The future of Iraq's Shia population hangs in a delicate balance, writes Abbas Kadhim* The US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 created a power vacuum which forced many Iraqis to turn to the only legitimate institution left: Islam. Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the highest Shia theological authority in Iraq, is now in a position to change the culture of political acquiescence that lasted for eight decades, which often resulted in dire consequences for his constituents. After Saddam's regime was toppled, young Shia cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr quickly rose to power and began appointing his own clergy before Ayatollah Al-Sistani and other Shia groups entering Iraq from Iran, Syria and London managed to establish authority. The followers of Ayatollah Mohamed Sadiq Al-Sadr, Moqtada's father, quickly re-grouped and rallied around their new leader. But there are several obstacles in Al-Sadr's path to power. First, he lacks scholarly credentials, the only basis for true power in the Shia community. He is also very young and too brash to be considered for senior leadership. He had hoped to forge an alliance with Ayatollah Al- Ha'eri, his father's closest ally, but Al-Ha'eri chose to stay in Iran and denied him any support. This politically isolated Moqtada and forced him to seek a new path to power. The chaotic situation in Iraq during the year following the occupation presented Al-Sadr with his chance and through his fiery rhetoric and staunch opposition to coalition forces he became a political icon for young energetic Shia. The ineptitude of other Shia leaders, many of whom were silent even when the Shrine of Ali Ibn Abi Talib was bombed, reinforced Al-Sadr's power. The destructive showdown between Paul Bremer and Al-Sadr only served to further cement Al- Sadr's popular support. The Shia comprise the largest group in Iraqi and make up the vast majority of the population of the nine southern governorates and approximately half of Baghdad. They also maintain a sizable minority status in governorates like Diyala, Mosul and Kirkuk. The majority of Iraqi Shia are Arabs, but there is also a significant number who are Turkomen and Kurds. The current situation of the Iraqi Shia community is very delicate and complex. There is a tenuous agreement among Shia groups to give the new government a chance. Yet, every group has different reasons for granting Iyad Allawi's administration this honeymoon period. Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is motivated by purely theological reasons. He does not want to be responsible for any bloodshed as long as there is a possibility for peace. But he also has the power to call his followers to action at a moment's notice, but has chosen instead to pursue a political path. His power has proven to be his trump card as he negotiates the future of his people. The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is cooperating with the government because its head, Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim, helped establish and is an active participant in the current administration. The Supreme Council's support among average Iraqis is too weak for Al-Hakim to rely on grass-roots efforts to gain legitimacy among the people. The same can be said for the Da'wa Party, which has pledged its allegiance to Allawi and has received important posts across the country in return. Moqtada Al-Sadr continues to send mixed messages about his political aspirations. He has given Allawi's government his conditional support, but continues to demand the withdrawal of foreign forces. Allawi reciprocated Al-Sadr's cooperation this week by lifting Bremer's controversial ban on his movement's main mouthpiece, the Al-Hawza paper. But it is a mistake to believe that Al-Sadr's tenuous support is a sign of approval. He is regrouping his forces after the prolonged confrontation with coalition forces and now commands one of the few groups powerful enough to challenge Allawi's government. His exclusion from the interim government was a mistake by the coalition and its Iraqi allies and could turn out to be advantageous for Al- Sadr in the long run. Finally, we must remember that the Shia areas in Iraq are much better off now than during the days of Saddam Hussein and certainly better off than three months ago. If Iyad Allawi eased the emergency laws and unlawful detentions in these areas, he could significantly approve his standing with Al-Sadr and the Shia people. * The writer is a PhD candidate at California University, Berkeley. His book on Shia theology is coming out next month.
