Turkey's EU accession bid has provoked a storm of debate in Cyprus, reports Michael Jansen from Nicosia To veto or not to veto the commencement of accession talks between Turkey and the European Union (EU) is the dilemma the government Cyprus now faces. Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos was not prepared to make a decision until he saw how the other 24 EU leaders meeting at summit level on 16-17 December intend to deal with the 30-year occupation of the northern 37 per cent of the island by 35,000 mainland Turkish troops. Addressing his Democratic Party's conference on 11 December, Papadopoulos said that the Cyprus government did not oppose giving Turkey a date for the start of negotiations, but before this could happen, he said, Ankara had to meet its obligations, notably to extend to the 10 new members of the bloc the 1963 commercial Association Agreement with EU, thereby tacitly recognising Cyprus. Papadopoulos called for a resumption of UN-brokered negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots with the aim of achieving a "viable and functional" bizonal, bicommunal federation. He called upon the EU to help achieve the "necessary improvements and additions" to the UN plan to bring it into compliance with UN resolutions, international law and the EU laws. He said that the status quo was "unacceptable and, at the same time, dangerous for both communities". Papadopoulos attempted to distance himself from suggestions that he might use the veto. "Have you heard any country in Europe speak of a veto? They are speaking of the conditions which must be imposed on Turkey to become a member." A draft summit declaration submitted by the Dutch presidency states that Turkey should meet the Cypriot demand on the Association Agreement. The EU regards the Greek Cypriot majority republic as "representing the entire territory and population of the island" and "as the sole legitimate government". Turkey, the only state to recognise the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state in the north, has strongly resisted EU pressure to take such a step although EU officials argue that doing so will not mean recognising Cyprus. As an alternative, Britain has urged Ankara to withdraw some of its troops from Cyprus. Although Cyprus focusses on the Turkish occupation of the north, Nicosia is not opposed in principle to Turkey's membership in the European bloc. France, Austria, Denmark, and several other "old" EU members express concern over the admission of a country with 93 per cent of its territory outside Europe and a poor, largely rural Muslim population of 70 million. Some members have suggested granting Turkey special status falling short of full membership. In Brussels to lobby for an EU statement he can accept, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected any gesture towards Cyprus and special status. He stated, "I hope that ... EU member states will reach a decision on opening negotiations without delay which does not deviate from the prospective of clear, full and unconditional membership," without reference to the Cyprus issue. This leaves Papadopoulos in a quandary. He is under strong pressure from the US, Britain and Turkey's friends in the EU to accept Erdogan demands. They take the line that the lack of a Cyprus settlement should not impede Turkey's accession negotiations. Meanwhile 60-70 per cent of Greek Cypriots demands Papadopoulos exercise the veto which is regarded as a measure of "self-defence". Greek Cypriots do not see how Turkey can conduct negotiations to join the EU while it remains in illegal occupation of the territory of one of its members states. Former Cypriot House President Alexis Ghalanos spoke for most Greek Cypriots when he vented frustration with both Turkey and the EU on this issue. "The message should have been clear for a long time that Turkey cannot advance to Europe unless it is committed to a course which leads to its withdrawal from Cyprus." Unless the EU comes up with a formula which reassures the Greek Cypriots, Cyprus stands to lose -- whatever Papadopoulos decides. If he goes along with a weak EU statement and EU accession talks commence in 2005, Turkey may feel it has no need to enter into fresh negotiations -- via the Turkish Cypriots -- on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. If, however, Papadopoulos uses his veto, Turkey is certain to retaliate by refusing to negotiate and by stepping up the colonisation of the area by mainlanders. In both cases, Turkey will continue doing what it pleases. But if Papadopoulos chooses the veto, he will be condemned by the international community for, once again, refusing to bow to the will of the powers-that-be. In April, arguing that amendments to the massive document were required, he urged Greek Cypriots to vote against the UN plan for a bizonal, bicommunal federation which the Turkish Cypriots, guided by Ankara, accepted. The Greek Cypriot "no" meant that a divided Cyprus entered the EU on 1 May, the Turkish Cypriots were left out in the cold, and Ankara's bid for EU membership was complicated by its continuing occupation of northern Cyprus. Since the principle of unanimity on the EU decision has been retained, Papadopoulos can, however, choose to put the veto in his pocket for the time being because he can exercise it at any time after Turkey receives a date -- in the second half of 2005 -- for accession talks to begin. If Turkey fails to extend its Association Agreement to include the 10 new EU members, including Cyprus, or to meet other Cypriot or EU demands, Papadopoulos could very well take out and deploy the veto.
