To understand the violence unleashed in Iraq since May 2003, one must understand the context of the country's invasion, writes Diaa Rashwan* When observing the phenomenon of violence, resistance and terror in Iraq, it seems necessary to link it with the context in which that country was invaded. The two invading allies, the US and the UK, failed to obtain political cover or justification for their war on Iraq, or its subsequent occupation. Neither the UN nor any of their closest allies in the West, or in any other part of the world, would give them that cover. Further, their unjustified insistence on fighting this war led to unprecedented rifts within the Western camp. The basic significance of the lack of legitimacy, for invasion as well as occupation, was that various political forces engaged in armed resistance in Iraq were able to claim it for their cause, a legitimacy that the occupation forces didn't have. The absence of a just and legitimate international foundation for the US-UK occupation of Iraq coincided with a great deterioration in political, economic and social conditions. In time, this turned the large number of occupation forces -- particularly US ones -- into a liability, not an asset for US policy and the policies of other countries participating in the occupation of Iraq. It became clear that various sides both inside and outside Iraq saw these forces as "hostage" in this region of complex ethnic, political and religious lines; a captive that could be used in order to pressure those very countries that sent forces, chiefly the US, with a view to forcing them to withdraw and change their policies towards Iraq and towards the Arab and Islamic world in general. These troops turned in time into ideal targets for attacks by parties wishing to resist US-UK occupation, or seeking to harm the interests of both countries in general, regardless of how these parties differed in their political goals and perceptions. Such parties today represent one of the aspects of the phenomenon of violence, resistance and terror in Iraq. Iraq's occupation came in the context of the US war, declared since 11 September 2001, on so- called "terror". Iraq was the second Muslim country occupied by US forces. Afghanistan was first. Afghanistan's second occupation -- its first occupation was by the Soviets in 1979 -- and Iraq's first invasion resuscitated and spread the same theological paradigm on which the wide- scale US mobilisation of Islamic "mujahidin" was based, when the latter were urged to go to Afghanistan to expel "Soviet invasion". Jihad, goes the theological paradigm, is a duty of every capable Muslim for the sake of liberating any part of the "land of Islam" that comes under occupation by non-Muslim foreign forces, regardless of the country to which these forces belong. This paradigm once again found a perfect context in which to gain ground and consolidate, within the circles of Muslim youths around the world. What made the paradigm particularly attractive to large numbers of youth was the absence of any legitimate international cover for the US occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq. Actually, the two occupations came under widespread criticism from the people and governments of the closest allies of the US, as well as from the people of Islamic countries. America's blind, vague and violent war against so-called terror, against a target both oblique and ill- defined by the administration of President George W Bush, has added other elements of attraction to the aforementioned theological paradigm, making it particularly alluring to large swathes of the Muslim youth, particularly those caught up in Islamic movements of various types across the world, enticing this youth to move towards confrontation with the US. Those Islamists, the Iraqis, as well as those arriving from other parts of the world, stand as a second aspect of the phenomenon of violence, resistance and terror now growing in Iraq. There is a third aspect to that phenomenon. Much of past and current evidence indicates that Iraq, particularly when the country was under the yolk of Saddam's Baath Party, was and is central to Israel's policies in the Middle East and the Gulf regions. It is hard to forget that the first country in the world that spoke of Iraq's nuclear capabilities was the Hebrew state, which not only talked but sent its fighter planes to bomb Iraq's civilian nuclear reactor in 1981, more than 20 years before the Bush administration brought up the matter of weapons of mass destruction there. The dossiers of the intelligence war between Israel and Iraq concerning the development of Iraq's military capabilities, particularly in the field of unconventional weapons, is full of events and incidents, including assassinations and liquidations of several of the Iraqi scientists working on weapons development. Also, it is hard to forget that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in summer 1990 coincided with public threats by Saddam Hussein towards Israel to the effect that he could attack it with advanced weapons were it to attempt to assail Iraq again, as it had in 1981. One of the evocative moments of the Gulf War was when the Iraqi army fired dozens of middle-range SCUD missiles at Israeli targets in response to what the Iraqi regime at the time construed as Israeli involvement in the war against Iraq. During the recent US-UK invasion, and subsequent occupation of Iraq, other evidence unfolded, the latest of which was the intensive Israeli presence in the Kurdish north areas of Iraq, indicating that there is a piqued Israeli interest in Iraq and direct security and intelligence interference in its internal affairs, all of which are motivated by a history of former hostility, as well as by a desire to prevent, through all methods, Iraq from possessing the power to harm or threaten Israel. This adds a third aspect to the phenomenon of violence, resistance and terror now escalating in Iraq. In the context of all of the above, the elements and components of resistance, violence and terror in Iraq began to coalesce since the war started and that country came under occupation, to form the current scene we see today. Although the Iraqi scene is a complex one, a closer look reveals that those engaged in violence, resistance and terror in Iraq today belong to one of two major wings. The first, which is larger and more important, is the wing composed of Iraqi groups, of forces that found in the lack of international legitimacy for the occupation -- as well as in its own political rejection of the occupation and the conflict between their own interests and those of the occupiers -- enough justification and motive to engage in armed resistance of various forms against the occupation. This first wing includes other Iraqi forces that discovered -- aside from the aforementioned motives -- additional motives to resist the occupiers militarily, motives that are primarily derived from the concept and interpretation of jihad in Islam. The second, and smaller, wing of those engaged in violence, resistance and terror in Iraq consists of non-Iraqi groups and forces. These can be divided into several sections. The first section is composed of people with Islamic tendencies that are partially related to Al-Qaeda, intellectually or organisationally. This section has found in the paradigm that "jihad is a duty of every capable Muslim" enough justification and motive to wage armed operations against the forces of foreign occupation in Iraq. The second section of this wing consists of Arab elements and groups with pan-Arab inclinations, of people who went to Iraq out of national solidarity with the Iraqi people, with the aim of expelling the forces of foreign occupation from the country so that Iraq may once again be an independent Arab country, not necessarily a Baathist state or a country ruled by Saddam Hussein. The third section of that wing is a mix of ultra-extreme Islamic groups and others affiliated in various forms with some of the external security and intelligence agencies, particularly the Israelis. The motives of each of these groups to come to Iraq are radically different, and so is the manner in which they contribute to the current phenomenon of violence and terror in that country. But the climate of chaos that has been created by the occupation and by the dismantling of the structures of the Iraqi state, particularly the security and military structures, was their main motive for going to Iraq. The Iraqi groups vary in their motives and background, but most have either Islamist or pan- Arab credentials. Yet even pro-Baath groups seem to have adopted the Islamic rhetoric since the invasion, as Saddam's messages to his followers, prior to his arrest, suggest. Iraqi groups are more active in Sunni areas in central and northwestern Iraq than in the southern Shia and northern Kurdish areas. Yet some radical groups are based in Shia areas and seem to provide logistical support to armed groups. The Shia has so far remained largely quiet, but should the situation deteriorate further, they may change their minds. Most indigenous Iraqi groups seem to be acting independently. So far, these groups lack a unified command or a plan of action. Generally speaking, most of these groups are active within their own areas, for they need the security and political backing of their natural milieu. None of these groups have a clear political programme concerning the country's future. Their rallying point is that of ridding the country of occupation. One should not assume that the bulk of indigenous Iraq groups are Baath loyalists. Many are, for every Iraqi household contained at least one Baath Party member under Saddam. But other Iraqi nationalists, including anti-Saddam activists, have joined the ranks of the resistance. One motive for action against the occupation forces is simple: retaliation. Iraq has a strong tribal structure, one in which reprisal against attacks by outsiders is a strong sentiment. Each operation mounted by the occupation forces, particularly those involving searches of women and residential dwellings, could be construed as unacceptable humiliation by local standards. Non-Iraqi groups are composed of pan-Arab nationalists, perhaps with an Islamist background, largely active in Sunni areas without a unified command, Al-Qaeda sympathisers with a higher degree of organisational cohesion, active in Sunni areas, particularly against diplomatic missions and the occupation forces, and ultra- Islamists with links to foreign security services, including that of Israel. Most of the above groups adopt extremist Islamic jargon and seem to be involved in particularly brutal attacks. It is likely that non-Iraqi groups are involved in attacks against Iraqi civilians, religious leaders, places of worship and foreign civilians. There is a difference, however, in their motivation. While Al-Qaeda sympathisers may wish to engage in "jihad" as an end in itself, fighters linked to foreign intelligence services would be more interested in spreading chaos in the country. Generally speaking, non-Iraqi groups tend to engage more in "violence" and "terror" than Iraqi groups. The latter have a clearer cause, that of "resistance". It is difficult, however, to imagine that non-Iraqis could wage such lethal attacks without the help of locals linked to outside groups. * The writer is managing editor of the annual The State of Religion in Egypt Report , issued by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
