The Turkish Cypriot community is divided over many issues and early election will only complicate matters, reports Michael Jansen from Nicosia As Greek and Turkish Cypriots marked the 30th anniversary on 15 July of the attempted coup by the Athens junta against President Makarios and the subsequent Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish Cypriot cabinet was in crisis. On 17 July, the cabinet narrowly survived a no-confidence motion by a vote of 25 to 25 in the 50-member assembly. A simple majority was needed for the motion to succeed. The 23-seat coalition survived only because it had the support of two tiny parties with one seat each. Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat said early elections were inevitable, but was unable to name a date as the majority of legislators opposed his call for a poll in late September. November is now being mentioned as a possibility. The government has only been in office since December 2003. The coalition formed by Talat has always been weak and beset with internal conflict as a result of the alliance between his Republican Turkish Party and Foreign Minister Sardar Denktash's Democratic Party. Talat supports the reunification of the island under the UN framework for a bi- zonal, bi-communal federation while the younger Denktash has reluctantly chosen to accept the plan only because it is backed by the majority of Turkish Cypriots. His father, Rauf Denktash -- veteran Turkish Cypriot politician and architect of the de facto partition of the island -- flatly rejects reunification on the basis of single sovereignty and insists on the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state being recognised by the international community and not just Ankara. Opposition leader Dervis Eroglu, whose anti-reunification National Unity Party has 18 seats, was able to threaten the coalition because he had the support of the New Party with one seat, two independents, and the pro-reunification Popular Democracy Movement headed by Mustafa Akinci, with four seats. Akinci went against the government after the failure of talks to bring his party into the coalition. Akinci is prepared to make more concessions to the Greek Cypriots than Talat. Talat's government lost its majority in May following the failure of the 24 April referendum to reunite the island ahead of its entry into the European Union (EU) on 1 May. Sixty-four per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the plan which was defeated when 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots turned it down. Although the EU has pledged to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots -- who have been suffering under economic sanctions since the Turkish army occupied the north -- and provide $320 million in financial aid, they remain outside the European bloc with no prospect of accession until a settlement is achieved. The no-confidence motion was tabled the day after the Greek Cypriot government put forward a package of confidence-building measures, including mutual troop reductions along the cease-fire line, the removal of mines from the buffer zone, and the opening of eight new crossing points to facilitate movement between north and south. The proposal also called for joint operation of Famagusta Port and the handover of the Greek Cypriot Famagusta suburb of Varosha to the UN. Both are under Turkish occupation. Although the US and EU reacted positively to the Greek Cypriot government's initiative, Talat promptly rejected it. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul commented by saying, "We'll evaluate [the proposal] with our [Turkish Cypriot] friends and then we will make a decision." But his ministry's spokesman, Namik Tan, said the confidence-building measures were meant to shift the focus away from Turkish Cypriot and Turkish efforts to end the isolation of the north. The spectre of fresh elections in the Turkish Cypriot north will complicate the search for a settlement acceptable to both sides. While Greek Cypriots are being called upon to outline the changes they want in the Kofi Annan plan, the current Turkish government and the international community expect Turkish Cypriots to remain committed to the implementation of the plan. This means they will be under pressure to give Talat, Akinci and other pro- reunification leaders a stronger mandate and to reject those opposed to the plan, particularly the rightist National Unity Party which follows the rejectionist line of Rauf Denktash. The pressure to elect reunification candidates will come from the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the international community, but there is certain to be counter-pressure to choose rejectionist legislators from Turkey's old guard politicians and the military. If the Turkish Cypriots give the pro- reunification camp a solid majority, they will retain the moral and material advantages gained by their "yes" vote in the referendum. But if the Turkish Cypriots, angry and frustrated over the Greek Cypriot "no" to the plan and pressed by Ankara's rejectionists, bestow their votes on the refusal camp, they will lose the benefits they gained from their positive stance. Since Turkey could also lose the credit it gained for backing the Annan plan, the government is now obliged to resume its struggle with Turkish rejectionists.
