forced to abandon his early promises one after another. Shortly after the IGC's surprise announcement that Allawi had been named prime minister, Brahimi was quoted as saying that it would be wrong to assume that he had "a free hand" in carrying out his mission in Iraq. The UN secretary-general, Annan, made similar hints while commenting on the formation of the new interim Iraqi government. "I think we all have to recognise that the process wasn't perfect and it was a difficult environment," Annan said. "And I think given the circumstances, I believe Mr Brahimi did as best as he could." Brahimi was caught between Washington's priority to show that progress is being made in Iraq ahead of November's presidential elections and an IGC seemingly determined to show it has some muscles to flex. The IGC not only rejected Brahimi's choice for the post of prime minister but also selected a future president contrary to the UN envoy's wishes. Brahimi reportedly wanted Hussein Al-Shahristani, a respected Shia figure, as prime minister, and backed Adnan Pachachi for the presidency. But IGC members insisted on naming Iyad Allawi, a secular Shia known for his close ties to the CIA, as prime minister, and insisted be named president. In the end they got what they wanted. US officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, conceded that it was not just Brahimi who had to compromise following the IGC's sudden emergence as a power broker. President Bush had also supported Pachachi for the post of president. That the IGC finessed the appointment of Al-Yawar, who in recent statements has accused US occupation troops as being responsible for the deteriorating security situation in Iraq, will have raised few smiles in the White House. In accepting the post, though, Yawar was quick to mention "our friends" who are assisting Iraqis rebuild their country. But it was left to the new prime minister, Allawi, to thank US and coalition troops "for liberating us". Responding to the announcement of the new Iraqi government, US commentators across the media were quick to point out that the new body was effectively a recreation of the IGC. "For weeks Washington encouraged the world to believe that the United Nations was putting together Iraq's new interim government. Instead, the most critical appointments were made by the outgoing Governing Council," the New York Times said in its editorial on Wednesday. The Washington Post, meanwhile, noted how Brahimi, after being "hemmed in by hovering US officials and their present and former Iraqi allies, acquiesced to a cabinet led by the same former exiles and Kurdish politicians who populated the discredited Iraqi Governing Council". Some observers suggested that IGC members were determined to cling onto their posts: should the deteriorating security situation preclude the holding of elections in January 2005 the IGC would then emerge as Iraq's de facto government. Questions over quite what sovereignty is to be handed over to Iraqis on 30 June given the presence of 138,000 US occupation troops seemed to be of little concern to President Bush. "The American people need to be assured that if our troops are in harm's way, they will be able to defend themselves without having to check with anybody else, other than their commander," Bush said. "At the same time, I can assure Iraqi citizens, as well as our friends in Europe, that we have done these kind of security arrangements before -- witness, Afghanistan, there is a sovereign government in Afghanistan, there are US troops and coalition troops there, and they're working very well together. I'm confident we can bridge any gap because we have done it in country after country." In a further attempt to reassure the international community of their seriousness in transferring sovereignty to Iraqis, US and British officials submitted on Tuesday a new draft resolution to the UN Security Council which for the first time sets a date for the pullout of occupation troops. The latest draft states that the mandate of the US-led occupation forces will "expire upon completion of the political process in Iraq" -- i.e. January 2006, according to the timetable set by President Bush in his speech last week on the future of Iraq. The new US-British draft resolution also states that the interim Iraqi government elected in January 2005 will have the right to request US troops withdraw at any time before the end of their mandate in January 2006. The timetabling, though, is obviously dependent on developments on the ground. That a huge explosion coincided with the announcement of the new Iraqi cabinet on Tuesday, killing five people and injuring scores, was one reminder among many of what might be lying ahead, regardless of Bush's readiness to show some compromise. Washington insiders have already started to point out that the Bush administration is increasingly willing to reach "deals with devil" to restore anything close to stability in Iraq ahead of the presidential elections in November. That includes brokering deals with former members of the Iraqi Baathist regime or radical Shias such as the young Moqtada El- Sadr. "What counts is the November 2nd deadline (US elections), and not June 30th," said one observer.
