Diaa Rashwan* reviews the history of connections between the Muslim Brotherhood and Western parties Rumours about the external connections of the banned Muslim Brotherhood are a sporadic aspect of Egypt's political landscape. It is customary in Egypt to view the external links of any group, legal or banned, with suspicion: no political movement -- pan-Arab, leftist, liberal or Islamic -- has escaped this. And for several years now the government and the ruling party have been making accusations of this sort against the Muslim Brothers. It is time to look objectively at the Brotherhood's links with the outside world. Since the Brotherhood was created in 1928 the West has taken a close interest in the group. The Brotherhood, for its part, has maintained channels of communication with various Western parties. The Brotherhood, one of the key political forces in Egypt for three-quarters of a century, is hard for either insiders or outsiders to ignore. But Western interest in the Brotherhood has not changed the fact that it is an indigenous and patriotic group that places its perception of Egypt's higher interests at the heart of its theoretical and practical endeavours. We should, however, differentiate between two phases in the history of the Brotherhood's external relations -- pre- and post -9/11. Before 9/11, most external parties with which the Brotherhood dealt were able to differentiate between Islamic moderates and extremists. The moderates, the West believed, should be engaged in political dialogue whereas the extremists were not viewed as credible political partners though it was deemed useful to communicate with them on occasion over security and other issues. Before 9/11 the Europeans and Americans communicated with the Brotherhood both inside and outside Egypt. Most of this communication centred on the Brotherhood's domestic and foreign agenda and the group's influence in the local scene. The Brotherhood, on its part, sought to reassure Western parties concerned about its agenda and to clarify some of the ambiguity that surrounds its goals. Things changed after 9/11. The US took to lumping together Islamic movements, viewing them all as either involved in, or potential supporters of, terror. The Bush administration, for one, saw terror as synonymous with Islamic activism. According to their view all Islamic movements are actual or potential enemies of the US and therefore unworthy of being engaged in dialogue. In the year following the 9/11 attacks the US succeeded in bringing Europe around to its point of view. Consequently, Europe began to associate Islamic movements across the world, including the Brotherhood, with terror. With the outbreak of the Iraqi crisis in September 2002 the views of the US and Europe began to diverge. Many European countries began to question the consequences of US policy on Arab and Islamic countries. The US tendency to use military options in countries close to Europe, in countries with sizeable immigrant communities within Europe, was particularly alarming. Most European countries would eventually revive their former, pre-9/11 approach to moderate Islamic groups, including Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, meanwhile, was aghast at the one-sidedness of US policy on regional and domestic problems in the Arab world. In brief, the Iraqi crisis offered both the Brotherhood and Europe the chance to turn a new leaf. The communication between the Brotherhood and Europe was not without constraints. The Brotherhood could not hold talks with its European interlocutors as a group. Communication operated at a personal, informal level and Brotherhood interlocutors spoke as individuals rather than officials representing a well-established group. European interlocutors, for their part, tended to be junior diplomats. This gave the talks a tentative air. The agenda of talks tended to focus on the Brotherhood's view of Egypt's domestic political scene and on the extent of the group's acceptance of democracy and rotation of power. The talks also touched on the nature of the political system the Brotherhood favours, and its secular-religious aspects. In particular, Coptic rights and the role of Copts in public life featured prominently. The Brotherhood was also asked to provide its views on the Arab- Israeli conflict and terror in the region. What is clear is that these were preliminary talks, aimed at clarifying positions rather than formulating any common ground. Meanwhile, the US war against so- called Islamic terror and the invasion of Iraq were obviously backfiring. Islamic movements, both peaceful and jihad- styled, have proliferated and several new groups emerged intent on using violence against the US and its allies. As a consequence the US perception of the Brotherhood became more unfavourable. Within US political, security, media and academic circles two attitudes developed towards the Brotherhood. A minority concluded that the Brotherhood differed radically from the jihad- styled groups and therefore deserved legitimacy. According to this minority view the Brotherhood could be useful as a buffer against extremist, jihad-styled groups. The majority of US decision makers, however, saw no significant difference between the Brotherhood and "terrorist" groups. The war on terror, they insisted, is a war against all movements, moderate as well as immoderate. In addition to the US tendency to lump all Islamic groups together under the same terror rubric, Islamists in the region are so disillusioned by the US occupation of Iraq that few are in a mood to communicate with the US. The result is that no communication has occurred between the Brotherhood and the US following 9/11. The close relation between Sharon's government and the US administration complicates things further: the current Israeli government views the Brotherhood as an inspiration to both Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Brotherhood, for its part, cannot risk its reputation and hold talks with the Americans at a time when the region is awash with anti-US sentiment. * The writer is managing editor of the annual The State of Religion in Egypt Report , issued by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
