Can Iraq pass the democracy test, asks Mohamed Sid-Ahmed As what is increasingly coming to be seen as a full-fledged civil war rages in Iraq, Bush's assertion that it would become a model of democracy for the entire Arab world rings somewhat hollow. In the early days of the occupation, the occupying forces sought to cloak their invasion of Iraq with a moral authority. To that end, they abolished the death penalty, an act designed to symbolise the new Iraq's commitment to democracy and its adherence to values that were the exact opposite of those which had prevailed under Saddam Hussein. But the promise held out by this symbolic act failed to materialise, and the dream of democracy remains as elusive as ever. A number of surprising developments have changed the situation dramatically. The first big surprise was the shocking abuse of Iraqi prisoners of war by their American captors in Abu Ghraib and other prisons. Then came the second surprise, the reinstatement of the death penalty by the Iraqi provisional government. Perhaps the biggest surprise of all was the falling out between Washington and its favourite Iraqi exile, Ahmed Chalabi, who was widely tipped to play the key role in shaping the new Iraq. For years he had enjoyed close relations with the American political establishment and intelligence community, who regarded him as a staunch ally and a reliable source of intelligence. Indeed, the information he provided on Saddam's alleged arsenal of WMDs was a major factor in Bush's decision to go to war. As it turned out, much of Chalabi's information was faulty, not to say downright false, but he could have survived that. What he could not explain away was the disclosure of his Iranian connection. It transpired that the Shia Chalabi was a double agent who had been furnishing Iran with important American documents, including the secret code used by the occupation forces. His perfidy not only ended his political career before it began but also deprived him of the extremely generous monthly allowance of $340 thousand which was promptly ended by his furious patrons. With Chalabi out of the running, the post of provisional prime minister went to Iyad Allawi. Allawi had advantages Chalabi did not have. A former Baathist, he had contacts with many political forces in Iraq. In this he differed from Chalabi, who left Iraq before the Tamuz 1958 Revolution and did not have Allawi's intimate knowledge of people living inside Iraq. This could help explain Chalabi's keenness to develop relations in a variety of directions, including with Iran. It can also explain his failure to grasp the realities of Iraqi political life. It was he who advised the US occupation authority to liquidate the Baathist Party in Iraq, a move which encouraged the Baathists to reorganise their ranks in secret and to join the armed struggle against the provisional government. Iyad Allawi's appointment to the top job was by default. He was not Washington's first choice, nor was he the choice of Lakhdar Brahimi, Kofi Annan's representative in charge of nominating the members of the provisional government. But when he was finally chosen by consensus, Bush said America would work closely with what he called the "real ruler of Iraq". It is interesting to note that all the protagonists in the internal Iraqi power struggle were, in one way or another, in contact with the US intelligence services. And often the inter-Iraqi disputes reflect tensions among the American intelligence organs themselves, who have their men in Iraq fight their wars by proxy. This sometimes results in bizarre situations, such as that involving Ahmed Chalabi's nephew, Salem Chalabi. A US-trained lawyer chosen to head the special tribunal set up to try Saddam Hussein, Salem was convicted of murder in absentia by an Iraqi court. A warrant has been issued for his arrest and he cannot go back to Iraq. According to Salem, the whole affair was orchestrated by his "enemies" to prevent him from taking part in Saddam's trail. The greatest danger now threatening Iraq is its fragmentation into a number of small nations. Saddam had many defects, but one of his main achievements was preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq whatever reservations one might have about the methods he used. In the absence of a legitimate central authority accepted by all political forces in Iraq, chaos and anarchy will continue to escalate, bringing the nightmarish prospect of Iraq's dislocation and fragmentation ever closer. Allawi has announced that security is his main priority and has vowed to impose order. To that end, he has introduced emergency measures which invest him with broad powers and effectively shatter the myth of a post-Saddam Iraq governed by the rule of law. Under the weight of external and internal pressures Allawi might be turning into a new Saddam Hussein. The only difference between Iraq's former strongman and its interim premier is that the former was targeted by the US administration while Allawi enjoys its full support, regardless of whether it is headed by Bush or Kerry. But for all the support he is receiving from the Americans, Allawi has so for proved unable to deliver on his promise of restoring security and stability to Iraq. Already he is facing a Shia uprising in the northern city of Najaf, led by the radical young cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr who has vowed to fight to the last drop of blood against the foreign occupiers. Fighting between his Al-Mahdi militias and government forces is already fierce and promises to escalate even more if the governor of Najaf -- with Allawi's discreet approval -- allows US forces to advance more deeply into the holy Shia city. At the same time, Allawi has to contend with secessionist rumblings coming out of Basra in the south, with Baghdad itself hardly a haven of security. Then there is the all-important question of Iraq's relations with its Arab environment. Will it divest itself of its historically strong pan- Arab identity and distance itself from its fellow Arab states, or will it, on the contrary, immerse itself more deeply into the Arab order? And how will Israel fit into the scheme of things? Washington will certainly do all it can to encourage a rapprochement between Iraq and Israel, but it remains to be seen whether Allawi, with his history of pan-Arab nationalism, will be willing to play along. At any rate, the situation is still too fluid to predict how matters will evolve with any degree of certainty. What is certain, however, is that Iraq's relations with its environment cannot be stable or steady if its internal situation continues its downward spiral. Stability and security in Iraq can only be restored in the context of a model of democracy adapted to its specific characteristics and needs. The January 2005 elections are crucial in this respect, and their outcome will determine whether Iraq will pass the democracy test or sink even deeper into chaos and anarchy.
