Syrian-United States relations are at an all-time low, writes Anwar Al-Bounni* In recent years Syrian-US relations have been bumpy. Following the collapse of Saddam's regime and the entry of US forces into Baghdad, Washington turned up the heat on Damascus, increasing pressure on several fronts. There was the Syria Accountability Act, the rejection of Syria's offer to return to the negotiating table, the Israeli military strike on Ein Al-Sahib and threats of another strike following the Beersheba operation. UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, an end to interference in Lebanese affairs and the disarmament of Hizbullah, is simply the latest example of the punitive measures now being taken against Damascus. William Burns, US assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, recently visited Syria carrying requests that were conveyed as demand. The US House of Representatives has condemned Syria's human rights record, called for support to peaceful opposition and human rights activists in the country, and called on Damascus to pull its troops out of Lebanon. In order to understand this course of events, one must understand the ways in which changing policies in Washington have altered the rules of the international game. In the earlier dispensation Syria enjoyed a wide margin for manoeuvre, something Hafez Al-Assad used with skill to maintain Syria's regional standing and leverage on both the Lebanese and Palestinian fronts. The late president even used the Kurdish issue to pressure Iraq and Turkey. He backed Hizbullah to keep Israel on its toes, without risking direct confrontation with the Israelis and without getting too embroiled in Cold War rivalries. The end of the Cold War shrank Syria's room for manoeuvre, and Washington's direct military intervention in Iraq underlined this fact. The world's sole superpower no longer needed middlemen in the region. The US is now doing business in a radically different manner. For one thing, the US insists on sweeping changes in the political life of the region. Washington is no longer trying to forge alliances with governments and regimes regardless of their shape and nature. Now, more than ever before, it is focussed on changing societal and political structures. Washington wants regional stability of the kind that serves its own interests and a measure of democracy and development, it now believes, will help reduce harsh reactions to its policies, terror notwithstanding. Syria has yet to understand the full implications of these changes. While Damascus opposed the war on Iraq, fearing the regional repercussions of a democratic regime in Iraq, it has offered no direct assistance to those undermining Iraqi security though it is hard to imagine any one in Damascus losing sleep over the continued turmoil. Damascus has failed to fully comprehend signals sent by the US about Lebanon, about Syria's influence on Lebanese foreign and domestic policy, and about Hizbullah. Damascus wrongly assumes that it has enough bargaining chips to use when the time is right, and labours under the impression that the US will someday need Syria, as it has in the past, to help control the region. Under the new set of international rules Syria's way of doing things becomes increasingly outmoded. This may explain why Europe is finally lending Washington help in upping the pressure on Syria. Europe has offered Syria partnership, financial and technical aid -- a whole raft of offers have been made in the hope that Damascus would accommodate itself to the new reality. All met with procrastination and stonewalling to the extent that the Europeans have now changed tack. The regional game of swapping favours is obsolete. Holding your hand close to your chest no longer gains any one favour. Terror, in all its shapes and forms, is the perceived enemy of the new international order and eliminating terror and drying up its springs -- the wells of poverty, repression, and corruption -- is the primary goal of US-led international policy. Corrupt regimes or individuals, people long used to ruling through repression, will not deflect Washington from pursuing its goals. US policy is unlikely to change, even should Kerry replace Bush, and continued Syrian inability to modify its foreign policy will place Damascus on a collision course with the Americans. The US will continue to press for radical change in countries around the region, and while those changes may be postponed for short-term considerations, such as the need to consolidate the situation in Iraq, US strategic demands are here to stay. Washington's neo-cons believe a more liberal and democratic climate will help alleviate terror. The Syrian regime, which continues to dominate all aspects of life in the country and hold on to regional bargaining chips to shore up its political standing, is an obvious target in their sights. Syria's case is unique. And because of the conflict with Israel one must always view US pressure in the light of Israeli interests and goals. Israel will not agree to any concessions Damascus may offer and will seek to use the changes that have followed the fall of Iraq to weaken Syria: it will constantly prod Washington into pressurising Syria into signing a peace agreement dictated by Tel Aviv. To resist these pressures Syria must democratise; Syrian authorities must introduce democratic reforms allowing citizens to share power, and end repression and human rights abuses. Syria stands at crossroads and Damascus does not have much time to make up its mind. Syrian officials have to prove their goodwill by endorsing democracy and putting their house in order. * The writer is a Syrian lawyer and a member of the Syria's Human Rights Association
