On Monday, US Civil Administrator Paul Bremer handed over "sovereignty" to the Interim Government of Iraq in a furtive ceremony, two days ahead of schedule. Not the stuff that independence days are made of. How sovereign is Iraq; what kind of future does the ongoing process offer for that shattered nation; and most significantly, how can a genuinely free, democratic and prosperous Iraq be created? Al-Ahram Weekly, in these special pages, invited Iraqi journalists and intellectuals to provide some answers Anatomy of a people Disparate forces released in the new Iraq are simply a consequence of decades of dictatorship and state decay, writes Ibrahim Al-Haidry* Iraq is currently at the most delicate and complex juncture in its modern history. It arrived at this point following decades of warfare and economic blockade that were among the byproducts of a paternalistic authoritarian government, the problematic of the incomplete formation of the nation state and their corollaries of a weak sense of citizenship, splintered identity and confused and conflicting social allegiances. This burdensome legacy ultimately brought the downfall of the dictatorship at the hands of occupation forces, exposing a torn and sharply fragmented society to the ubiquitous chaos and violence that has beset the country. It also contributed to generating that security and political vacuum that unleashed three decades of pent up hatred, anger and hostility as hundreds of the poor and oppressed joined mercenaries and supporters of the former regime in the plunder and destruction of our great national antiquities, our libraries, universities and government buildings, while occupation forces stood by and watched. The buildings sacked were not, after all, of the Ministry of Petroleum, which the occupiers defended to the teeth. The plight Iraqis are suffering today is not only symptomatic of a people ruled by an oppressive dictatorship. It is the manifestation of a cumulative objective reality that extends deep into the past and that interweaves factors of geographical place with factors of historical time. It is the product of the centuries-long fluctuation between the centrifugal tug of cultural and political dissension, fragmentation and upheaval on the one hand and the centripetal pull of the coexistence of diverse and disparate social groups that have yet to be unified within a cohesive framework of social and national identity on the other. This is not the plight of a poor country. Iraq is rich in natural resources and material and human potential and has a long and glorious history as a centre of Arab-Islamic heritage and culture. Such factors could have aided in the development of a modern, independent state with a dynamic civil society had the development of our resources and potential been pursued rationally and wisely. Unfortunately, under the former regime our enormous petroleum revenues were poured into buttressing a "rentier" state that became increasingly alienated from the people it was meant to serve and unite into a cohesive social entity. As a result, Iraq may not have been able to build sturdy economic, agricultural and commercial bases, but it did build a mighty security apparatus and formidable military institutions and industries, the edifice of which quickly crumbled at the first painful missile strikes. It also produced more crises and hardship, and more tyranny, repression and mass graves. While in the grips of such social and political disparities and contradictions, Iraqis immersed themselves in ethnic, sectarian and tribal conflicts, since such narrow kinship, geographic and partisan affiliations remained the only way to power and wealth. Indeed, such rivalries helped account for voluntary submission to military authority and absolute loyalty to its leadership. Furthermore, with nothing to mediate between the individual, society and the state, the social fabric disintegrated and with it the entire structure of social, cultural and moral values. The resultant disequilibrium and decay had a profound impact on social structures in general and on the family, women and children in particular. This, in turn, produced further psychological and social turmoil, further disruption of the networks of social relations and deeper divisions in society. All these factors contributed to shaping the contemporary culture and personality traits in Iraq. Iraq now has entire generations that do not know the meaning of allegiance to the nation. Their horizons closed by the politics and culture of domination and submission, they had little choice but to fall back on themselves and the ethnic, sectarian or tribal bonds between them. Although many joined political parties, mass organisations and military and security agencies, enlistment was prompted by fear, material need, submission and sometimes, depending on the organisation, rebelliousness. Regardless of motive, they adhered to their individual values, customs and partisan affiliations in spite of their outward show of allegiance to the government. The spectre of the compound fear of authority, the other and the self has also functioned to intensify anxieties over the future, to diminish hopes for self-expression and to strengthen the tendency to conform to prevailing values and behavioural codes. Conformity, too, has thus become a common trait, hailed by the majority as an "achievement" and used as a means to confront everything new, alien and potentially dangerous. In fostering this passivity in the face of events that the individual is powerless to oppose and this negativity towards the self and the other, the dictatorial authority reduces the tension between the individual and the state and, simultaneously, generates the opportunity to satisfy immediate needs and interests. Ultimately, this sets the tone for the prevalent culture. In a culture of tyranny and acquiescence the relationship between the individual and the state is confined to the ability of the powerful to satisfy the needs of those subjected to power. This also reinforces the "strategy" of domination and submission. Fear of further repression and cruelty drives the individual to sanction and adopt, whether out of conviction or not, the ideology of the state. In return for this acknowledgement of legitimacy, the individual is compensated for his degradation and deprivation in the form of position and privilege. These payoffs, in turn, constitute an official recognition of his existence and a boost to his lost sense of self-esteem, which propel him towards a more vociferous embrace of the ideology, more grovelling submission to authority and greater docility as a tool in the service of the perpetuation of the regime. It is not surprising therefore, that so much suppressed feeling should erupt following the fall of the regime and the occupation. Certainly it helps explain why violence and counter- violence should become such a general phenomenon and how it is used as an excuse to settle old scores and disputes over interests, to make a grab for wealth and power and even to obstruct the process of handing over sovereignty to the Iraqi people, regardless of what form the handover takes. The chaos, violence, terrorism and self-destruction that have spread through Iraq are a product of the factors we have mentioned above. If sociologists and other analysts express surprise and conflicting opinions over this phenomenon, the chances are that they have failed to penetrate beyond surface appearances, established attitudes and prejudices, or conflicting interests. It is imperative that the Iraqi people resuscitate their social consciousness, lead their society by themselves and summon the will to regain their independence and sovereignty. They must work together to put an end to the chaos, plundering and internecine divisions by disseminating a culture of tolerance and dialogue. They must dedicate themselves to the creation of a government by law and a robust civil society, which entails the establishment of a multiparty parliamentary system that safeguards human rights and civil liberties and promotes, even through its most basic mechanisms, the acquisition of democratic practices and behaviour. This is the only way to revive national unity, which is the aspiration of everyone in Iraq. * The writer is a London-based Iraqi sociologist.
