Abbas Kadhim argues that the Iraqi interim government has no tools to deal with either external or internal challenges Iraq's interim government is dysfunctional. This is the good news -- the bad news is that nothing can be done about this sticky situation. Among the signs of decay in Iyad Allawi's cabinet is the serious lack of unity and concurrence. This is not a trivial weakness, because unity and harmony are prerequisites for the success of the executive branch in every government. A few examples suffice to illustrate this problem. Back in July, Defence Minister Hazim Al-Shalan lashed out at Iran in a tone that reminded us of the rhetoric of Saddam Hussein, calling it the greatest enemy of Iraq. He even went as far as passing threats of conducting terrorist acts in the streets of Tehran. This language, despite its folly, placed Al-Shalan's colleagues in the hot seat, especially those who took residence in Iran before the collapse of the Baathist regime. They raced to the media to distance themselves from Al-Shalan and his provocative remarks. Only the minister of interior, Falah Al-Naqeeb, was supportive of Al- Shalan for a while. Then came the crisis of Najaf. Once again, Al-Shalan and Al-Naqeeb were the hardliners who advocated a military solution to the gathering threat of Moqtada Al-Sadr. The Shia branch of government, while eager to see Al-Sadr defeated, did not want to be associated with a military campaign that might have led to the destruction of the Shrine of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib. Unable to align themselves with either side, they stormed the various talk shows with extravagantly evasive language. Those who lacked the skill to philosophise their untenable positions elected to disappear until the dust settled. My third example is the story of capturing Saddam's deputy, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri. Officials in the government, including two ministers, raced again to the media to give detailed accounts of the battle that took place near a clinic, where Al-Duri went for treatment. After a long day of fascinating stories about the hunt, the government announced that perhaps it was a case of mistaken identity. Then it was impossible to find one Iraqi official to comment on the case. This lack of discipline within the Iraqi interim government is not accidental. Indeed, it is the manifestation of a bigger problem: the members of the cabinet consider themselves above the restraints of their respective positions in the government. As the famed Iraqi poet Ali Al-Sharqi described a similar group: "These are people all of whom are heads; have you seen the onion farm?" -- onion bulbs being called "heads" in Iraqi Arabic. After all, their nominal chief, Allawi did not choose them, like all prime ministers do to a certain degree. They were simply imposed upon him, and for all practical purposes, he is unable to dismiss any one of them. Iyad Allawi is stuck with a concoction of personalities that may compose a parliament rather than an executive branch. However, not all the challenges to this government are within the institution itself. Many challenges are external. In addition to its lack of legitimacy and popular support, this government does not control the vital affairs in Iraq. There are 140,000 soldiers who operate in Iraq and report to foreign governments, not to mention the thousands of mercenaries who control the life and death of everyone in the Green Zone and much beyond. They too are exempt from any laws. This combination of foreign soldiers and "contractors" is the only defence the government has against the increasing militant opposition it faces in almost all parts of Iraq. Another important challenge facing the interim government of Iraq is the potency of unofficial institutions that keep accumulating credit for succeeding where the government fails. It must be humiliating for any official to watch the foreign minister of France, Michel Barnier, meet with a group of clergymen to secure the release of the French journalists taken hostage by anti- government gangs. It is even more painful because it came immediately after the success of Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in securing a deal to save the government from a catastrophic fate in the holy city of Najaf. Relinquishing certain political functions to local figures, religious leaders and tribal sheikhs is not a healthy sign in any government. Can anything be done about this political disarray? It is hard to say. To begin with, this government has no tools to deal with the external challenges. Without credible national forces the government cannot achieve stability in the country. As we have seen, foreign troops have been part of the problem, not the solution. At the present, Iraq is denied any credible army. The same can be said about the institutional challenges. The only possibility for fixing the structure of the government will come, if ever, when a constitution is written. This consociational system is not the way to go in Iraq. At best, it will create a corrupt government and a clientalist society, the seeds of which have already been sown. The proposed parliamentary system will inevitably lead to back- door tyranny. What Iraq needs is a presidential system with direct popular elections and term limits. Otherwise, Iraqis will re- live the notorious days of false democracy prior to 1958 or end up with something far worse.
