Sharon's dogged persistence in pushing through his unilateral disengagement plan has kept the Arab world pinned on the intricacies of Israeli politics, writes Azmi Bishara From the moment his referendum within the Likud rejected his Gaza disengagement plan the difference between Sharon and those members of his party who opposed the plan became obvious. He was thinking tactically of how to capitalize on the historic opportunity available to Israel following 11 September and now that Arab regimes have persuaded the US that they will give anything in exchange for its acceptance of them as they are. The Likud representatives, on the other hand, were thinking about the forthcoming elections. Oddly, many of those Likud members who voted against Sharon's plan actually believed in it wholeheartedly, and more. That is one of those odd traits of that type of "hyper" parliamentary democracy, which makes it the butt of bitter sarcasm. Of course the plan had its opponents for ideological reasons. When ideology impedes actions of potential benefit to the state and society it is both fanaticism and lunacy, albeit lunacy of a special flavour. Others opposed it for strategic political considerations. In the Israeli context this is understood to mean that the opponent would have voted in favour of the plan if it was also approved by the Palestinians, which brings us back to that familiar Israeli vicious cycle: "We want an agreement but there is no one to agree with." However, most of those Likud members who opposed the plan did so for reasons that had nothing to do with ideology or strategic political considerations. Some just could not bring themselves to deviate from their long-held refusal to let any settlement go. Others voted against it because they did not belong to the camp of Mofaz whom, it appears, Sharon has designated as his successor. They would not have wanted to hand their adversary such a victory. In the logic of Israeli electoral politics, when the media plays up a success of one of the candidates vying over the same position, even if that success is no more than a more attractive hair style, that scores as a loss to his adversary. In the opinion of the Mefdal Party, for example, Sharon is a doddering old man. But the father of Jewish settlements is not only an adept tactician, he has on his side two indispensable allies for any Zionist head of government. The first is the support of the majority of Israeli public opinion for withdrawing from Gaza or as Sharon put it: "There is no future for the Jewish settlements in Gaza." This conviction now runs so deep that this large segment of opinion is no longer wondering whether it would be better simply to withdraw from highly populated areas; they just want out of Gaza entirely now that the option has been mooted. No father wants his son the soldier to die on a piece of land that their country is going to leave anyway. Their prime minister had already made a commitment to the American president and in return he received pledges on final status issues, discarding the Palestinian right to return, putting a clear limit to Israeli "concessions" and effectively guaranteeing that the rest of the settlements in the West remain under Israeli sovereignty. What the average Israeli's greatest fear from a unilateral step was that "it might encourage the Palestinians to ask for more without having to give anything in exchange." But, the US has allayed this fear, and with a generosity that far exceeded any Zionist's expectations at this time in advance of negotiations. From the Israeli perspective, Bush's letters to Sharon are the answer to negotiations with the Arabs because they believe that Washington's position sets the ceiling for Arab demands. This belief is not unfounded. The Arabs have long been in the habit, not of gearing their external relations on the basis of their positions on their causes, but rather of attuning their positions to the vibrations emanating from major powers and from the US in particular. Another Israeli fear is that a situation similar to that in southern Lebanon would develop if the Palestinians believed that they had forced Israel into an unconditional withdrawal and were thereby encouraged to step up their resistance. However, the average Israeli is aware of the difference between the capacities of Gaza fighters to take on Israeli soldiers outside Gaza and the capacities of the Lebanese resistance with its strategic Lebanese and Syrian depth. In addition, they realize that Sharon has left it up to those Arab governments keen on sustaining their good relations with the US to prevent any potential development of such capacities so that Israel will not have to be "forced" into repeating its incursion into Gaza. Not only is this threat made explicit in Sharon's plan, but Bush in his letters to Sharon has pledged his support for Israel's right to defend itself, for which, of course, we read the right to invade, bomb and destroy. Sharon's second ally is Washington and its full support for his plan. This factor is nothing to be toyed with, not even by other Likud members, and every aspirant to the Israeli premiership, in particular, is acutely aware of this. With the majority of Israelis and the US behind him, Sharon is now pushing to redeploy out of Gaza and to cordon it off by air, land and sea within the framework of an Israeli security system that controls everything that goes in, comes out and goes on inside Gaza. He is also pushing to impose borders unilaterally in the West Bank and to reinforce the settlements that will remain under Israeli sovereignty under any "acceptable permanent solution," as Sharon puts it. No amount of party maneuvering can stand up against these factors if Sharon plays his cards right. And, not only does he appear to be an expert player, he has nothing to lose in that doddering old age of his, so he might as well press ahead with his plan in spite of everything. True, he postponed the final decision removing settlements, but it is clear that the cabinet approval of the plan approves the step in principle. The recent vote has given opposition Likud ministers a way out of the tight corner into which they had worked themselves. Meanwhile, the continued presence of the non-Likud ultra right members in the coalition is only temporary, for once the withdrawal from the settlements is approved the remaining Mefdal members in particular will move over to Labour, which is rubbing its hands at the chance to get back into power. At that point, Sharon's task will be to cement the ranks of his party and rally it behind his government. The greatest danger he faces is that a majority of 61 right wing parliamentary representatives will turn around and nominate Netanhayu. So far, however, this possibility seems unlikely. In all events, it will take more than the abstaining of a few coalition members to topple the government; this may strengthen the hand of the opponents of the coalition, but it will not draw the majority of 61 needed to deliver a vote of no confidence. Clearly, Sharon has succeeded in gaining time, and now he will begin his war of attrition against his opponents, confident that he will win because he has the two above-mentioned allies on his side and because he is no less wily in the corridors of parliamentary intrigues than he is ruthless in the field of battle and bloodshed. If the Likud can't be depended upon to jettison Sharon's initiative, what should the weak and marginalized do? Sharon's plan for unilateral disengagement is portrayed as another link in the series of Israeli concessions. In fact, however, Palestinians are confronted with an attempt to impose Israeli dictates with regard to a final settlement. The logic of this approach is to jettison earlier understandings of the interim period and final status negotiations in favor of the imposition of unilateral Israeli action as an interim period and the subsequent emergence of a Palestinian leadership that accepts the Israeli version of a permanent solution or a protracted interim period. This solution or interim period will provide for the creation of a Palestinian state that relieves Israel of the burdens of direct occupation and, in the long run, the danger of a bi-national state. Needless to say, the Palestinian state that Sharon has in mind is one tailored to Israeli conditions which the Palestinians reject. In other words, the Israeli idea of a new interim phase is to eliminate a Palestinian leadership that may or may not accept its solution and, instead, impose a solution that may or may not accept the Palestinian leadership and, indeed, sanction the continued assassination of Palestinian leaders and the demolition of homes in border areas. This solution may well find Palestinian proponents who claim they are willing to try anything new, not because they are setting their opportunistic sails to the new winds but because they are dissatisfied with the current Palestinian leadership for various reasons. Israel's first step towards this end was to lay siege to the Palestinian leadership on 29 March 2002. Then, on 24 June, President Bush announced his "vision" for solving the conflict, after which pressures mounted on the besieged Arafat to appoint a new head of government and transfer authority over the PA security agencies to him or to a minister of interior. Sharon had expected to put into effect his take on the roadmap with the cooperation of that new Palestinian government. However, that take, which he is now implementing in Gaza and which led him to his current thinking on unilateral disengagement, is precisely what drove the first Palestinian prime minister to resign. The conflict between the logic of dictates and the question of legitimacy brought down the government that Sharon had imagined he would strike a bargain with. That government had approved the roadmap without reservation; Sharon in effect did not, and, instead, continued to insist on what he called "Bush's vision", in accordance with which the Palestinians get a state without borders and only after signing pages and pages of commitments and pledges. On 6 September 2003, three months after the Aqaba summit on 3 June 2003, the Palestinian prime minister resigned. Soon afterwards, on 18 December 2003, Sharon told the participants at the Hertzliya Conference that Israeli society should no longer be vulnerable to the fluctuations in Palestinian politics and their failure to meet their security obligations. He then unveiled the outline of his unilateral disengagement plan, which called for withdrawal from Gaza and the dismantlement of Jewish settlements "north of Samara" (read Jenin). On 18 April, Sharon put his plan to a referendum within the Likud and was rebuffed, but he refused to give up, and, on 6 June, succeeded in getting his cabinet to pass a revise version of the plan. Exactly a year after the Aqaba summit, to which he brought his 14 reservations on the roadmap, Sharon got his ideas approved, with no need for a conference or a Palestinian partner and with the full support of the US. Then, after some foot-dragging, the Quartet climbs on board, as Europe usually does on matters pertaining to the "peace process." Just as the roadmap put the Arab peace initiative out of diplomatic circulation, Sharon's plan put the roadmap out of circulation. Throughout Sharon's ordeal, Israel's domestic squabbling, and the wrangling within the Israel right in particular, became headline news in every Arab home and everyone was at the edge of their seats waiting to see what this or that Mefdal minister would do. When the Arab world gets that obsessed with the smallest details in Israeli politics and when our news commentators have the names of Likud opposition ministers and Knesset members committed to memory, this is a sign that what goes on in Israel is "the only game in town." I think we all know why Arab and Palestinian political behaviour helps keep it that way.
