Mohamed Sid-Ahmed questions the validity of the notion that democracy can be imported from abroad The success of Egypt's mediation efforts to break the impasse between Arafat and Abu Mazen over the formation of a new Palestinian government ushered in an atmosphere of optimism. Finally, it seemed, the Palestinian problem was on its way to being solved, especially when President Bush declared that he was ready to deal with Abu Mazen, even to invite him to the White House, an invitation he has consistently refused to extend to Arafat. While the elimination of any form of inter- Arab friction in the present appalling conditions of the Arab world is understandably welcome, western capitals hailed the reconciliation between the two men for reasons very different from ours. Indeed, as far as many Palestinians are concerned, it is not a cause for celebration. Abu Mazen is firmly convinced that the time has come to end the Intifada, regardless of the fact that Jewish settlements are still being constructed and that Israeli forces have not withdrawn from the Palestinian territories they reoccupied after the outbreak of the second Intifada. The Palestinian prime minister has accused the Intifada of being the main obstacle in the way of the creation of a Palestinian state and has promised to do everything he can to put an end to terrorist activities. His statements provoked an uproar in the ranks of the various Palestinian factions, not least because they were praised in the West and, more significantly, in Israel. Some observers attribute Arafat's intervention in the formation of the Abu Mazen government, as well as his insistence on changing some of its portfolios, to the Palestinian leader's unwillingness to go along with Abu Mazen's plan to confiscate the weapons held by the resistance factions. Whether their reading of the situation is right or wrong, the fact is that the Palestinian government has every interest in not severing its relations with any of these factions. Other observers put the disagreements between Arafat and Abu Mazen down to subjective factors, dismissing them as nothing more than an expression of Arafat's pique at being stripped of his prerogatives as leader of the Palestinian resistance movement. But even the most cynical observers cannot deny that there is an objective issue at stake when the PLO is required to shed its identity as a resistance movement and accept the resumption of negotiations in the absence of a Palestinian consensus. Worse, in the context of Israel's refusal to make any concessions whatsoever. According to both Sharon and the US administration, conditions are now more favourable for a settlement than at any time since the Six-Day War. It is no accident that this sanguine assessment was made in the wake of the defeat inflicted on Iraq, or that the roadmap for peace drawn up by the Quartet, which the Americans were for long reluctant to put on the table, has suddenly been revived, albeit in a revised form to accommodate Israel's "reservations". Sharon has come forward with an alternative roadmap in which the proposed Palestinian state will cover an area less than one half the area of the West Bank. It will be completely cut off from Jerusalem, completely disarmed, have limited sovereignty and no control over its air space. Moreover, what the Americans and Israelis consider "favourable conditions" are anything but favourable from an Arab perspective: the balance of power is tilted more sharply to Israel's advantage than ever before, Arafat and Abu Mazen are at loggerheads, and Arab leaders are falling over backwards to avoid tensions with America. A case in point is the Syrian president's uncharacteristically conciliatory reaction to Bush's warnings that he immediately stop giving refuge to Iraqi political fugitives, producing banned weapons of mass destruction and supporting Hizbullah, Hamas and other organisations branded as terrorist. It was against this backdrop that, in a religious ritual which was banned under Saddam's rule, more than a million Iraqi Shi'ites took to the streets of Karbala last week to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Al-Hussein. The massive outpouring of long-repressed religious fervour was a surprise for everybody. The American occupation forces, whose continued presence in Iraq is justified as necessary to introduce democracy and ensure the observance of civil and religious freedoms, could hardly break up a demonstration that symbolised the very principles they claim to be upholding. Their restraint was tested by the anti-American slogans raised by the demonstrators, who denounced the US- occupation of Iraq and demanded the immediate pullout of US troops. Thousands of pilgrims waved banners carrying the unequivocal message: "No to America, no to Israel, yes to Islam!" Other groups chanted "No to Shalabi", the leader of the Iraqi National Congress who spent many years in self-imposed exile in the United States and who is Washington's favourite candidate for leadership of Iraq. Democracy cannot be imposed by force. It requires the accommodation of a variety of viewpoints, not their elimination. But the Bush administration believes that the budding Iraqi democracy needs to be protected against various forms of backwardness widespread in the Iraqi environment, particularly in Iran, another Shi'ite stronghold. Rumsfeld has declared that the US will not allow an Iranian-style theocracy to be installed in Iraq. Surely it is a contradiction in terms to talk of democracy, which is the ultimate expression of the free and unrestricted will of the people, in the same breath as vowing to hijack the democratic process if it does not serve the state interests of the self- appointed champion of democracy. How to promote democracy, the right to demonstrate and to strike when restrictions affect basic freedoms? Despite the strong anti-American sentiments they expressed, the ceremonies in Karbala were non-violent, attesting not only to the potential power of the Iraqi Shi'ites but also to their organisational skills. America may now be asking itself if it has not let a genie it cannot control out of the bottle. It may even be asking itself whether the Shi'ites do not represent a greater threat than Saddam's Ba'ath Party, and whether it should reconsider its strategy. Will this pave the way for a relationship between the American administration and the remnants of the Ba'ath Party to avert the possibility of an Iranian-backed Shi'ite takeover of power in Iraq? Was the demonstration of strength displayed by the Shi'ites the reason why the US administration suddenly upgraded its warnings against Iran and downplayed its dissatisfaction with Syria? Is the news blackout surrounding the interrogation of Tareq Aziz somehow related to such a reconsideration of strategy? The objective of America's war on Iraq was not only to overthrow Saddam Hussein but also to resolve all outstanding problems in the region, particularly the Palestinian problem, taking advantage of the fact that a defeated Iraq could eventually be used to relieve Israel of the need to implement the right of return provision in UN Resolution 194 on its own soil. But before Iraq can be used to absorb Palestinians wishing to exercise their right of return there must be full normalisation of relations between Israel and the new Iraqi government. Is this conceivable? Can the American administration impose such a development? In other words, can democracy in Iraq and the peace process with Israel become pillars on which harmony, stability, security and peace will be built throughout the region? Or is it not more likely that the region will be exposed to still more violent cataclysms?
